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ABSTRACT

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) defines the estimate o f the difference
between the federal income tax due each year and the amount voluntarily and timely paid
as the “tax gap”. In 1981, the Service reports a tax gap o f 81.5 billion dollars. In 2006,
the most recent IRS data indicates that the tax gap has risen to 345 billion dollars which
suggests that tax evasion in the United States remains a growing concern for the federal
government. Although various economic and nonpecuniary theories have been developed
to investigate tax noncompliance, Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Cruz et al. (2000)
suggest that future research should investigate the importance of ideological factors.
Specifically, this study addresses questions concerning the importance o f religion
and morality with respect to the ethical evaluation of tax evasion intentions.

The

respondents’ levels o f religiousness (i.e., intrinsic versus extrinsic), morality (i.e.,
postconventional reasoning), and ethicality are assessed to develop a structural model of
the ideological factors o f tax compliance. Primarily, the study finds that higher levels of
intrinsic religiousness and postconventional morality are associated with higher
evaluations that tax evasion is unethical. Also, increases in intrinsic religiousness are
significantly associated with decreases in tax evasion intentions controlling for the effects
o f ethicality. However, neither extrinsic religiousness nor postconventional morality is
related to tax evasion intentions in light o f the ethical evaluations.

iv
This study’s results may be used by the IRS to introduce the ideological
phenomena o f religiousness, morality, and ethicality concerning the reduction of the tax
gap-
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Overview
The Internal Revenue Service (hereafter, IRS or Service) defines the estimate of
the difference between the federal income tax due each year and the amount voluntarily
and timely paid as the “tax gap” (IRS 2004). In 1981, the Service reports a tax gap of
81.5 billion dollars (Tanzi 1986). In 2006, the most recent IRS data indicates that the tax
gap has risen to 345 billion dollars which suggests that tax evasion in the United States
remains a growing concern for the federal government (IRS 2011). There are two general
schools o f thought addressing the question, “why do some individuals evade their legal
income tax obligation?” These competing yet complementary groups o f theories are
motivated by either economic or nonpecuniary concerns. The resulting conceptualizations
have led to the inclusion o f several tax compliance phenomena for the development o f tax
research models and tax empirical analyses. Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Young
(1994) delineate the following factors as important, but often inconclusive, determinants
of tax evasion: (1) age, (2) sex, (3) level o f education, (4) level of income, (5) source of
income, (6) occupation, (7) influence o f peers, (8) social norms, (9) perceptions of
fairness, (10) marginal tax rates, (11) complexity o f the tax system, (12) interpersonal
sanctions, (13) party affiliation, (14) religion, and (15) other ideological factors.
Interestingly,

Jackson

and

Milliron

(1986)
1

suggest

that

future

research

2
should investigate the importance o f ideological factors which proposes changing the tax
system to fit people rather than the converse. After outlining the various economic
noncompliance tax factors and behavioral tax evasion phenomena addressing the question
o f income tax evasion, this chapter proceeds by introducing selected ideological elements
that affect tax noncompliance.

Economic Theories

General Deterrence Theory (GDT)
Economists have developed models o f deterrence (i.e., GDT) to mitigate tax
evasive intentions (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Srinivasan 1973; Cowell 1985; Klepper
and Nagin 1989). Collectively, these models assert propositions that income to be evaded
is an optimum function of: (1) visibility o f income (i.e., probability o f detection), (2)
level o f penalty, (3) level of income, (4) tax rate structures, and (5) interactive effects.
However, these models only assume underreporting o f taxable income without tax
deduction overreporting. Furthermore, these conceptualizations impose a simple
proportional tax rate structure rather than a progressive one.
Empirical research has uncovered some interesting findings. First, GDT research
overwhelmingly finds that visibility o f income (i.e., third party reporting to the IRS)
affects the likelihood of detection and is negatively correlated with admitted tax evasive
behavior (Groves 1958, Mason and Calvin 1978; Madeo et al. 1987; Milliron and Toy
1988; Buchheit et al. 2005; Gerxhani and Schram 2006; Aim and McKee 2006; Aim et
al. 2009). This finding holds under cases o f varying detection rates by tax line item
(Klepper and Nagin 1989; Martinez-Vazquez and Rider 2005). In fact, recent IRS data

3
indicates that approximately 55 percent o f the 197 billion dollar individual tax gap is
from self-employed taxpayers’ understatement o f business receipts and/or overstatement
o f business deductions (IRS 2011). Self-employment earnings and deductions are not
highly visible to the Service. Likewise, previous studies are inconclusive, but generally
find that penalty level is negatively related to tax noncompliance (Mason and Calvin
1984; Violette 1989; Carnes and Englebrecht 1995). Last, prior research is mixed
concerning the income level o f taxpayer and the level o f tax rates, but both are primarily
positively correlated with taxpayer noncompliant behavior (Srinivasan 1973; Spicer and
Lundstedt 1976; Clotfelter 1983; Madeo et al. 1987; Aim et al. 1992; Aim and McKee
2006; Aim et al. 2009). Madeo et al. (1987) and Clotfelter (1983) suggest that an
unambiguous prediction could not be made for the main effects o f income level because
of its interaction with source o f income (i.e., opportunity). Furthermore, Madeo et al.
(1987) also find an interactive effect between the tax rate structure and risk propensity.

Prospect Theory
Prospect theory posits that decisions under risk are inconsistent with the axioms
o f expected utility theory because individuals value potential gains and losses more than
final asset states (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman 1992). Specifically, research finds that subjects are risk-adverse when
experiencing pretax filing gain positions and risk-seeking during withholding loss
situations. Furthermore, empirical studies find that individuals do not differentiate
accurately when considering decisions involving small probabilities or experiencing
subadditivity o f decision weights (Jackson and Jones 1985; Dusenbury 1994; Reckers et
al. 1994; Trivedi et al. 2003; Jackson and Hatfield 2005; Sanders et al. 2008; Boylan
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2010). The previous finding may be significant for this study because tax evasion
involves a minor chance (i.e., less than one percent) o f being caught for most taxpayers.
To summarize, economic theories support the explanatory power o f their primary
propositions concerning evasive behaviors o f taxpayers, especially when taxpayer income
is not reported to the IRS by third parties or when pre-filing frame (i.e., overpayment of
tax or underpayment o f tax) is salient for the taxpayer. Therefore, this study incorporates
visibility of underreported taxable income and overreported tax deductions into its
research design. Moreover, because o f the extremely low likelihood o f a tax audit for
which Prospect Theory posits that taxpayers will overestimate the risk o f audit, the
research question changes slightly from “why do some people not comply with tax laws”
to “why don’t most self-employed individuals evade taxes?” Next, this chapter provides
an overview o f the various noneconomic behavioral theories to address this new question.

Noneconomic Theories

Fiscal Psychology Theory
Fiscal psychology theory maintains that a taxpayer’s belief in the system’s
fairness is more salient in alleviating noncompliance than the phenomenon posited by
both GDT and Prospect Theory (Schmolders 1959). Previous research finds mixed results
for the following Fiscal Policy Theory tax factors: (1) tax structure, (2) perceptions o f tax
equity, (3) tax rate level and structure, and (4) complexity of the tax system (Mueller
1963; Spicer and Lundstedt 1976; Song and Yarbrough 1978; Spicer and Becker 1980;
Clotfelter 1983; Mason and Calvin 1984; Arrington and Reckers 1985; Milliron 1985;
Long and Swingen 1987; Collins et al. 1992; Hite and Roberts 1992; Porcano and Price

1992; Forest and Sheffrin 2002; Feld and Frey 2007; McGee et al. 2008). This study
evaluates hypotheses undergirded by the presumption that fairness and ethicality when
interacting with morality and religiousness may affect tax evasion intentions.

Social Norms
In their seminal study concerning the social norms of taxation, Schwartz and
Orleans (1967) find that conscience appeals are more effective than sanction threats.
However, Violette (1989) finds that taxpayer evasive behavior is significantly influenced
by formal legal sanctions rather than informal ones such as appeals to the conscience.
Torgler (2002) finds that social and institutional factors matter even when holding GDT
variables constant. This indicates that taxpayers have a more refined motivation structure
than that assumed by traditional economic theory. Therefore, Aim (1999, p.32) indicates
that researchers must consider the “full house” of theories to explain tax noncompliance.
Studies find conflicting results as to the saliency o f the following social norm
factors: (1) guilt, (2) neutralization o f norms, (3) appeal to the conscience, and (4)
internalization o f norms (Scott and Grasmick 1981; Richards and Tittle 1981; Witte and
Woodbury 1985; Hite 1988; Chung and Trivedi 2003; Wenzel 2004; Manly et al. 2005;
Hasseldine et al. 2007; Bobek et al. 2007; Blanthome and Kaplan 2008). This study
operationalizes

fairness

perceptions

via

the

moral

equity

dimension

of

the

Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) and internalization o f norms using the intrinsic
religiousness measure of the Allport-Ross Religious Orientation Scale (ROS). Bobek et
al. (2007) assess the role o f social norms in Australia, Singapore, and the U.S. and find
that only in the U.S. was there significant correlation between social norms and
compliance intentions. Therefore, in the U.S., paying taxes appears to be the social norm.

Furthermore, Rest (1986) indicates that most adults in the U.S. have a maintaining social
norm level o f moral reasoning and more than eight-five percent o f this study’s subjects
are U.S. citizens.

Theory o f Planned Behavior
Because taxpayers must prepare and file an annual tax return themselves or solicit
the services o f a tax preparer, tax evasion may be considered a planned behavior. Beck
and Ajzen (1991) and others collectively posit that the central phenomena o f the Theory
of Planned Behavior (TPB) are (1) intention to exert effort for individual behaviors, (2)
attitudes about chosen behaviors, (3) social norm influences, (4) perceptions of
behavioral control, and more recently (5) the impact o f moral obligation. Moral
obligation has been found to influence behavioral intent beyond that o f individual
attitudes, perceived abilities, or societal norm concerns (Ajzen 1991; Bobek and Hatfield
2003; Blanthome and Kaplan 2008).
Considering the extensions o f TPB to account for ethical and/or moral ideologies,
this study employs explicit research methodologies to account for resulting interactions
when measuring tax evasion intentions. Specifically, this study measures ethical
evaluation via the MES and moral capacity using the Defining Issues Test (DIT 2) to
determine tax compliance intentions. Both of these scales are discussed in the next
section o f this chapter.

7

Ideological Philosophies

Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES)
Founded on a set o f normative philosophies, Reidenbach and Robin (R&R 1988,
1990) find significant ethical dimensions for moral equity, relativism, and deontological
based contractualism, but not for teleological based utilitarianism or egoism. R&R (1988,
p. 877) say that the contractualism dimension “seems to suggest a more formalized set of
rules and duties, perhaps based on family and religious training....” Their statement
suggests an association between contractualism and religion for some respondents. The
model’s dimensions remain valid while surveying business professions (R&R 1988,
1990; Reidenbach et al. 1991; Flory et al. 1992; Cruz et al. 2000) and college students
(Robin et al. 1996), but an additional dimension (i.e., teleological-utilitarianism) surfaces
when surveying less conservative accounting students and accounting academics (Cohen
et al. 1993) from the northeast region o f the United States.
Empirically, Robin et al. (1996) not only assess the original six-dilemma Defining
Issues Test (DIT 1), but also convert DIT 1 dilemmas into MES scenarios and find that
the MES outperforms the DIT 1 in assessing ethical evaluations and behavioral intentions
o f the subjects. Moreover, Cohen et al. (1996) find that the MES is superior to the DIT in
predicting the actions o f accountants. While Weber (1996) welcomes the contributions of
MES to the moral reasoning literature, he criticizes the research regarding its theory
confusion, instrument confusion, and positive rather than normative conceptualizations.
Nonetheless, he resolves that the MES is a compliment, not a replacement, to the DIT.
More recently, Blanthome and Kaplan (2008) discover significant correlations between
MES dimensions and tax compliance behavioral intent.

8
Religious Orientation Scale
Religion may be defined in terms of cognition (e.g., religious knowledge or
belief), affect (e.g., emotion), and behavior (e.g., church affiliation, church attendance,
Bible reading, or praying). In their study o f churchgoers, Allport and Ross (1967) define
four religious orientations: (1) intrinsics who live their religion, (2) extrinsics who use
their religion for selfish motives, (3) indiscriminates who have both intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations, and (4) antireligious who are neither intrinsic nor extrinsic in nature. Their
study indicates that, excluding antireligious people, intrinsics are the least prejudice
concerning acceptance o f minority groups, indiscriminates are most prejudice, and
extrinsics are moderately prejudice.
With regard to reporting peer unethical behavior, Barnett et al. (1996) measure
religiousness in unidimensional cognitive terms and ethical judgment via the MES (R&R
1990). Their study finds that religiousness is negatively associated with relativism, but
not associated with idealistic behavior such as that associated with the MES moral equity
and contractualism dimensions. Concerning taxation and appeals to the conscience,
Grasmick et al. (1991) find that threat o f shame for intrinsics is a stronger deterrent to tax
evasion than embarrassment for extrinsics. Furthermore, Tittle and Welch (1983) find
that religiousness predicts conformity to rules uniquely prohibited by religious
institutions (e.g., tax evasion), but not necessarily to rules prohibited by society as a
whole which reflects the idea o f normative dissensus o f deviant acts. Moreover, Tittle
and Welch (1983, p. 662) state, “A multidimensional index of religiousness would have
been desirable, but sufficient data to construct one were unavailable in the data set.”
Last, previous research indicates that the DIT is not equivalent to various religiousness
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measures in that they are either independent, inversely correlated, or connotatively
conflictive (Kohlberg 1981: Getz 1984; Richards and Davison 1992). The DIT is
discussed next.

Defining Issues Test (DIT)
Rest et al. (1999) asserts that Kohlberg’s core values o f cognitive moral
development (CMD) consist o f (1) a cognitive emphasis, (2) an effortful construction of
morality, (3) a developmental approach, (4) a shift in thinking, and (5) a macromorality
concept. Within the context o f taxation, Kaplan et al. (1997) manipulate sanction type
and find that tax evasion intentions are significantly lower for taxpayers who utilize
relatively high levels o f moral reasoning (i.e., postconventional thinkers) regardless o f the
level of perceived legal sanctions. In other words, this finding suggests that
postconventional reasoners may not be affected by economic deterrent factors similar to
that o f individuals with lower levels o f moral capacity as measured by the DIT.
Correspondingly, Troutman et al. (1995) assess student taxpayers and find that the DIT 1
P-score is positively related to tax compliance through its determination o f taxpayers’
attitude concerning the fairness of the tax system. However, they determine that moral
development is not directly related to tax compliance intentions. Furthermore, Trivedi et
al. (2003) manipulate probability o f detection, social norms, and fairness covaried with
moral reasoning and find that students’ moral reasoning is positively related to tax
compliance. Moreover, student tax compliance is negatively affected by the level of their
DIT 1 A-Score. This finding suggests that subjects who are highly anti-establishment or
resistant to government have low intentions to comply with the tax system.

However, while administering the updated DIT (DIT 2), Shawver and Sennetti
(2009) find that higher DIT 2 P-score students did not evaluate questionable accounting
actions as more unethical than low DIT 2 P-score subjects. Moreover, the composite
MES score better explains accounting students’ ethical choices and is unrelated to the
DIT 2 P-score, indicating that the two measures quantify distinct constructs. Given these
findings, this study evaluates the complementary aspects o f the DIT 2 and MES with
respect to tax compliance intentions. Furthermore, the new DIT 2 measure (i.e., N2score) is assessed in addition to the P-score and/or the A-score.
To summarize, this study combines several of the methodologies of the previously
mentioned ideological studies. First, it incorporates the eight-item three-dimension MES
to evaluate the ethical evaluation o f tax evasion intentions (M&M 1988, 1990; Flory et al.
1992; Henderson and Kaplan 2005). Second, the current study implements peer
behavioral assessment to eliminate the “halo effect” or “social desirability bias” (Cohen
et al. 1996) and extends the analysis to include subjective social norm evaluations. Third,
Cruz et al. (2000) suggests that future research should investigate which is more
significant, cognitive moral development or personal values, with respect to the
evaluations o f ethical dilemmas and behavioral intentions. By incorporating scales for
both measures (i.e., morality and religiousness, respectively), this study compares the
predictability of moral reasoning and religiosity with respect to tax evasion intentions.
Furthermore, this study assesses the complementary nature of the DIT 2 (i.e., morality)
and the ROS (i.e., personal religious values) with the MES concerning tax evasion.
Fourth, this study considers the interactive effects between the DIT 2 and MES constructs
as suggested by Weber (1996). Fifth, the current research administers the DIT 2 to assess
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moral capacity as did Shawver and Sennetti (2009) and evaluates the study’s results using
Structural Equations Modeling (SEM) which is similar to Henderson and Kaplan (2005).
Sixth, consistent with Bamett et al. (1996), this study infers associations among
religiousness and the moral equity, relativism, and contractualism dimensions o f the
MES. Seventh, this study uses the ROS to address Tittle and Welch’s (1983) concern for
the use o f a multidimensional measure o f religiousness to explain the effects o f religion
on tax evasion (Gorsuch and McPherson 1989). Last, the association between the DIT 2
and the ROS is evaluated for which prior research predicts or finds inconsistent results
(Kohlberg 1981; Getz 1984; Richards and Davison 1992).

Research Questions and Findings
Cruz et al. (2000, p. 239) states, “ ...future research could investigate whether the
effects o f personal characteristics such as cognitive moral development or personal
values influence their deontological and teleological evaluations of ethical dilemmas, and
whether those evaluations in turn influence ethical judgments and intentions.” Based on
the previous statement, this study examined three complementary research questions.
First, do personal religious beliefs matter with respect to the ethical evaluation o f tax
evasion intentions?

Similarly, the second question is whether moral capacity matters

regarding the ethical evaluation o f tax evasion intentions?

The last inquiry considers

interactive effects and questions whether cognitive moral development interacts with
personal religious beliefs considering the ethical evaluation o f tax evasive practices?
Significant findings of the study are as follows. First, addressing the first two
questions, the study finds that higher intrinsic religiousness and postconventional
morality are associated with higher evaluations o f the moral equity dimension o f the
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MES, regardless o f the type of hypothetical tax scenario (i.e., underreporting o f income
or overreporting o f deductions). Second, with respect to the first question, higher
extrinsic religious measures are related to lower assessments of moral equity and implied
contracts as represented by the MES for the hypothetical income tax case and the
combined scenarios, but not for the deduction instance. Third, also considering the first
question, increases in intrinsicness are significantly associated with decreases in tax
evasion intentions considering the effects of the MES dimensions. However, neither
extrinsic religiousness nor postconventional moral reasoning is related to tax evasion
intentions when accounting for MES dimensions. Last, in addition to finding moderate
factor structure invariance for models combining religiousness with morality, R2s for
these models are lower than all other models, especially for higher level postconventional
reasoners.

Organization of the Study
In the next chapter, relevant economic and nonpecuniary literature, including
ideological research streams, are reviewed. Moreover, hypotheses are developed and
posited for the full model. In Chapter Three, the study’s experimental methodology is
described including the subject types to be sampled, the instruments to be used for the
requisite research tasks, and the statistical methods to be employed to validate the study’s
results. Chapter Four reports the results of the analyses, and Chapter Five summarizes the
study and discusses its limitations and extensions.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Overview
There are two general schools o f thought addressing the question, “why do some
individuals evade their legal obligation to pay federal income taxes?” These competing,
yet complementary, groups of theories are the economically based General Deterrence
Theory (GDT) and Prospect Theory and behaviorally motivated theories such as Fiscal
Psychology Theory, Equity Theory, and others. These conceptualizations have led to the
inclusion of several tax compliance phenomena in the development o f tax research
models and empirical tax studies. Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Young (1994)
delineate the following factors as important, but inconclusive, determinants o f tax
evasion: (1) age, (2) sex, (3) level o f education, (4) level o f income, (5) source o f income,
(6) occupation, (7) influence o f peers, (8) social norms, (9) perceptions o f fairness, (10)
marginal tax rates, (11) complexity o f the tax system, (12) interpersonal sanctions, (13)
political affiliation, (14) religion, and (15) other ideological factors. Interestingly,
Jackson and Milliron (1986) suggest that personal ideology may be an important
noncompliance determinant which implies changing the tax system to fit taxpayers rather
than the converse. After outlining the various economic noncompliance tax factors and
behavioral tax evasion phenomena, this chapter proceeds to address the question o f how
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ideological factors affect tax evasion intentions, for religiousness, for postconventional
moral capacity, and for the combination of religiousness and dichotomous levels of
postconventional moral reasoning.

General Deterrence Theory

Overview
Becker (1968) develops an economic theory of crime and punishment which
derives the optimal level o f expenditures for resources to assist law enforcement in not
only apprehending and punishing offenders, but also deterring them from committing
crime. This theory is grounded on the axioms o f expected utility theory and the assertions
of optimizing self-interested behavior. Ehrlich (1973) formalizes and tests general
deterrence theory (GDT) within the context o f individual participation in illegal activities.
The model assumes that those who violate certain laws differ systematically from those
who abide by the same; however, both respond to economic incentives. Rather than
resorting to hypotheses regarding unique personal characteristics and social conditions
affecting respect for the law as did previous research, the model conceptualizes the extent
to which illegal behavior can be explained by the effect o f opportunities given individual
preference and self-interests. Since deviant behavior does not automatically provoke a
penalty, but comes from the probability o f effortful patrol or surveillance, the model
accounts for behavior under uncertainty. The study finds a deterrent effect of lawenforcement activity on all crime which mitigates the otherwise resulting social loss.
Considering the widening o f the tax gap, the study’s findings lend support for
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incorporating GDT to address the question, “why do some people evade their legal
obligation to pay federal income taxes.”

Analytical GDT Tax Models
Economists have developed models o f deterrence to mitigate tax evasion
(Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Srinivasan 1973; Cowell 1985; Klepper and Nagin 1989).
Collectively, these models assume that persons will submit an honest tax return only if it
is optimal for them to do so from a self-interested economic perspective.
First, o f the GDT tax models included in this study, Srinivasan (1973) develops
the least complex one. His conceptualization derives the optimum proportion o f income
to be understated as a function o f (1) true income, (2) the probability o f detection, and (3)
the penalty assessed on the understatement of taxable income. Furthermore, the penalty
assessed for underreporting taxable income is determined by the level o f underreported
income which indicates that there is perhaps an interactive relationship between these
constructs (Madeo et al. 1987). The model posits a direct relationship between income
level and tax noncompliance, but both likelihood o f detection and penalty level should
have an indirect correlation with tax evasive activities. Similar to the criminology models
from which it precedes, Srinivasan’s (1973) model determines the optimal allocation of
resources towards detection o f the criminal offense o f tax evasion. However, this less
complex model holds annual income constant rather than varying it which is more
consistent with the life-time income concept. It also assumes that all taxpayers comply at
some level instead o f accounting for a set o f non-filing taxpayers. Last, the model
captures underreporting o f taxable income, but ignores overreporting o f tax deductions
which is another evasive tax practice.
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Second, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) develop a more dynamic model to
examine various aspects o f tax evasion. This model, like that o f Srinivasan (1973), is
underpinned by criminology theory (Becker 1968), but also includes the finance theory of
optimal portfolio investment. Their analytical model resolves issues that Srinivasan’s
(1973) static model ignores, namely, the interrelationships that exist with other types of
economic choices. Specifically, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model the opportunity to
increase returns to cheating inherent in higher tax rates (i.e., higher tax rates yield higher
incentives for tax evasion). The model also accounts for individual choices related to a
sequence o f annual tax declaration decisions similar to those o f portfolio investment
strategic decisions. However, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) do not structure the effect
of nonfinancial penalties like jail sentences, but rather focus merely on pecuniary cost.
Additionally, the model ignores the potential for dynamically determined court penalties
which depend on the facts and circumstances surrounding those cases, but rather assumes
functionally derived sanctions. Last, the model is simplified by considering a
proportional rather than a progressive tax structure like that of the U.S. federal income
tax system. The results o f their study indicate that accounting for static and dynamic
aspects o f the decision to evade income taxes can allow for a more optimal design o f the
U.S. federal income tax system.
Third, Cowell (1985) expands Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) GDT model of
tax evasion to account for the tradeoff between legal income which is subject to
withholding and illegitimate income which is difficult for governmental authorities to
detect. This model also assumes that some would be taxpayers who earn illegal income
will not file a return at all which addresses a weakness of previous conceptualizations.
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The study posits that taxpayers may divert their work efforts to areas not subject to
withholding to avoid taxation. This may also help to explain the existence of and shifts to
underground economies. Furthermore, their work suggests that an inefficient allocation of
the macro labor market could result from taxpayers’ selection of this evasive tax strategy.
Last, Klepper and Nagin (1989) develop a tax noncompliance model motivated by
previous research’s mixed results for both the penalty level and the income tax rate. This
model is derived from Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data. To
account for the previously stated mixed results for penalty level, they incorporate
nonmonetary penalties into their model and allow detection probability and penalty to be
endogenously determined by tax line item. The resulting factors in their model include:
(1) a flat tax structure, (2) detection probability endogenously determined by the audit
rate of each tax line item, (3) penalties which include nonmonetary ones, (4) taxpayer risk
neutrality, and (5) maximization of expected utility concepts. Because this model
employs the use o f line item tax effects, it may account for multiple modes o f tax evasion
activities between tax return line items. Contrary to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), their
study does not identify a positive relationship between higher tax rates and tax
noncompliance behavior. This suggests that perceived fairness in the income tax system
as determined by tax rate structures may not be a resonant issue among taxpayers.

Empirical GDT Studies
GDT assumes that individuals are economic utility maximizers who will evade
taxes whenever the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs o f tax noncompliance.
The theory’s propositions have been the basis o f several individual taxpayer and
professional tax preparer noncompliance studies, and the theory’s deterrent effects have
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been found significant (Mason and Calvin 1978; Mason and Calvin 1984; Madeo et al.
1987; Violette 1989; Klepper and Nagin 1989; Reckers et al. 1991; Carnes and
Englebrecht 1995; Martinez-Vazquez and Rider 2005; Buchheit et al. 2005; Aim et al.
2009). GDT models (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Srinivasan 1973; Cowell 1985;
Klepper and Nagin 1989) collectively posit the following noncompliance factors and
prior research finds mixed results concerning their saliency: (1) the likelihood of
detection from the visibility o f tax information reported to the IRS, (2) the level of
sanctions or penalties imposed on the taxpayer and/or tax preparer, and (3) the taxpayer’s
level o f taxable income.

Visibility of Income
Prior research overwhelmingly finds that visibility o f income via IRS third-party
information reporting effects the likelihood o f detection and is negatively correlated with
admitted tax evasive behavior and/or tax noncompliance intentions (Groves 1958, Mason
and Calvin 1978; Madeo et al. 1987; Milliron and Toy 1988; Martinez-Vazquez and
Rider 2005; Buchheit et al. 2005; Gerxhani and Schram 2006; Aim and McKee 2006;
Aim et al. 2009). In his seminal study, Groves (1958) investigates Wisconsin residential
landlords and farmers and identifies income source as a significant influence o f taxpayer
noncompliance. Interestingly, the study documents less noncompliance for reporting
fictitious deductions than for omitting income on the income tax returns selected.
Motivated by Groves (1958), Mason and Calvin (1978) survey Oregon taxpayers and find
that opportunity coupled with the probability of not being apprehended have the strongest
correlation with admitted tax evasion. Additionally, Madeo et al. (1987), using a tax
model derived from tax professionals, find that source of income is three times more
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important in predicting tax compliance than either the penalty level, the tax rate structure,
or the taxpayer’s level o f income. In their study, source o f income serves as a proxy for
visibility o f income to the Service. Furthermore, increases in the probability o f audit and
information reporting are hypothesized and found to dissuade tax noncompliance
(Milliron and Toy 1988).
In more recent studies, Buchheit et al. (2005) find that reduced detection risk
caused by lower documentation requirements results in taxpayers overstating legal
deductions for charitable contributions. Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) find that
increased enforcement effort (i.e., probability o f detection) in one mode o f tax evasion
has a net positive effect on tax compliance even though it has a negative effect on non
targeted modes o f tax evasion. This result supports Klepper and Nagin’s (1989)
propositions delineated in their line item analytical model o f tax evasion. Multiple modes
o f tax evasion by tax line item present a means for taxpayers to conceal income tax
evasion efforts. Moreover, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) suggest, among other
things, that the government need only increase income subject to third-party reporting by
a small amount to exponentially increase tax compliance. Aim and McKee (2006) find
that the increase in compliance for participants who have been informed that they will be
audited is more than offset by the decrease in compliance for subjects who have been
informed that they will not be audited. Gerxhani and Schram (2006) compare individuals’
tax evasive behaviors before and after a country’s transition from communism to
capitalism. Their experiment indicates that subjects seem to choose a source o f income
that takes the possibility o f tax evasion into account which can lead to an inefficient
allocation o f the labor market. These results may support Cowell’s (1985) tax model
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predictions of preferences for income that is not reported to the government to increase
tax evasion opportunities and overall income. Last, Aim et al. (2009) conduct an
experiment which manipulates the level o f earned income matched to recipients by the
IRS and the probability o f audit. The study finds that higher unmatched earned income
and lower audit probabilities lead to higher levels o f tax evasion. Aim et al. (2009) also
find, as did Madeo et al. (1987), that the income source is overwhelmingly more
important than other deterrence variables studied for predicting tax compliance.

Penalty Level
Prior research generally, but inconclusively, finds that the penalty level is
negatively related to tax noncompliance as posited by GDT tax models (Mason and
Calvin 1984; Violette 1989; Carnes and Englebrecht 1995). Mason and Calvin (1984),
during their interview of adult taxpayers, find that sanction fear is a stronger incentive to
obey tax laws than the taxpayers’ satisfaction with the tax system. Furthermore, in his
experiment with adult night class students, Violette (1989) finds that communicating
existing legal sanctions may increase tax compliance, but publicly listing tax violators, a
noneconomic form o f social stigma or guilt, does not reduce tax evasion. Previous studies
set detection and penalty rates significantly higher than actual rates. However, even when
penalty and detection rates are manipulated reflecting actual levels, Carnes and
Englebrecht (1995) find that deterrent effects o f sanctions remain significant.
However, in their survey o f Oregon residents, Mason and Calvin (1978) find that
the deterrent effect o f penalties or sanctions seems uncertain concerning admitted evasion
practices. Additionally, Madeo et al. (1987) derive a model based on responses from tax
professionals and test it against IRS TCMP data from a period in which marginal tax
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rates are as high as seventy percent. Their study finds that increasing penalties are only an
effective deterrent for steeply progressive income tax systems rather than moderately
progressive or proportional tax systems. This result suggests that penalty sanctions are
only necessary when the tax system is perceived to be unfair (i.e., steeply progressive tax
rates).

Income Level
Prior studies primarily, but inconsistently, indicate that the level o f taxpayer’s
income has a positive correlation with noncompliant behavior (Srinivasan 1973; Spicer
and Lundstedt 1976; Clotfelter 1983; Madeo et al. 1987; Aim et al. 1992; Troutman et al.
1995; Aim and McKee 2006; Aim et al. 2009). Initially, Srinivasan’s (1973) model posits
this positive relationship between income level and tax noncompliance. Moreover,
Clotfelter (1983) notes that an income level-tax evasion positive relation exists, but offers
conjectures that high income taxpayers are less compliant simply because o f the
interaction with higher opportunities to evade or changes in risk propensities as income
level increases. Similarly, when considering interactions with risk adverseness, Aim and
McKee (2006) find that low- and middle-income taxpayers increased their reported
taxable income when informed that they were likely to be audited, but higher-income
taxpayers continue to underreport taxable income at a significant level. More recently, in
their experiment with student subject which manipulated income visibility to the IRS,
Aim et al. (2009) confirm the general relationship and find that higher earned income
levels o f subjects lead to higher levels o f tax evasion intentions.
However, some studies find either a negative correlation between level o f income
and tax noncompliant behavior or no income level affect at all (Mason and Calvin 1978;
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Mason and Calvin 1984; Cowell 1985; Witte and Woodbury 1985; Madeo et al. 1987;
Collins et al. 1992; Troutman et al. 1995). In their studies o f Oregon taxpayers, Mason
and Calvin (1978, 1984) find a higher level o f tax evasion for people with lower income
levels (i.e., a negative correlation between income level and tax noncompliance). Also,
Cowell (1985) tests his TCMP derived model and the results contradict Srinivasan’s
(1973) model predictions in that Cowell (1985) does not find a significant relationship
between the level o f income and tax evasion practices. Troutman et al. (1995) find similar
results in their survey o f students. Witte and Woodbury (1985) find that middle-income
taxpayers are most compliant and both low- and high-income level taxpayers are
relatively noncompliant in comparison representing a curvilinear relationship. This
nonlinear relationship between taxpayer income level and tax evasion behavior may
account for the inconclusive results o f previous studies. As a result o f mixed previous
results, Madeo et al. (1987) suggest that an unambiguous prediction could not be made
for the main effects o f income level because o f its interaction with source o f income (i.e.,
opportunity). Furthermore, they are not able to posit hypotheses concerning the effects of
the tax rate structure because o f its interaction with income level and risk propensity.
Additionally, Collins et al. (1992) find inconclusive results with regard to the correlation
between income level and noncompliance behavior in their study o f households from the
Southwest and the Northeast regions o f the United States.
A more recent archival study concerning the level o f income sheds light on these
mixed results. Johns and Slemrod (2010) use a newly available data source from the
Service to assess the distributional consequences o f U.S.

federal

income tax

noncompliance. Their study finds that the ratio o f aggregate misreported income to true
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income generally increases with the level o f taxpayer income, but it peaks among
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes in the 99.0 to 99.5 percentiles. However, they find
that the ratio o f underreported tax to true tax is highest for lower-income taxpayers.
These mixed results indicate that income level is an area o f fruitful future research that
may be clarified by behavioral theories. Moreover, the inconclusive findings concerning
level o f taxpayer income suggests that researchers might include income level as a
control variable in future studies.

Prospect Theory

Overview
Prospect theory posits that decision-making under risk is inconsistent with the
axioms o f expected utility theory in that individuals value potential marginal gains and
losses rather than final asset states (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman and
Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Prospect theory may address the risk
propensity concern raised by prior research with respect to interactive effects. The utility
function derived from Prospect Theory is concave for gains and convex for losses rather
than linear. Specifically, subjects are risk-adverse for gain frame points o f reference and
risk-seeking for loss vantage points which indicate that individuals have more disutility
for losses than utility for gains.
Furthermore, individuals’ decision weight perceptions replace those o f actual
probabilities. Specifically, individuals do not differentiate accurately between small
chance choices (i.e., subadditivity o f decision weights), but focus instead on magnitude of
gamble which contradicts relevant axioms o f expected utility. This idea is significant
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because the context of the tax evasion problem for many taxpayers involves minor
chance o f getting caught (e.g., less than one percent). The subadditivity o f decision
weights caused by overestimating small detection probabilities may explain why many
people do not evade taxes as often as expected utility theory and GDT predict. Moreover,
people overweigh certain outcomes (i.e., certainty effect) for a definite amount o f taxes
due compared with some probability that a greater amount will be paid because o f an
additional penalty assessment if caught evading taxes. To summarize, the concept of
subadditivity o f decision weights posits that a very low or certain detection rate may
cause taxpayers to reduce tax noncompliance more than expected utility theory predicts.

Empirical Studies
Empirical research grounded in Prospect Theory has explained the hypothesized
effects o f withholding frame reference points and very low audit detection rates
concerning the subadditivity o f decision weights in light o f tax evasion (Jackson and
Jones 1985; Dusenbury 1994; Reckers et al. 1994; Trivedi et al. 2003; Jackson and
Hatfield 2005; Sanders et al. 2008; Boylan 2010).

Withholding Frame
Two early experimental

studies

investigate

Prospect Theory’s assertions

concerning withholding frame. First, Dusenbury (1994) observes experienced taxpayers
and finds that subjects select riskier filing positions and report less income in payment
due (i.e. loss frame) cases than in refund (i.e., gain frame) scenarios. Furthermore,
participants select riskier options in a nontax loss frame context than in a tax loss frame
environment indicating that subjects respond differently within tax settings as compared
with nontax ones. Also, the study reveals that taxpayers with more filing experience
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preferred riskier filing positions than less experienced taxpayers in both the tax due and
refund reference points. This finding suggests that there is a direct relationship between
filing experience or perhaps age and tax noncompliance. Second, Reckers et al. (1994)
manipulate tax rates (i.e., high and low) and withholding frame (i.e., refund or tax due)
and find that subjects who do not view tax evasion as an ethical issue are influenced by
framing as posited by Prospect Theory. However, when subjects are morally opposed to
cheating on taxes in any amount, withholding position is irrelevant which is contrary to
the tenets o f Prospect Theory. The results o f this study indicate that noneconomic factors
based on psychology, sociology, and/or ideology may explain the inconsistent findings of
prior tax compliance research.
In more recent studies, researchers uncover interesting findings. First, Trivedi et
al. (2003) measure risk preference o f participants and perform an experiment wherein the
subject pay tax on an income endowment for which the recipient puts forth little or no
effort to acquire. Their study finds a negative cause-effect relationship between riskaversion and tax noncompliance. Complementarily, Boylan (2010) finds that when the
taxpayer is given an income endowment, taxpayer compliance increases following an
audit. However, when taxable income is earned and requires comparatively large
amounts o f time and energy to generate, taxpayer compliance decreases following an
audit.

If the reference point is after-tax income in Trivedi et al. (2003), then the

respondent may believe that paying tax is a national duty (i.e., endowed income effect)
and would be risk-averse concerning tax noncompliance. However, if the reference point
is before-tax income, then the subject may believe that paying tax is a loss (i.e., earned
income effect) and could be risk-seeking concerning tax evasive strategies.
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Next, Jackson and Hatfield’s (2005) experimental results indicate that taxpayers
who owe additional taxes consider a pending conservative tax deduction as a threat of
loss because their final state may still be a loss; whereas, those same taxpayers would
view a pending aggressive tax deduction as an opportunity for gain. Conversely,
taxpayers who are due a tax refund consider a pending conservative tax deduction as an
opportunity for gain in that they are likely to retain their positive position. However,
those same taxpayers would perceive a pending aggressive tax deduction as a threat of
loss in light o f the potential cost associated with the probability of detection. With regard
to the Jackson and Hatfield’s (2005) opportunity versus threat perspective, Sanders et al.
(2008) perform an experiment among businesses and find that sanction manipulation is
more effective among taxpayers in a declining revenue state (i.e., loss frame) than in an
increasing revenue state (i.e., gain frame). Perhaps this finding stems from the idea that
risk seeking loss frame taxpayers are more likely to evade taxes than risk adverse gain
frame ones. This outcome partially supports Prospect Theory which asserts that subjects
will be risk seeking for losses; however, this risky attitude is diminished when the
taxpayer is made aware o f tax evasion sanctions (i.e., GDT effects).

Subadditivity of Decision Weights
Although most of the prior studies incorporating Prospect Theory to explain their
findings are based on withholding frame concepts, an early experimental study of
subadditivity o f decision weights highlights interesting results. Jackson and Jones (1985)
compare the level o f detection risk with the magnitude o f the penalty level and determine
that the penalty is more salient, especially when the probability o f occurrence is
extremely low (i.e., when subadditivity o f decision weights exists). Moreover, consistent
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with Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), Jackson and Jones (1985) also find
that those taxpayers are risk seekers for potential losses.
To summarize, economic theories generally, but inconclusively, support their
primary propositions concerning evasive behaviors of taxpayers, especially when taxable
income is not reported to the IRS by third parties or when pre-filing frame is salient for
taxpayer. Therefore, this study incorporates visibility o f underreported taxable income
and overreported tax deductions into its research design. Moreover, because of
invisibility o f some types of income (i.e., self-employment income) and the low
likelihood of a tax audit for many taxpayers, the research question changes slightly from
“why do some individuals evade their legal income tax obligation to pay income taxes” to
“why don’t most individuals evade income taxes when their income is not visible to the
Service?” Next, this study employs various noneconomic behavioral theories to address
this significantly different question.

Fiscal Psychology Theory

Overview
Contrary to economic models o f tax evasion, Schmolders (1959) studies the
motivational and emotional layers o f taxpayers’ minds in his development o f a theory of
fiscal psychology. Soon after World War II, professional interviewers cross-examine a
large sample of West Germans from all walks of life regarding their general taxmindedness. The study finds that tax evasion is unfamiliar to most, and many believe that
only businessmen and professions are able and willing to evade taxes (i.e., opportunity).
This study also finds that tax resistance starts only after a certain threshold o f taxation has
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been surpassed. Fiscal psychology theory maintains that a taxpayer’s belief in the tax
system’s fairness is more salient in alleviating noncompliance than the penalty structure
and risk as posited by both GDT and Prospect Theory, respectively.

Empirical Studies
Studies grounded in Fiscal Psychology Theory hypothesize that decreasing the tax
rate, the level o f sanctions, and the probability of audit will increase tax compliance
through
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complexity and is hypothesized to increases tax compliance (Porcano 1984, Milliron and
Toy 1988). However, a decrease in allowed deductions for low- or middle-class taxpayers
may be perceived as inequitable (Milliron 1985) and result in reduced tax compliance.
Based on distributive justice to increase equity and to deter tax evasion, Porcano (1984)
surveys graduate students and indicates that, from an equity perspective, taxpayer need
and ability to pay are the most significant variables that should be utilized when
formulating tax policies as opposed to self-interest motivations o f the taxpayergovernment exchange. Also, the study finds support for the idea that negative tax is
appropriate for low-income taxpayers, and respondents favor extending the earned
income credit to this group o f taxpayers whether they have dependents or not.
Milliron and Toy (1988) investigate seven key features o f tax compliance: (1)
deductions permitted, (2) IRS information services, (3) information reporting, (4)
preparer penalties, (5) taxpayer penalties, (6) probability o f audit, and (7) tax rates. Their
study finds that CPA subjects considered reducing tax rates to be the most important
feature for mitigating noncompliance. Furthermore, the study determines that subjects
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preferred an overall compliance system with a flatter tax structure that maintains or
reduces the applicable penalty. These results are consistent with the propositions o f Fiscal
Psychology Theory, which assert that the taxpayer’s belief in the tax system, not
increasing penalties, is the solution for reducing evasive tax behavior (Song and
Yarbrough 1978, Collins et al. 1992).
Song and Yarbrough (1978) conduct personal interviews with some subjects
while others respond to a self-administered questionnaire to measure their general
attitudes towards taxation. The study finds that North Carolina taxpayers in a college
town are dissatisfied with the federal income tax burden placed by the government on the
middle-class. Moreover, the study’s participants believe that the government provides
unequal opportunities among taxpayers for reducing their individual tax burdens.
However, most respondents have faith in the administrative efficiency o f the taxing
authority, believe that they pay the same amount o f tax as others in similar situations,
receive a similar benefit as taxes paid, and feel that people should pay taxes according to
their ability. Collins et al. (1992) mail a random survey to households in the Southwest
and the Northeast regions of the United States and evaluate the results o f a contingency
model o f tax noncompliance. The study finds that return complexity, tax evasion
opportunity, and tax system unfairness are significant and positively related to
noncompliant tax behavior for all contingency subgroups. Their dependency model
improves predictions compared with those o f less dynamic models, but subgroups vary
significantly making it difficult for the government to implement a single strategy to
minimize tax evasive behavior. However, Arrington and Reckers (1985), in their pursuit
to uncover a link between noneconomic factors and tax evasion, find that student
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subjects’ views regarding the equity o f national revenue and expenditure programs did
not influence their responses concerning tax evasion. This result is contrary to the
predictions o f Fiscal Psychology Theory perhaps because there may be insufficient
subject perception variation for students. Hence, student subjects may not be an
appropriate surrogate for adult taxpayers when predicting tax evasion.
Based on the mixed results from the preceding discussion, the following Fiscal
Policy Theory factors appear to be important: (1) fiscal policy and the tax system, (2)
fairness perceptions, (3) tax rate level, and (4) tax system complexity. Next, this chapter
addresses each of these factors in turn citing relevant empirical research as supporting
evidence.

Fiscal Policy and the Tax System
In an early Fiscal Policy Theory study, Mueller (1963) interviews taxpayers and
reports several significant outcomes. First, large majorities o f Americans have favorable
attitudes toward a number of major government expenditure programs and did not favor
less spending. Second, respondents exhibit a high level o f support for spending to help
the elderly and the needy and to educate Americans, but little support for spending to
help other countries, to support agriculture, or to explore space. Third, concerning
government programs which subjects indicate should receive more spending, the list did
not change much when asked whether they would pay more taxes to support the
programs. Fourth, debt reduction is favored by many, but interestingly it has less priority
in most people’s minds than the expansion of a number o f government programs. Fifth,
when asked for their preferences o f money allocations if defense spending is reduced,
most respondents favor spending more on other programs (i.e., welfare, public
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construction, education, etc.) rather than reducing debt or cutting taxes; however,
wealthier individuals favor the latter. Sixth, contrary to intuition, upper income groups do
not favor extension o f government programs less than lower income groups, but upper
income groups favor spending on different programs. Seventh, many people favor greater
expenditures to programs from which they are not likely to reap direct personal benefit
which contradicts exchange theory. Last, age differences are small, but people over fiftyfive years of age prefer less government spending, lower taxes, and reduced budget
deficits.

Fairness Perceptions
Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) conduct a survey and find that perceived inequities
in the taxpayer-govemment exchange (i.e., exchange theory) and the number o f tax
evaders known by the taxpayer (i.e., neutralization of social norms) are positively related
to the likelihood o f tax evasion. The results indicate that including psychological and
sociological variables adds new and useful insights to the study of economic behavior for
tax compliance. Specifically, perceived inequity, personally knows tax evader, and
previously audited by the IRS are positively related to tax noncompliance intentions;
whereas, age and income demographic variables are uncharacteristically negatively
related. Furthermore, Lewis (1979) conducts interviews to measure different aspects of
tax mentality and discovers several important findings concerning perceived tax fairness.
First, people with higher incomes feel that legal tax avoidance is fair while those with
lower incomes do not. Second, wealthy taxpayers do not believe that they have an unfair
advantage because o f loopholes; whereas, low-income earners belief the well-off have
disproportionate opportunities for tax evasion. Third, people with higher incomes feel
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that small amounts o f tax evasion should be treated leniently, but lower income taxpayers
do not. Fourth, in opposition to lower income earners, higher ones believe that the
progressive tax system is unfair. Last, the relationship between taxation and services
received through public expenditures (exchange theory) is not an important part o f tax
mentality. In essence, the study’s results collectively suggest explanations for the
generally positive relationship between level of income and tax evasion intentions despite
the findings o f Spicer and Lundstedt (1976).
Additionally, concerning fairness perceptions, Hite and Roberts (1992) conduct a
survey to determine whether the Tax Reform Act o f 1986 was successful in improving
public perceptions of fairness and economic growth as described by Adam Smith as
factors o f an effective system o f taxation. The study finds that perceptions o f fairness,
simplicity and helpfulness to the economy are negatively related to tax noncompliance.
Furthermore, perceptions o f fairness better explained the participants’ reactions to tax
system changes than did economic self-interest. Relatedly, Klepper and Nagin (1989) test
an empirical model and find, among other things, that individuals with poor opportunities
for noncompliance perceive the tax system as inequitable.
In two more recent studies, fairness is assessed referencing taxpayer-government
behavioral relationships. First, Feld and Frey (2007) find that tax paying citizens are
willing to honestly declare income even if they do not receive a full public good
equivalent in return for their tax payments as long as the political process is perceived to
be fair and legitimate. Furthermore, friendly treatment o f taxpayers by the taxing
authority in the tax audit processes reduces future tax noncompliance compared with
more hostile treatment o f taxpayers. Second, McGee et al. (2008) survey university
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students from Hong Kong and the United States and find that ethical scores differ by
country, but that the strongest arguments justifying tax evasion are in instances where the
government is corrupt or where the tax system seems unfair. Conversely, the weakest
arguments for validating tax evasive practices occur when taxpayers rationalize their
actions based on their admitted selfish motivations.

Tax Rate Level
Compared with a control group, Spicer and Becker (1980) find that the percent of
evasion is highest among those who are told that their tax rates are higher than average
and noncompliance is lowest among those informed that their tax rates are lower than
average. The study’s results support inequity theory which predicts that victims of
inequity experience anger and evade taxes because they pay higher than average tax rates.
Furthermore, inequity theory asserts that beneficiaries of inequity feel guilt and refrain
from tax noncompliance which further explains why some would be taxpayer evaders
comply with the tax system.
In an archival study using the IRS TCMP database, Clotfelter (1983) finds that
taxpayers equate lower marginal tax rates with a fairer tax system. More importantly,
perhaps because o f this mental assessment, they decreased their level o f tax evasion
intentions. This finding is significant because increasing marginal tax rates may drive
more o f the economy underground which has the potential to reduce tax revenue receipts
and to widen the tax gap (Cowell 1985). Moreover, Porcano and Price (1992) survey
taxpayers and tax preparers and find that practitioner perceived tax rate structures and
constrained deductions as less fair than that o f the overall tax system which might
contribute to tax preparer tax aggressiveness.
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Mason and Calvin (1984) interview adults responsible for keeping tax records and
find that dissatisfied honest taxpayers are unwilling to employ noncompliance tactics to
cope with feelings o f inequity. Moreover, a higher proportion o f dissatisfied honest
taxpayers compared with that o f dissatisfied dishonest taxpayers believe that people cheat
because tax rates are too high. However, deterioration in public confidence in tax system
is not associated with an increase in admitted income tax evasion, but may be in the long
run if social norms concerning tax noncompliance are neutralized in the United States.

Tax System Complexity
Milliron (1985) uses multidimensional scaling (MDS) for her exploratory study of
tax complexity factors. The study finds that subjects view complexity and equity as
inversely related features o f the tax system independent o f demographic and attitudinal
control variables. Explicitly, four dimensions of tax complexity surfaced which include:
(1) the nature o f the topic, (2) the quantitativeness o f applying the tax law, (3) the
vulnerability o f law to misuse, and (4) the readability o f tax passage. The general
perception across taxpayers is that simplifying the tax law is consistent with improving
equity. However, efforts to improve fairness by refining tax laws to account for variations
in personal and economic circumstances increases complexity. Similarly, Long and
Swingen (1987) administer a questionnaire to professional tax preparers and use
exploratory factor analysis to reveal factors o f tax complexity for selected tax return line
items. The most salient o f these complexity factors are (1) excessive details, (2)
numerous calculations, (3) confusing forms, and (4) ambiguity.
From a different perspective, Porcano and Price (1992) survey taxpayer and tax
preparers and find that they differ substantially in perceptions in that tax practitioners
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have a higher fairness rating for the overall tax system. Conversely, findings among
taxpayers indicate that equity and complexity perceptions may have a major impact on
their compliance behavior. Additionally, taxpayers only perceive taxing unemployment
compensation as less fair than their assessment o f the overall tax system. Yet, both
taxpayers and tax practitioners perceive providing relief to needy as a very fair criterion
for assessing the tax system and consider equal treatment of taxpayers in similar
situations as a judgment criterion most frequently linked to tax provision fairness.
However, in a more recent study, Forest and Sheffrin (2002) find that simplifying the tax
system may not be an effective deterrent to tax evasion because taxpayers do not
necessarily consider a complex tax system as an unfair one which supports the conjecture
o f Milliron (1985). Furthermore, Pope and Mohdali (2010) give greater weight to
ideological factors such as religiousness and spirituality in determining the extent to
which people meet their legal tax obligations because o f personal perceptions o f fairness.
This study posits hypotheses undergirded by the presumption that fairness and
equity perceptions when interacting with moral capacity and religiousness may have a
significant effect on tax evasion intentions. This idea is explored in more depth after a
discussion o f impact o f social norms and the theory o f planned or reasoned behavior.

Social Norms and the Theory of Planned Behavior

Social Norms Overview
In their seminal study concerning the payment o f federal income taxes, Schwartz
and Orleans (1967) perform an experiment to compare the effectiveness o f sanctions with
that of appeals to the conscience. They find that conscience appeals are more effective
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than sanction threats perhaps because those appeals induce a moralistic attitude towards
tax compliance. However, the tax evasion effect for conscience appeals and sanction
threats are both significantly different from that o f the control group indicating that each
possesses explanatory power. Moreover, conscience appeals seem to produce less social
loss through resistance which may be caused by the taxpayer’s sense o f civic
responsibility compared with that o f the threat o f punishment. In opposition to the
findings o f Schwartz and Orleans (1967), Violette (1989) conducts an experiment
manipulating sanction communication type from formal (i.e., legal penalty threats) to
informal (i.e., guilt and appeal to conscience) and finds that taxpayer evasive behavior is
not affected by informal sanction communication, but significantly minimized via formal
legal sanctions. This result suggests that formal penalties may increase taxpayers’
perceptions o f the likelihood o f getting caught or other deterrent phenomenon.
To assess the impact o f social norms on tax morale and tax evasive behavior,
Torgler (2002), in his descriptive review o f prior literature, defines social norms as
consisting o f prescribed behaviors which must be shared by other people and sustained
by others’ approval or disapproval through the informal social sanction o f reciprocity.
The study finds that individuals who comply tend to view tax evasion as immoral. In
societies, like the United States, which have a strong sense o f social cohesion, tax
compliance may be higher if a moral or social appeal is made to the taxpayer rather than
an economic threat. However, individuals with tax evaders as friends are more likely to
not comply themselves because their social norms have been neutralized. Overall, the
study finds that holding GDT influences constant, social and institutional factors matter.
This indicates that taxpayers have a more refined motivation structure than that assumed
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by traditional economic theory; therefore, researchers must consider the “full house” of
theories to explain tax noncompliance (Aim 1999, p. 32).

Social Norm Empirical Studies
In light o f the previously discussed literature, the following social norm factors
appear salient: (1) Guilt, (2) Neutralization o f Norms, (3) Appeal to Conscience, and (4)
Internalization o f Norms. This study describes these factors in ascending order of
commitment to the maintenance o f social norms with guilt referencing the weak-end and
internalized norms anchoring the strong-end o f the continuum. Next, this section
addresses each o f these factors, in turn, citing relevant empirical research as supporting
evidence.

Guilt
Scott and Grasmick (1981) develop and test an analytical model o f utilitarian
cost-benefit theory with respect to tax noncompliant behavior. On one hand, the study
finds that, at high levels o f inhibition caused by the threat o f legal sanctions, injustice
motivations are not strongly related to noncompliance behavior. Specifically, individuals
who are outraged about social injustice are inhibited from tax evasive behavior because
o f pecuniary perceptions. On the other hand, at a low level o f inhibition because o f mere
guilt feelings, a significant relationship occurs between injustice motivation and
noncompliance behavior. Furthermore, in the absence of inhibition from legal sanctions
or guilt feelings, higher social injustice motivation is related to a greater likelihood of
noncompliant tax behavior. These results suggest that feelings of guilt interact with social
injustice perceptions to cause tax noncompliance only when the threat o f penalty is low.
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One’s peers could provide motivation to comply with tax laws if feelings o f guilt
or reciprocity deter tax noncompliance. However, if taxpayers’ peers are tax evasive
themselves, then taxpayers’ social norms concerning tax compliance may be neutralized
which could cause them to evade taxes. In light o f peer influence, Witte and Woodbury
(1985) derive an empirical model from actual tax return data and find higher rates of
evasion when the taxpayer’s community and peer groups are noncompliant. However,
Hite (1988) conducts an experiment using prospective jurors and discovers that peer
compliance-noncompliance experimental manipulations do not directly affect selfreported tax evasion intentions. These mixed findings indicate the need to conduct future
studies to determine the effectiveness o f guilt for mitigating tax noncompliance intentions
as it relates to social norms.

Appeals to the Conscience
Given the inconclusive prior research results for appeals to the conscience, Chung
and Trivedi (2003) measure the effect o f friendly persuasion and gender on tax evasion
intentions. The researchers have participants in the friendly persuasion group first
generate and then read a list o f reasons why they should comply with the tax laws. The
study contributes two significant results to the literature. First, consistent with previous
research, the authors find that women are less tax evasive than men. The second result is
much more interesting. Women in the friendly persuasion group report significantly
higher amounts o f income compared with that o f men in the same group; however, there
is not a significant difference in tax evasion intentions in the control group o f men and
women. These findings indicate that appeals to conscience may have a positive effect on
income tax compliance, especially for women.
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In an effort to evaluate tax non-filers’ motivations to complete their returns
through amnesty programs, Manly et al. (2005) assess respondents reactions to
enforcement efforts through federal-state data sharing programs. These efforts emphasize
deterrence through the threat o f income visibility to the IRS and friendly persuasion
through tax amnesty communications which accentuate social norms. The study finds that
tax amnesty programs encourage taxpayers who want to avoid penalties and feel morally
or socially obligated to pay taxes; whereas, letters from data-sharing programs increase
amnesty participation by self-employed and higher income taxpayers. These results
indicate that both enforcement measures (i.e., data sharing program letters) and outreach
efforts (i.e., amnesty programs) may be effective means o f capturing non-filers because
these methods appealed to different types of taxpayers. Furthermore, federal-state data
sharing programs attract compliance from two types o f taxpayers for which previous
research suggests are highly evasive: the self-employed and the wealthy. In a more recent
study, Hasseldine et al. (2007) manipulate type o f appeal at five levels on a continuum
from normative appeal to sanction appeal to test the actual evasive behavior o f selfprepared and paid-preparer sole proprietors in the United Kingdom. The study finds that
taxpayers reported increases in gross revenues and net income after receipt o f the
normative appeal or sanction appeal. Interestingly, the researchers find that the sanction
letters are generally more effective than the normative citizenship appeal letters for
reporting income which further highlights the inconsistency o f normative versus sanction
appeal results.
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Neutralization of Norms
In their study of adults in the United States, Richards and Tittle (1981) find that
women perceive tax noncompliance detection risk higher than do men. Specifically,
women perceive tax noncompliance o f others lower than do men indicating that m en’s
social norms are probably neutralized more than that o f women. Hence, males are more
noncompliant than females; however, women are closing this tax evasion gap via an
apparent neutralization o f their social norms.

Moreover, this effect has seemingly

occurred over time perhaps not only due to women’s perceptions of others’ tax
compliance, but also potentially interacting with their changing role in society.

Internalization of Norms
Wenzel (2004) investigates the moderating and mediating effects of personal and
social norms on GDT. Schmolders’ (1959) argument that research needs to incorporate
noneconomic factors such as norms, fairness, and morality in order to better understand
tax compliance, rather than mere economic self-interest as posited by GDT, motivates
this study. Wenzel (2004) and other studies measure personal norms, social norms, and
ethical beliefs and find that internalized norms o f tax honesty and ethics moderate the
effects o f GDT concerning the underreporting o f taxable income (Reckers et al. 1994,
Blanthome and Kaplan 2008). This suggests that the deterrent effects o f GDT only occur
when individual ethics are relatively weak.
Bobek et al. (2007) define social norms as rules and standards that are understood
by members of group that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force o f law.
Moreover, social norms are categorized on a continuum from more general societal
influences to more personal influences or internalized norms. First, beginning on the
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more general end o f this spectrum, descriptive norms are casually observed standards of
others’ behavior. Next, injunctive norms specify individual behavior with respect to
group expectations. Following injunctive norms, subjective norms relate to expectations
of referent others (e.g., family and friends). Last, personal norms are one’s self-based
standards or internalized expectations o f appropriate behavior. Bobek et al. (2007) find
that internalized personal and subjective norms are more important than descriptive and
injunctive norms for explaining subjects’ tax noncompliance intentions. Furthermore,
descriptive norms are not found to be significantly related to the subject’s tax evasion
intentions under any circumstance.
Since studies find mixed results for the effect o f guilt, neutralization o f norms,
appeal to conscience, and internalization o f social norms as predictors o f tax
noncompliant behavior, future research should address this concern. It appears that these
studies measure norms and fairness by means that are not well tested in the literature.
Therefore, this study assesses fairness and equity using the Multidimensional Ethics
Scale (MES) as it assesses the likelihood o f taxpayer noncompliance. Furthermore, this
study measures the internalization o f religious beliefs based on the intrinsic and extrinsic
orthogonal measures o f the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS). Internalization o f moral
beliefs is measured based on the level o f postconventional reasoning as assessed by the
Defining Issues Test (DIT 2). Moreover, subjective norms and peer influences are
considered while assessing the likelihood o f tax evasion intentions.

Theory o f Planned Behavior Overview
Ajzen (1991) and Beck and Ajzen (1991) posit that the central phenomenon o f the
Theory o f Planned Behavior (TPB) is the intention of an individual to exert effort for
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given behavior. TPB extends the Theory o f Reasoned Action which asserts that the
determinants o f the intention to put forth effort are the evaluations o f alternative
behaviors (i.e., opportunities) and subjective social norms (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977). In
addition to behavioral evaluations and social norms as precursors o f intentions, TPB
posits that behavioral control or the relative ease or difficulty o f overcoming past or
anticipated obstacles is a significant predictor o f behavioral intentions. The theory
predicts that more favorable behavioral attitudes, higher levels of subjective norms, and
greater perceived behavioral control, result in a stronger intention to perform the behavior
in question. Hence, intention depends on a person’s real or perceived access to resources,
his or her assumed ability, and one’s supposed cooperation of others to determine the
probability o f successful completion o f the desired outcome or behavior.
Reckers et al. (1994, p. 826) states, “ ...prior research (investigating tax rate
effects and/or prospect theory’s framing effects) has been inconclusive in that the moral
beliefs o f some subjects may have overridden other factors affecting tax compliance.”
Considering the interactive effects of morality, Bobek and Hatfield (2003) extend TPB.
Moral orientation is expected to be an important determinant of behavioral intent beyond
the influences o f the individual’s behavioral attitudes, abilities, and/or societal norm
concerns. The results of this and other studies are discussed in the next sections.
TPB Empirical Studies

Non-Taxation Study
In their empirical study of students concerning cheating, stealing, and lying, Beck
and Ajzen (1991) find that TPB predicts deviant intentions with a high degree of
accuracy and with moderate success foretells actual behavior. Furthermore, TPB is more
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successful in predicting cheating than shoplifting or lying perhaps because their
participants had more experience cheating or maybe because shoplifting and lying come
more impulsively rather than as planned actions. Regardless, adding perceived moral
obligations to the prediction equation improves the theory’s ability to explain subjects’
lying behaviors, but does not help predictions for deviant acts of cheating or shoplifting.
Because TPB is more successful in predicting cheating than other behaviors, the theory’s
constructs may be significantly associated with tax evasion intentions.

Taxation Studies
Bobek and Hatfield (2003) first determine the beliefs that underlie taxpayers’
attitudes and then ask subjects to respond to three tax compliance scenarios. This study
has several interesting findings. First, the model which includes moral obligation,
measured by the perceived moral wrongness o f the action, significantly explains tax
noncompliance in all of the scenarios evaluated. Second, if moral obligation is low,
almost all o f subjects cheat. Third, when moral obligation is very high, a significant
amount o f cheating still occurred which is contrary to the finding o f Reckers et al. (1994).
This finding suggests that interaction effects of moral obligation, possibly with fairness
perceptions, appear to be more complex than originally hypothesized. Fourth, virtually no
cheating occurs only when moral obligation is high and perceived behavioral control (i.e.,
opportunity) is reduced but not completely eliminated. Fifth, guilt and concern for
legality o f behavior directly relate to tax compliance intentions, and the informal concern
for illegality is greater than that o f formally incurring a legal penalty which contradicts
Violette (1989). Last, taxpayers’ attitudes and perceived social pressures are influential in
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all scenarios. The study suggests that social influences and perceived behavioral control
may improve voluntary compliance more than ethical beliefs and moral obligation.
In their survey o f mostly flea-market vendors, Blanthome and Kaplan (2008)
uncover several interesting results concerning the relationship among opportunity, social
norms, and ethical behavior concerning self-reported tax noncompliance behavior and
hypothetical tax evasion intentions. First, the study indicates that ethics partially mediates
the relationship between opportunity and self-underreporting behavior. Specifically,
taxpayers with high opportunity to underreport income judge underreporting to be less
unethical than those with low opportunity to underreport income which is consistent with
previous research (Schmolders 1959; Lewis 1979). Moreover, beliefs that underreporting
income is unethical are negatively associated with self-reported noncompliant tax
behavior. Furthermore, controlling for ethical beliefs, opportunity has a significant
positive relationship with taxpayers’ self-underreporting tax behavior. Second, ethics
partially

mediates

the opportunity-behavioral

underreporting ethics is negatively associated with

intention

relationship.

Explicitly,

underreporting intentions at a similar

magnitude as self-underreporting tax behavior. Moreover, controlling for ethical beliefs,
there is a direct relationship between opportunity and underreporting intentions but
weaker than that o f self-underreporting behavior. Last, ethical beliefs fully mediate the
social norm-tax behavior relationship. More precisely, social norms have a significant
direct relationship with underreporting ethics; however, controlling for ethics, the
relationship between social norms and self-underreporting behavior is not significant.
This result indicates that individuals internalize social norms which indirectly affect tax
evasion

intentions

and actual

underreporting decisions.

However,

contrary

to
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expectations, taxpayers with a high opportunity to underreport income do not judge social
norms for underreporting less unethical than those with a low opportunity for tax evasion.
Considering TPB for ethical and moral interactions of taxpayers, this study
employs explicit research methodologies to account for these interactions when
measuring tax evasion intentions. Specifically, this study measures the ethical evaluation
o f tax evasion intentions via the MES which is discussed in the next section o f this
chapter. Also, this study assesses moral capacity using the Defining Issues Test (DIT 2)
which is discussed in a later section o f this chapter.

Ethical Evaluation
As the prior sections o f this study have indicated, internalized personal norms are
powerful predictors and/or moderators o f tax evasion intentions. Specifically, there
appears to be a negative relationship between personal norms and tax noncompliance.
After considering the effects o f ethical evaluation, the remainder o f this chapter outlines
the relationships between personal norms as indicated by religious orientations and moral
capacity as they relate to the ethical evaluation o f tax evasion intentions.

Multidimensional Ethics Scale
In an initial development o f their model o f ethical behavior founded on normative
philosophies o f deontology, utilitarian teleology, egoist teleology, relativism, and justice,
Reidenbach and Robin (R&R 1988) survey students in a basic marketing course. Subjects
are provided contextual stimuli to evoke their ethical evaluation processes. The
Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) investigates not only one’s detailed ethical beliefs,
but also one’s reasons for his or her beliefs. The subjects assess the probability that they
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would act in the same manner as the person in the hypothetical unethical scenario after
rating twenty-nine items associated with the aforementioned normative philosophies. The
study’s significant factors satisfy the tests o f consistency and reliability normally
performed to validate similar scales and result in an eight item instrument with three
independent dimensions. The subsequent dimensions are justice based moral equity,
contextual based relativism, and deontological based contractualism. Factors grounded in
teleological-utilitarianism, which focus on societal cost-benefits, and teleological-egoism,
which measure selfish motivations, prove not to be significant. To summarize,
individuals tend to rely on a broad sense o f moral equity dominated by concerns for
fairness and justice, tempered by relativistic behaviors and implied social contract
deontological ideas. However, results do not support the contention that individuals are
affected by the consequences o f teleology.
Furthermore, no one philosophy is assumed for ethical evaluation and decision
making. Rest et al. (1999) suggests that individuals mature from personal interest
thinking to society maintaining and postconventional moral reasoning. Postconventional
thinkers are concerned about maintaining an ideal societal structure for all members o f a
community which must be open to scrutiny. The dominance of the ideas o f fairness and
justice in the moral equity dimension of the MES is rooted in Kohlbergian and NeoKohlbergian notions that these concepts are involved in all ethical decision-making
regardless o f the individual’s stage o f moral development. Interestingly, R&R (1988, p.
877) say that the contractualism dimension “seems to suggest a more formalized set of
rules and duties, perhaps based on family and religious training....” Their statement
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suggests an association between contractualism and religious orientation for some
respondents.
Moreover, the model is tested surveying business professions (R&$ 1990), retail
marketing professionals (Reidenbach et al. 1991), and business and nonbusiness students
in a basic economics course (Robin et al.

1996). R&R (1990) find that the

multidimensional scale is a significantly better predictor for most unethical scenarios
compared with univariate measures o f ethicality. In addition to subjects assessing their
likelihood of making the same decision as the protagonist in the scenario, the respondents
evaluate the probability that their peers would make such a judgment. This method of
evaluation minimizes the bias often evident in self-reports o f deviant behavior (i.e., the
“halo effect” which asserts that respondents evaluate themselves more favorably than
actual) and incorporates the concept o f subjective social norms o f referent others. R&R
(1990) suggest that the moral equity dimension focuses on the inherent fairness, justice,
goodness, and rightness o f decisions. The relativistic dimension seems to indicate that
societal and cultural guidelines define our ethical beliefs rather than individual concerns.
Furthermore, R&R (1990) indicate that the moral equity dimension may be defined by
the broad relativism dimension in that each dimension has overlapping items o f differing
moral philosophies. Last, the contractualism dimension is purely deontological and
incorporates the idea of implied social contracts with institutions and society including
implicit notions o f fair play and truth telling. R&R (1991) find that the three dimensions
remain significant for most of their experimental trials; however, a few trials indicate that
moral equity and relativism combine into one large dimension while contractualism
remains independent.

48
In addition to administering the MES, Robin et al. (1996) not only assess the
original six-dilemma Defining Issues Test (DIT 1), but also convert the DIT 1 dilemmas
into MES-like scenarios to compare students’ evaluations o f the contextual differences of
the settings. Two DIT 1 scores are assessed in this study: the P-score and the U-score.
Briefly, the P-score measures the percentage o f moral thinking at the highest moral
reasoning stages (i.e., postconventional morality) and the U-score evaluates the
utilization o f moral reasoning in the decision making process. It appears that DIT
scenarios are direct, single issue stories about a potentially unethical situation and contain
few complexities; while the MES scenarios offer alternative problems and possible
rationalizations for acting unethically. Presumably because cognitive moral development
(CMD) measures (i.e., the P-score and the U-score) are designed to measure moral
cognition rather than behavior, the MES outperforms the DIT 1 in assessing the subjects’
ethical evaluation and behavioral intent. Specifically, the moral equity dimension is most
significant, but both the relativism and contractualism factors of the MES individually
outperform the CMD measures. Furthermore, the MES outperforms the DIT 1 even when
predicting the behavioral intentions of the DIT 1 scenarios.

MES Empirical Studies

Non-Taxation Studies
Since R&R (1988, 1990) survey marketing student and marketing professional
subjects from conservative Southern states,

Cohen et al. (1993) question the

generalizability o f the study’s results. Cohen et al. (1993) replicate R&R’s (1988, 1990)
study substituting more liberal Northeastern state participants for the more conservative
Southern ones. Like that o f R&R (1988, 1990), the study finds that the multivariate scale
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has better explanatory power than univariate ethics measure for the marketing scenarios;
however, the finding does not persist for accounting contextual scenarios. Furthermore,
the teleological-utilitarian construct which relates to a “cost-benefit” or a “greater good”
approach to ethical evaluation emerged for more conservative accounting academics
evaluating accounting scenarios, somewhat contradicting R&R (1988, 1990). This
finding suggests that since cost-benefit analysis is the cornerstone o f accounting decision
making, the utilitarian dimension may be important for accounting academics and not
marketing academics.
However, in their national questionnaire o f accountants, Flory et al. (1992) find
results that confirm R&R’s (1988, 1990) three MES dimensional findings for accounting
ethical decision-making. Flory et al. (1992) use four realistic accounting context MES
scenarios to examine how accountants make ethical decisions. Since accounting is
centered on the establishment o f pragmatic, rule-oriented codes intended to regulate
public practice, philosophical discussions about good and evil are largely avoided.
Consistent with this idea, their study finds that the three dimensions (i.e., moral equity,
relativism, and contractualism) capture a substantial amount of the decision dynamics
used by accountants to make ethical judgments in a financial context.
In another study, Cohen et al. (1998) compare subjects based on gender and
university major (i.e., accounting versus non-accounting). The research finds that women
and accounting students are more likely to evaluate questionable actions as more
unethical and less likely to state an intention to perform the unethical action than male
and non-accounting student respondents, respectively.
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Taxation Studies
Cruz et al. (2000) study tax practitioners from two of the big five accounting
firms and find factor support for R&R (1990)’s moral equity, relativism, and
contractualism dimensions along with Cohen et al. (1993)’s utilitarian dimension.
However, the utilitarian dimension is not significant for any of their tax dilemmas with
respect to ethical evaluation, and only important in one case for behavioral intentions of
the subject. This finding also somewhat refutes Cohen et al. (1993)’s claim that costbenefit utilitarian reasoning is central to accountants’ moral reasoning and may question
the overall fairness o f the tax system. Furthermore, the MES, compared with univariate
measures, appears to be most useful in situations that pose relatively difficult tax ethical
dilemmas for the respondents.
While administering a questionnaire to adults, Henderson and Kaplan (2005)
assess the relationships among ethical orientations, ethical evaluations, and tax
compliance behavior using Structural Equations Modeling (SEM). Subjects complete the
MES including two tax scenarios based on cases used by Kaplan et al. (1997), an ethical
orientation deontological-teleological scale, global tax ethical beliefs assessment, and tax
system fairness assessment to provide interesting research findings. First, participants
moderately believe that tax evasion is wrong in any amount and taxes are necessary to
keep the society running smoothly, but somewhat disbelieve tax laws are enacted and
administered fairly. Second, in predicting tax compliance, moral equity is positively
related to tax compliance and has a larger effect for the expense scenario than the income
case, even though the income case is also positively related to tax compliance and
significant. Third, relativism and contractualism are only significant for the tax expense
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case; whereas, all dimensions are important when evaluating the taxable expense and
taxable income cases simultaneously. Last, there is a direct relationship among ethical
orientation and ethical evaluation and tax compliance; however, ethical orientation is
only indirectly associated with tax compliance behavior through ethical evaluation.
Overall, the study finds that ethical orientation is a complementary antecedent to MES
dimensions.

Religious Orientation
Religion may be defined in terms of cognition (e.g., religious knowledge or
beliefs), affect (e.g., emotion), and behavior (e.g., church affiliation, church attendance,
reading about religion, or praying).

Beliefs and Emotions as Measures o f Religiousness
Barnett et al. (1996) surveys business students to assess relationships between
religiousness and ethical ideology, ethical ideology and ethical judgments, and ethical
judgments and intentions to report peer wrongdoing. The study measures religiousness in
cognitive and affect terms, rather than a behavioral standpoint such as church attendance.
Furthermore, ethical ideology is measured using Forsyth’s (1980) Idealism-Relativism
Scale, ethical judgment is measured via R&R’s (1990) MES instrument, and behavioral
intent is measured considering Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) Theory o f Reasoned Action.
The study finds that religiousness is negatively associated with relativism, but not
associated with idealism. Moreover, idealism is positively associated with judgments that
peer reporting is ethical suggesting that idealists are concerned about others and believe
that peer unethical action might harm the society. Also, relativism is negatively
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associated with judgments that peer reporting is ethical perhaps because relativists
believe that it is impossible to make accurate ethical judgments about another’s behavior
without knowing all circumstances that led to the behavior. Last, judgments that peer
reporting is highly ethical is associated with stronger behavioral intentions to report a
peer’s unethical behavior. This finding is consistent with the Theory o f Reasoned Action
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1977) or the Theory o f Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991). Concerning
this study, Barnett et al.’s (1996) findings link religiousness to MES dimensions (i.e.,
moral equity, relativism, and contractualism).

Church Attendance and Church Affiliation as
Measures o f Religiousness

Non-Taxation Studies
During their study which surveys students entering junior- and senior-high school,
Hirschi and Stark (1969) measure religiousness via church attendance because it serves as
a surrogate that internalizes moral values, legitimizes legal authority, and reinforces the
concept o f supernatural punishment and rewards. They find that church attendance and
belief in the supernatural are not deterrents to juvenile delinquency. This finding may be
the result o f children not internalizing their religious beliefs, but simply casually
identifying with the beliefs of their parents. However, these children are slightly more
likely to respect conventional authority.
McDaniel and Burnett (1990) conduct a national mail survey and compare
religious commitment, measured via cognitive and behavioral attributes including church
attendance, with religious affiliation to assess consumer behavior concerning retail
market attributes. McDaniel and Burnett (1990, p. 103) define religion as “a belief in God
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accompanied by a commitment to follow principles believed to be set forth by God.” For
all levels o f religious commitment, the study finds a consistent positive relationship with
importance placed on sales personnel friendliness and helpfulness, but inconsistent
associations with product quality and availability o f credit at some levels o f religious
commitment. To the contrary, religious affiliation is not supported at any level indicating
that it may not be important in the United States. The authors suggest that while the
typical consumer is in a state o f flux, religiousness may tend to be stable over a
reasonable period o f time which can serve as a basis for marketing strategies.
Conroy and Emerson (2004) study the effect o f religiousness as measured by
church attendance and ethical and religious curricula on students’ ethical attitudes. Their
study finds that church attendance significantly correlated with ethical perceptions while
ethical and religious courses do not. Specifically, church attendance generally reduces the
acceptability levels o f the unethical vignettes assessed in the study. However, for one
scenario, church attendance unexpectedly increases acceptability when a male candidate
is hired over equally qualified female applicant since the supervisor thinks that
employees would resent being supervised by woman. The authors suggest that this
extraneous result could either be because males dominate church leadership or
religiousness is correlated with tradition. Nonetheless, in response to the study’s findings,
the authors state (p. 384), “ ...perhaps believers in God are less willing to act unethically
because they believe that an omniscient God will ‘catch’ them in the act - or by
extension, know their unethical thoughts or attitudes.” With respect to other important
factors, the study finds that subjects who are female, non-white, over 23, or graduate
students generally have reduced acceptability levels for the unethical vignettes. The
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authors suggest that these demographic characteristics may be used as control variables
for future studies o f the effect of religiousness on ethical evaluation.

Taxation Studies
Tittle and Welch (1983) extract data from interviews of residents o f Iowa, New
Jersey, and Oregon to determine whether religiousness, measured by church attendance,
inhibits nine different deviant behaviors within various contexts. The contextual
properties include: (1) normative dissensus among respondents concerning the morality
o f deviant acts, (2) social integration with the community, (3) perceived conformity with
respect to committing deviant acts, (4) aggregate religiousness as measured by religious
affiliation, and (5) status inequity as measured by dispersion of a socio-economic status
(SES) variable. The study finds that tax evasion is the only of nine deviant behaviors
significant for all five contextual characteristics. Moreover, the extent to which
religiousness influences conformity varies directly with general normative dissensus.
These findings may suggest that religiousness predicts conformity to rules uniquely
prohibited by religious institutions (e.g., tax evasion), but not to rules prohibited by
society as a whole which reflects the effect of normative dissensus. Furthermore, Tittle
and Welch (1983, p. 662) state, “A multidimensional index o f religiousness would have
been desirable, but sufficient data to construct one were unavailable in the data set.” This
study incorporates the use of a multidimensional measure o f religiousness (i.e., intrinsic
and extrinsic religiousness) which is discussed in the next section o f this chapter.
Torgler (2006) conducts a multivariate archival analysis o f data from the World
Values Survey and finds that religiousness as measured by church attendance is
associated with rising tax morale, even when government corruption, trustworthiness, and
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demographic and economic factors are controlled. Specifically, the study finds that being
an active member o f a church group increases one’s probability o f believing that tax
evasion is never justifiable. This more recent finding suggests that tax evasion is less
likely for persons with higher levels o f church attendance or other religious behavioral
attributes.
Similarly, in a current archival tax study, Boone et al. (2013) measure
religiousness as the fraction o f the U.S. county-wide population that claims affiliation
with an organized religion. The study predicts and finds that religiousness is positively
related with tax compliance for both corporations and individuals. Concerning individual
taxpayers, the authors assert that perhaps their findings are the result o f the religious
person’s higher level o f risk aversion and potentially their perceived guilt from the
violation o f religious-based social norms. Their result is consistent with that o f Witte and
Woodbury’s (1985) finding that higher rates o f tax evasion occur when the taxpayer’s
community and peer groups are noncompliant. However, Boone et al. (2013)’s finding
contradict that o f Tittle and Welch (1983) which suggests that societal normative
dissensus affords religion a greater influence on tax compliance intentions.

Religious Orientation Scale

Non-Taxation Studies
In their study o f churchgoers, Allport and Ross (1967) define two measures which
produce four orientations o f religiousness in their development o f the Religious
Orientation Scale (ROS). First, people with an extrinsic orientation find religion useful
for providing security and solace, sociability and distraction, and status and self
justification. These persons turn to God, but not away from selfish motivations. Second,
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intrinsic religious people embrace and internalize a creed. Allport and Ross (1967, p.
434) characterizes these two poles o f the religious continuum by stating, “ ...the
extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated lives
his religion.” The third and fourth religious orientations are indiscriminately proreligious
(hereafter, indiscriminates) and antireligious. These religious orientations are simply
extensions based on mean evaluations o f the intrinsic-extrinsic measures. Indiscriminates
highly endorse all items that seem favorable to religion in any sense (i.e., both extrinsic
and intrinsic items); whereas, antireligious people disagree with items on both intrinsic
and extrinsic scales. Since their study surveys churchgoers, none o f the participants are
categorized as antireligious. However, o f the remaining religious types, their study
indicates that intrinsics are the least prejudice concerning acceptance o f minority groups,
indiscriminates are most prejudice, and extrinsics are moderately prejudice. These
findings support the authors’ hypothesized religious characterizations.
In his meta-analysis o f the factors of religiousness (i.e., intrinsic, extrinsic,
indiscriminate, and antireligious), Donahue (1985) assesses their correlations with other
constructs and highlights several important findings. First, intrinsic religiousness is
uncorrelated rather than negatively correlated with prejudice across most anti-black
measures, but extrinsic religiousness is positively correlated with this prejudice measure.
These findings partially support Allport and Ross (1967) in that Donahue (1985) finds
support for extrinsic outcomes, but not for intrinsic ones. Second, extrinsic religiousness
is positively correlated with religious close-mindedness, but intrinsic religiousness is
uncorrelated with such dogmatic attitudes. Third, extrinsic religiousness tends to be
positively correlated with negatively evaluated characteristics and uncorrelated with other
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measures o f religious belief and commitment; whereas, intrinsic religiousness tends to be
uneorrelated with negatively evaluated characteristics and positively associated with
other measures o f religiousness. Fourth, intrinsic and extrinsic factors are orthogonal
dimensions rather than a continuum as originally assessed by Allport and Ross (1967).
Last, the ROS based on median splits o f the two scales is o f little use when the dependent
variable is religious in nature, but various nonreligious variables produce results that may
correspond to findings of curvilinearity observed with other measures o f religiousness.
Gorsuch and Venable (1983) develop an “Age Universal” ROS scale and find that
it compares favorably to the original ROS scale for adults and children with a fifth grade
reading level or higher. Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) refine the “Age Universal” ROS
scale by studying middle school, junior high school, high school, and college students to
assess the subdivision of the ROS extrinsic construct into three components: personally
oriented extrinsicness, socially oriented extrinsicness, and reverse intrinsicness. Their
results indicate that reliabilities are equal to or better than those o f the original scales.
Furthermore, the reversed intrinsic items seem to indicate something other than religion
is important while increasing the level o f overall reliability o f intrinsicness while
counterbalancing the intrinsic scale against acquiescence bias. Concerning the two new
“E-scale” measures, Gorsuch and McPherson (1989, p. 353) state that they are
“empirically distinctive.... However, the scales need further work to determine whether or
not they differentially predict criteria.”

Taxation Study
Grasmick et al. (1991) describe people who have a strong religious identity
salience or internalized religious convictions as intrinsic, and those who are involved in a
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social network based on religion as extrinsic. They interview adults and find that the
threat o f shame emanating from religious identity salience (i.e., intrinsics) is a stronger
deterrent to cheating on taxes than embarrassment o f those involved in a social network
(i.e., extrinsics); however, both religious types are significant. Furthermore, religiousness
measured by identity salience or church attendance has a greater negative effect on
inclination to cheat on taxes than do gender, race, socio-economic status, and political
conservatism. Overall, this study indicates that intrinsic religious persons and persons
with higher levels o f church attendance tend to have higher tax compliance intentions.

Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) and
Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES)
Multidimensional ethic philosophies encompass ideas of fairness, justice, social
contracts, obligations, consequences, and greatest goods which can be found in the Bible,
the Koran, the writings o f Buddha, and in other religious or spiritual written works. Two
studies relate the ROS with the MES. First, Clark and Dawson (1996) investigate the
influence o f religiousness in the formation of ethical judgments for business activities.
The study provides an initial framework relating the orthogonal religious measures (i.e.,
intrinsicness and extrinsicness) with the moral equity dimension o f the MES. They find
that intrinsics rated the unethical actions o f the protagonists in the scenarios as more
unethical than extrinsics, but interestingly less unethical compared with non-religious
participants. The authors offer several explanations o f the variation between intrinsics
and non-religious participants. First, intrinsics may perceive fewer viable alternatives and
evaluate the consequences o f those alternatives differently. Second, intrinsics may tend to
be more concerned with interpersonal relationships and social customs (i.e., utilitarian
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norms). Third, intrinsics may place higher values on forgiveness and obedience and
therefore internalize less demanding duty and justice conceptualizations. Last, intrinsics
may experience conflicts between teleological work ethic coupled with its commensurate
benefits and deontological future orientation which rejects the importance o f material
things. Perhaps these conflicts cause intrinsics to be less concerned with and therefore
less condemning o f minor unethical

lapses especially in moderately unethical

circumstances.
Second, Wiebe and Fleck (1980) find that intrinsic religious persons tend to be
more moral, more conscientious, and more disciplined suggesting that intrinsic religious
commitment may affect ethical judgments. In light of this finding, Knotts et al. (2000)
study religiousness (i.e., ROS intrinsic scale only) among other factors that may affect the
ethical decision-making process (MES moral equity dimension only). Their research
finds that females, business students, and intrinsics judged MES scenario actions as more
unethical which partially contradicts Clark and Dawson (1996). With respect to religious
commitment, the authors say, “Therefore, these results suggest the need for greater
attention to religiousness and its influence on ethical decision-making” (Knotts et al.
2000, p. 162).
To address the concern o f Knotts et al. (2000), this study relates both the intrinsic
and extrinsic orthogonal measures o f the ROS with all three dimensions o f the MES (i.e.,
moral equity, relavatism, and contractualism). Based on the author’s review o f prior
literature, this relationship has not been examined for tax compliance.
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Moral Reasoning
Cognitive Moral Development (CMD)
Kohlberg (1981) asserts that morality is a philosophical or an ethical rather than a
behavioral concept. Furthermore, an adequate psychological explanation o f cognition or
of morality must include an explanation o f the universality o f these concepts throughout
humanity. Consistent with this idea, Kohlberg derives his theory from the works of Kant
and Rawls. First, Kantian morality assumes a moral judgment based on conformity to an
ideal norm, instead o f one that adheres to particular circumstances or cultures. Second,
Rawls’ moral philosophy asserts that inequality is only justified if it is acceptable to the
person in the most disadvantaged position. The sentiment o f this view is similar to that of
the Golden Rule (i.e., “one should treat others the way that he or she would prefer to be
treated”) which is observed by many o f the world’s religions. This study discusses the
implications o f religion as it relates to morality later in this chapter.
Contrarily, relativists believe that there are no universal human values because
each culture or society determines its own moral values. Although rational ethics may be
considered prescriptive in that it is guided by rational standards, relativism is generally a
descriptive doctrine. Kohlberg (1981) states that the naturalistic fallacy results from the
attempt to derive prescriptive statements from descriptive ones. He emphasizes that even
if there are observed cultural or societal differences in moral judgment, there are moral
principles that can reconcile these differences and lead to consensus. Kohlberg (1981)
suggests twenty-nine categories o f morality consisting o f modal elements (e.g., obeying
or consulting), value elements (e.g., seeking rewards or avoiding punishment), and
societal norms (e.g., preservation o f life).
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Rest et al. (1999) asserts that Kohlberg’s core values o f Cognitive Moral
Development (CMD) consist o f (1) a cognitive emphasis, (2) an effortful construction of
morality, (3) a developmental approach, (4) a shift in thinking, and (5) a macromorality
concept. First, a cognitive emphasis is asserted because one must understand how people
make sense o f the world (i.e., their worldview) in order to comprehend their moral
behavior. Second, the individual’s construction o f his or her basic categories o f morality
(e.g., justice, duty, right, and social order) are aggressively self-constructed, not passively
absorbed through their cultural surroundings. Moreover, the highest level o f moral
development constructs a moral point o f view by imaginatively taking the roles o f all the
participants in the dilemma with all the contextual information available to each person
(Rest et al. 1999).

Third, development of moral judgment evolves from simple to

complex with gradual transition periods. Fourth, a shift in thinking occurs from
conventional maintenance of social norms to postconventional ideas for which rules,
roles, laws, and institution serve some sharable concept o f cooperation which must be
open to scrutiny. Last, postconventional moral reasoning is macromorality or m an’s
interaction with formal institutions o f society rather than m an’s micromoral face-to-face
interaction with people o f close relations. A specific postconventional macromoral
concern is equity in economics which includes paying a fair amount o f taxes to the
government for the support of public institutions which is the central theme o f this study.
Flowever, critics o f CMD object to the view that the most advanced moral
thinking is independent individual cognition apart from others who may have a stake in
the moral decision. Furthermore, opponents cite that stage three, seeking interpersonal
concordance, is unjustly portrayed as being primitive to stage six, loyalty to abstractions
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or societal institutions. Munsey (1980) rejects CMD in that the philosophy asserts
principlism o f one rule or one method o f reasoning over others. Specifically, CMD favors
a “bottom up” morality based on theories o f justice instead of a “top down” common
morality o f the community or relativism. However, Rest et al. (1999) note that, in a
democratic society like the United States, open discussion, debate, and disagreement are
inevitable and can lead to societal justice rather than Kohlberg’s fear— mindless
conformity to the status quo.

Levels (Schemas) and Stages o f CMD
Prior research summarizes Kohlbergian and Rest’s Neo-Kohlbergian moral stages
o f development and indicates each stage’s motivation for action (Munsey 1980; Rest et
al. 1999; Bebeau and Thoma 2003) including faith or religious motivations (Kohlberg
1981). Rest et al. (1999) concludes that the Defining Issues Test (DIT) which
operationalizes CMD empirically supports only three schemas which are combinations of
five o f the six Kohlbergian stages. Furthermore, the three DIT schemas allow researchers
to describe the developmental aspect o f moral judgment and the construction of basic
moral concepts. These DIT schemas are described in addition to Kohlberg’s moral stages.
Also, Kohlberg (1981) describes faith stages that parallel moral ones which are also
addressed in this section.

Stages One and Two
First, the preconventional level has two stages which indicate a person’s
responsiveness to cultural rules and labels o f right or wrong based on one’s self-interest.
In stage one, action is motivated by avoidance o f punishment and conscience is the fear
o f punishment. Physical outcomes determine an action’s rightness or wrongness
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regardless o f the moral value o f these consequences. Concerning the parallel faith stage,
responsiveness to God’s rules replaces that o f societal laws. In stage two, action is
motivated by desire for reward or benefit in mutual exchanges. Right actions consist of
what maximizes the individual’s utility and occasionally the utility o f others. For the
complementary faith stage, exchanges between God and mankind supplant those between
individuals. Clearly, the theory underlying preconventional action is associated with the
preventative effects o f general deterrence theory (GDT) in that punishment is avoided or
self-interest is sought and morality is disregarded. Therefore, persons with an affinity to
preconventional behaviors should not evade taxes when deterrence factors are high and
should be noncompliant when these factors are low or absent. Furthermore, the
preconventional level seems to be theoretically related to the teleological egoism
orientation which asserts that individual morality is grounded on cost-benefit
consequences to actions in light o f the individual’s selfish interests. However,
preconventional thinking is primarily found in adolescents and seldom observed in adults
who are the focus o f this study.

Stages Three and Four
Second, the conventional level considers the individual’s expectations o f family,
group, and nation as valuable from the perspective o f maintaining a good society
regardless of individual consequences. It seems to be interconnected with the teleological
utilitarian “greatest good” or a relativistic theoretical orientation. Conventional moral
thinking is the morality o f maintaining social norms because persons at this level believe
that these norms are the most appropriate way o f doing things in society. This cognitive
style embraces micromoral concepts which include: (1) displaying courtesy and
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helpfulness to others; (2) caring in intimate relationships; (3) observing personal events
o f friends and family; (4) being punctual for appointments; and (5) generally acting in a
decent, responsible, empathic way in one’s daily dealing with others. This level also has
two stages. In stage three, action is motivated by the actual or imagined disapproval of
others (e.g., guilt for committing actions that are contrary to social order). Good behavior
is defined as what pleases or helps others and is approved by society. The corresponding
faith stage substitutes the disapproval o f others for that o f God. Furthermore, guilt
feelings are magnified at this stage because God is now considered a personal friend as
well as an all knowing eternal being.
In stage four, action is motivated by anticipation of dishonor or failure as
perceived by one’s social group. Right behavior consists o f doing one’s duty, showing
respect for authority, and maintaining social order. The related faith stage asserts that
moral rules are internalized and driven by one’s conscience. The action basis o f the
conventional level moves an individual from GDT motivations towards the sentiments
and loyalties described by Fiscal Psychology Theory (i.e., fairness). Specifically, since
social norms have been found to moderate the deterrent effects o f GDT (Reckers et al.
1994, Wenzel 2004, Blanthome and Kaplan 2008), persons with strong conventional
behaviors may be more likely than preconventional thinkers to be tax compliant
irrespective o f deterrent levels. Furthermore, social institutions reinforce this attitude by
mediating conflicting claims, promoting the common good, and codifying such practices
into institutionalized laws such as those found in the Internal Revenue Code.
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Stages Five and Six
Last, at the postconventional level, a clear effort is made to define moral values
and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority o f the groups
holding these principles (i.e., family, peers, and nation) in order to proactively create,
rather than maintain, a just society. This type o f moral thinking holds a macromoral point
o f view which includes: (1) rights and responsibilities o f free speech, (2) due-process
rights o f the accused, (3) nondiscriminatory work practices, (4) freedom o f religion, and
(5) equity in economic and educational opportunities. Because Kohlbergian Theory is
concerned with the possibility o f establishing a system o f cooperation at a society-wide
level, such as that required for a country’s system of taxation, impartiality or fairness
among participants is demanded. The postconventional level has two stages. In stage five,
action is motivated by concern for maintaining respect for equals, for the community, and
for one’s self based on reasons o f justice rather than those o f emotion. The comparable
faith stage posits that God and man will combine to create a community in which dignity
and freedom prosper. This stage separates postconventional thinkers from conventional
reasoners, where the former are rational moral agents aware of fundamental universal
rights which a moral society must protect for all o f its members and the latter are biased
by loyalties to associated persons and groups.
In stage six, action is motivated by concern about self-condemnation for violating
one’s internalized principles and integrity. The individual is concerned with selfdetermined universal principles o f justice, with reciprocity and equality o f human rights,
and with dignity o f human life. For the parallel faith stage, there exists a natural or
common law which unites principles o f justice with the ultimate. Additionally, Kohlberg
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(1981) suggests a seventh moral stage based on the sentiments o f the sixth religious
stage. This ultimate moral stage is not only concerned about integrity and oneness with
people and all o f life, but also the confrontation and defeat of despair which universal
principle awareness alone is unable to conquer. The actions o f the postconventional level
embody the philosophy of Fiscal Psychology in that perceptions o f fairness and justice
are important in both. Low penalty and tax rate structures have been found to indicate a
fair tax system. Therefore, persons with postconventional tendencies should be tax
compliant only when the tax system’s penalties, rates, and other tax structure factors are
perceived to be fair; otherwise, they will likely evade taxes.

Defining Issues Test
The Defining Issues Test (DIT 1 or DIT 2) operationalizes the measurement of
moral capacity and has been administered in over four hundred studies (Bebeau and
Thoma 2003). The DIT activates and assesses moral schemas in terms o f importance
judgments. The instrument uses a bottom-up fragment strategy to state just enough of
argument to activate one’s moral schema with a top-down method o f not stating too much
to encourage concept-driven processing (Rest et al. 1999). Lawrence (1978) suggests that
less developed subjects do not select high-staged items because they do not comprehend
them, and more developed subjects do not select low-staged items because they prefer
high-staged ones. The DIT schemas, personal interest, maintaining norms, and
postconventional, capture the essence o f Kohlbergian stages, but are somewhat different.
The personal interest schema o f development (i.e., Kohlberg’s stages two and three) is
concerned with teleological egoism; whereas, the maintaining norms schema (i.e.,
Kohlberg’s stage four) is associated with relativism. Furthermore, the postconventional
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schema (i.e., Kohlberg’s stages five and six) emphasizes society-creating with a
deontological justice orientation. Therefore, the DIT is able to distinguish between
maintaining norms and postconventional thinking. On one hand, maintaining norms
reasoning involves doing one’s duty guided by the authoritarianism o f governmental
control. On the other hand, society-creating postconventional reasoning recognizes that
the law may be inequitable, should be open to scrutiny, and should appeal to a sharable
social ideal.
The newer DIT instrument (i.e., DIT 2) updates the dilemmas and items used to
activate moral reasoning. Furthermore the DIT 2 is shorter than the original DIT 1 and
fewer subjects are purged during its reliability checks. The validity and reliability o f the
DIT 1 and DIT 2 have been robustly tested. First, their measures differentiate groups
assumed to be o f greater or lesser expertise in moral reasoning (i.e., formal moral
education improves scores). Second, an upward change in longitudinal studies is evident
in that each higher level o f education increases P-scores by about ten points indicating
that higher levels o f education challenge subjects to reexamine their perception o f the
moral

basis o f society. Third,

higher P-scores are associated

with

advanced

comprehension of moral concepts, higher job performance, and greater ability to
reconstruct moral arguments, but they are not necessarily related to moral action or
behavior. Fourth, to improve the measure’s predictability, the N2-score has been
developed for the DIT 2 and has greater internal reliability than that o f the P-score. The
N2-score measures the extent to which the subject ranks postconventional items highly
while avoiding rating personal interest items as important.
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To address the concern that the DIT is biased towards liberals, McGeorge (1975)
asks first-year teachers college students to respond to the DIT as if they are either liberal
or conservative. The study’s results indicate that the students are not able to fake high
DIT 1 P-scores, but are able to fake low ones. However, there is some concern about the
scale’s ability to significantly predict political attitudes, political choices, and societal
participation (Bailey et al. 2010). To compensate for political concerns, the DIT 2
includes a measure of political identification and religious attitudes to produce an
orthodoxy-progressivism scale which accounts for about two-thirds o f the variance on
positions o f divisive public policy issues such as abortion, school prayer, gay and lesbian
rights, women rights, and free speech. Bebeau and Thoma (2003) suggest that
understanding the development o f moral judgment is crucial to comprehending the great
ideological divide between conservatism and liberalism.
When questioning whether the Kohlbergian CMD philosophy should be
abandoned by accountants, Bailey et al. (2010) analyze prior research and find mixed
results concerning the Kohlbergian approach and DIT results for accountants. First,
principled reasoning is important for accountants, but accounting students and
professional accountants’ P-scores are generally below that o f adults with similar levels
of education. Second, there is only a small effect that the DIT measures political ideology
rather than identifies moral capacity for accountants. Third, women tend to score higher
than their male counterparts on the DIT for which the authors suggest that future research
should include gender as a covariate. Last, the study finds that prior research is
inconclusive concerning the mismeasurement o f accountants’ ethical judgment.
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D IT Empirical Studies
Fisher (1997, 1999) develops and tests a tax specific DIT. First, Fisher (1997)
surveys high school students, undergraduate and graduate college students, faculty, and
university staff and administrators to develop a DIT instrument with a tax framework
called the Tax Context Issues Test (TCIT). Since the author posits that stage three
reasoning is more likely to cheat on taxes than stage four thinkers, the study calculates a
T-score as the sum o f stages four through six whereas the DIT P-score only sums stages
five and six in its calculation. However like the DIT, the TCIT assesses issue statements
from stage two through stage six presenting lower stage items earlier, includes an anti
establishment assessment (i.e., the A-score measures the condemnation o f the traditional
for the arbitrary) and a meaningless measure (i.e., the M-score assesses the attractiveness
o f ambiguous wording). Moreover, validity and reliability test for the TCIT are
comparable to those of the DIT. For the TCIT, the study finds that the mean level of
moral reasoning is equivalent to that o f the DIT, persons with more education display
higher levels o f moral reasoning, and the mean level of moral reasoning is higher for
females than males. However, the moral reasoning concerning taxpaying contexts seems
less advanced than that of the social dilemmas measured by the DIT. This difference in
reasoning may surface because o f the greater difficulty o f observing the effects of
taxpaying behavior on the welfare o f others or because persons perceive issues o f the DIT
on a higher moral plane than those o f the TCIT.
Second,

Fisher

(1999)

conducts

an

experiment with

business

students

manipulating penalty level and congressional intent of the tax law to assess the TCIT’s
(Fisher 1997) ability to predict tax evasion. The study finds that the likelihood of tax
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noncompliance for subjects receiving the penalty treatment is less than that o f subjects
receiving the intent of law treatment. Moreover, for tax evasion, the penalty treatment has
a greater effect on low level moral reasoners and the intent o f law treatment has a greater
effect on postconventional moral thinkers indicating that moral reasoning has a
moderating effect on GDT factors. However, because the TCIT score combines
maintaining norms thinking with postconventional reasoning, the study’s finding may not
be comparable with other DIT studies.
In an experiment o f first year MBA students, Kaplan et al. (1997) manipulate type
o f sanction (i.e., legal versus appeal to conscience) to assess the moderating effects o f the
DIT 1 P-score on the likelihood o f tax noncompliance. The study finds that tax evasion
intentions are significantly lower for taxpayers who utilize postconventional moral
reasoning. Furthermore, for taxpayers utilizing relatively low levels o f moral reasoning,
tax evasion intentions are significantly lower among those who receive legal sanction
communication than those receiving either no educational communication or appeal to
conscience communication. However, tax evasion intentions are not significantly lower
among those postconventional thinkers who receive appeal to conscience communication
as opposed to those receiving no educational communication. Perhaps the most
interesting finding is that legal sanction communication has no effect on the tax evasive
behavior o f postconventional moral reasoners which further indicates that morality
moderates the effects o f GDT.
Last, Troutman et al. (1995) assess student taxpayers and find that higher DIT t
P-scores are related to higher levels o f tax compliance only through tax system fairness
perceptions. However, they determine that moral development, income level, and age are
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not directly related to tax compliance intentions. Furthermore, Trivedi et al. (2003)
manipulate audit level, peer reporting information, and tax inequity covaried with moral
reasoning among other variables and find, ceteris paribus, that students’ DIT 1 P-scores
are positively related to tax compliance. Furthermore, student tax compliance is
negatively affected by the level o f their DIT 1 A-Score (i.e., anti-establishment score).
These results are encouraging concerning the potential use o f the DIT measures for future
tax compliance research as a moderating or interacting variable.

Ethical Evaluation and Moral Capacity
Cohen et al. (1996) relate the MES to the DIT 1 for auditing professionals and
find that the MES outperforms the DIT 1 in assessing moral development and predicting
moral behavior. While Weber (1996), in his commentary of Cohen et al. (1996),
welcomes the contributions o f the MES to the assessment o f individuals’ moral
reasoning; he criticizes the research regarding theory confusion, instrument confusion,
and the theoretical basis of the MES. First, Weber believes that theory confusion is
apparent when Cohen et al. (1996) equate Kohlberg’s and Rest’s theories to the MES.
Weber (1996, p. 518) states, “While moral equity may provide an excellent foundation
for the development o f the MES, condemning Kohlberg or Rest for their failure to ground
their CMD theories on this construct or for developing instruments that do not emphasize
this cognitive moral reasoning element is inappropriate.” The reasons concerning the
first criticism are made more clear by the second concern— instrument confusion. The
DIT is neither equal to the MES, nor is it intended to be. According to Weber (1996), the
MES has no a priori normative moral philosophy; therefore, it allows individuals to apply
their own previously learned perceptions o f fairness or justice when making ethical
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judgments. However, the DIT is primarily based on the ideological philosophy o f Kantian
deontology or a duty to act the “right” or “just” way regardless o f the circumstances.
Last, the third critique highlights a concern stemming from the second observation: the
fear that the MES allows respondents to create their personal perception o f what is fair
and just which suggests that ethics research should be normative rather than positive.
Kohlberg (1981) refers to this as the naturalistic fallacy. Specifically, Reidenbach and
Robin (1988) consistent with CMD theory group the statements “acceptable to my
family” and “unacceptable to my family” as relativistic; however, factor analysis results
o f the subjects’ responses seem to inappropriately group these items with normative
moral equity or justice. Concerning the other dimensions o f the MES, Forsyth (1980)
finds that neither idealism (i.e., MES contractualism dimension) nor relativism as
measured by his Ethics Position Questionnaire is related to the DIT 1 P-score. Therefore,
the MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) appear to be
independent o f the DIT. Moreover, Weber (1996) resolves that the MES is a compliment,
not a replacement, to the DIT and Neo-Kohlbergian Theory.
In a more recent study, Shawver and Sennetti (2009) survey undergraduate
students in an introductory accounting course and measure their ethical behavior using
the MES and the DIT 2 to assess whether accounting ethics should be taught at the
university level. The study has a number o f thought-provoking results. First, higher DIT 2
P-score students did not evaluate questionable accounting actions as more unethical than
low DIT 2 P-score subjects. This outcome reinforces previous findings that the DIT may
be incapable o f predicting behavioral intentions. Second, consistent with Cohen et al.
(1996), the MES constructs of moral equity, relativism, egoism, utilitarianism, or
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contractualism and the composite MES score explain the ethical and unethical choices by
accounting students better than the DIT 2 P-score. Last, the study indicates that the
composite MES score is not related to the DIT 2 P-score suggesting that the two
measures quantify distinct constructs which is consistent with Weber (1996).

Morality and Religiousness
Kohlberg (1981) distinguishes morality from religiousness in that the purpose of
moral thinking is to resolve competing claims on the basis of moral norms; however,
religious reasoning defines life and morality beyond human experiences (i.e., reliance on
God to live a moral life). Although morality differs from religiousness, Kohlberg defines
common attributes o f both constructs. These common attributes are the foundation of
Natural Law Theory which is discussed later in this section. Moreover, Kohlberg
distinguishes faith from religion in that the former is an abstract universal quality of
knowing; whereas, the latter is an expression o f former in which concerns about the
ultimate are made clear. Kohlberg (1981) parallels moral reasoning stages with those of
religious thinking (i.e., faith thinking) for which the motivation for action have
previously been addressed in this chapter. Nonetheless, the study finds that differences
only occur in the higher stages with the moral reasoning being rated more highly. This
result suggests that the development o f higher levels o f moral reason precede that of
higher levels o f religious thinking. Therefore, religious reasoning maybe derived from
moral reason.
On one extreme, Fundamentalists or Divine Command theorists posit that
morality is ultimately defined by divine commands revealed by some document of
ultimate revelation (e.g., The Bible or Koran). On the other extreme, Freud’s Emotivistic
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or Agnostic Theory posits that morality and religion are simply irrational illusions or
human fantasies. Freud asserts that moral judgments only offer emotional approval or
disapproval; therefore, they have no meaning as statements o f truth or falsity. However,
Freud contends that scientific judgments have meaning because they are predictors of
observable data. A more neutral position, Natural Law Theory, posits that there are
universal or natural principles o f justice and morality developed through Socratic
reasoning that should guide all societies. Furthermore, these principles are independent of
specific religious revelation or faith. Kohlberg provides an exemplar o f Natural Law
Theory in a statement by Martin Luther King from a Birmingham jail. King says
(Kohlberg 1981, p. 319), “There is a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws, though
one must do so openly, lovingly and with a willingness to accept the penalty.”
Previous studies indicate that morality as measured by the DIT is not equivalent
to various religiousness measures especially for subjects with conservative religious
beliefs (Kohlberg 1981; Getz 1984; Rest et al. 1986; Richards and Davison 1992).
Kohlberg (1981) believes that religious orientation is mostly independent of moral
development in that the former focuses on religious doctrine which may be biased and the
latter strives for an ideal norm. Furthermore, Rest et al. (1999) note that a limitation of
the Kohlbergian Approach is that it neglects the role of religion in the formation of moral
thinking. Getz (1984), in her review o f the relevant literature, finds an inverse
relationship between principled moral reasoning and conservative religious beliefs for
most studies. However, Getz (1984) does not find conclusive evidence concerning the
relationship between religious orientations (e.g., intrinsic and extrinsic) and moral
judgment. Getz (1984, p. 107) states, “Those who were intrinsically oriented clearly
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tended to take seriously the moral teachings typical o f their particular congregation.”
This observation suggests that intrinsic religious subjects may behave differently than
other religious people and that their religion may intensify their behavioral preferences.
Furthermore, Rest et al. (1986) note that the divine origin of moral absolutes for religious
persons may cause them to not rely on their own intellect for making moral judgments;
therefore, religious people may refrain from principled moral thinking.
In their study of conservative religious subjects, Richards and Davison (1992)
find that some stage four and anti-establishment DIT items have religious connotations.
The authors suggest that these implied spiritual tones activate conservative religious
people’s moral schema causing them to select these conventional items rather than
postconventional ones. Furthermore, they find that some postconventional items have
negative religious undertones for conservative religious subjects triggering them to reject
these items in favor o f lower stage items. Richards and Davison (1992) suggest that the
weakness o f Kohlbergian Theory is that it assesses information in light o f justice
considerations, to the exclusion o f other philosophies such as care, moral duty,
benevolence, compassion, self-realization, honor, and liberty.
To summarize, this study incorporates several of the methodologies o f the
previously mentioned ideological studies. First, it uses the R&R (1988, 1990) eight-item
three-dimension MES (i.e., moral equity, relativism, contractualism) to evaluate tax
evasion intentions using both evasive income and deduction cases (Henderson and
Kaplan 2005; Kaplan et al. 1997). Second, the current study implements a peer
behavioral assessment to eliminate the “halo effect” (i.e., reduce the bias o f self-reports
o f deviant behavior) and incorporate subjective norms. Third, Cruz et al. (2000, p. 239)
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states, “ ...future research could investigate whether the effects of personal characteristics
such as cognitive moral development or personal values influence their deontological and
teleological evaluations o f ethical dilemmas, and whether those evaluations in turn
influence ethical judgments and intentions.”

Consequently, this study assesses the

complementary nature o f the DIT 2 and the ROS with the MES concerning tax evasion
intentions. Furthermore, this study considers the interactive effects between the DIT 2
and MES constructs as suggested by Weber (1996). Additionally, the current research
administers the DIT 2 to assess moral orientation as did Shawver and Sennetti (2009) and
evaluates the study’s results using SEM which is consistent with Shawver and Sennetti
(2009) and Henderson and Kaplan (2005). Last, this study extends Henderson and Kaplan
(2005) by substituting the orthogonal religious scales (i.e., intrinsic and extrinsic) for the
orthogonal ethical orientation measures (i.e., deontology and teleology) and evaluating
the interactive effects o f the DIT measures (i.e., P-score and N2-score).

Development of Hypotheses
Cruz et al. (2000, p. 239) states, “ ...future research could investigate whether the
effects o f personal characteristics such as cognitive moral development or personal
values influence their deontological and teleological evaluations o f ethical dilemmas, and
whether those evaluations in turn influence ethical judgments and intentions.” Based on
the previous statement, this study examines three complementary research questions.
First, do personal religious beliefs matter with respect to the ethical evaluation o f tax
evasion intentions? Similarly, the second question is whether moral capacity matters
regarding the ethical evaluation o f tax evasion intentions?

The last query considers

interactive effects and questions whether cognitive moral development interacts with
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personal religious beliefs considering the ethical evaluation of tax evasive practices? In
order to appropriately address these questions, the study’s constructs must be defined.
First, McDaniel and Burnett (1990, p. 103) define religion as “a belief in God
accompanied by a commensurate commitment to follow principles believed to be set
forth by God.” Similarly, Kohlberg distinguishes faith from religion in that the former is
an abstract universal quality o f knowing; whereas, the latter is an expression o f the
former in which concerns about the ultimate are made clear. Second, Forsyth (1980)
develops an ethical ideology taxonomy based on two factors o f ethical evaluation: (1) the
extent to which one replaces universal moral rules with relativism and (2) the degree to
which one focuses on idealism. Idealism and relativism are purported to be orthogonal
measures with characteristics similar to those o f deontology and teleology, respectively.
Third, Kohlbergian morality and Rest’s Neo-Kohlbergian morality are derived from Kant
and Rawls (Munsey 1980; Kohlberg 1981; Rest et al. 1999; Bebeau and Thoma 2003).
Kantian deontological philosophy assumes that moral judgment is based on conformity to
an ideal norm or a duty to act the “right” or “just” way, regardless o f the teleological
circumstances. Moreover, Rawls’ moral philosophy asserts that inequality is only
justified if it is acceptable to the person in the most disadvantaged position.
Religion may be defined in terms of cognition (e.g., religious knowledge or
belief), affect (e.g., emotion), and behavior (e.g., church affiliation, church attendance,
Bible reading, or praying). Tittle and Welch (1983) indicate that a multidimensional scale
o f religiousness may have improved their study. Therefore, this study measures
religiousness via the multidimensional Religious Orientation Scale (Allport and Ross
1967; Gorsuch and McPherson 1989). Allport and Ross (1967, p. 434) characterize two
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constructs of the scale by stating, “ ...the extrinsically motivated person uses his religion,
whereas the intrinsically motivated lives his religion.” Moreover, Getz (1984, p. 107)
states, “Those who were intrinsically oriented clearly tended to take seriously the moral
teachings typical o f their particular congregation.” Furthermore, Grasmick et al. (1991)
in their tax compliance study describe people who have a strong religious identity
salience or internalized religious convictions as intrinsic, and those who are involved in a
social network based on religion as extrinsic. Also, Tittle and Welch (1983) suggest that
religiousness predicts conformity to rules uniquely prohibited by religious institutions
(e.g., tax evasion), but not to rules prohibited by society as a whole.
The first stage o f the ideological model o f tax evasion indicates that religiousness
directly influences the ethical evaluation of one’s tax reporting decisions (see Figures 17).
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Furthermore, Donahue (1985) finds that intrinsic and extrinsic factors are
orthogonal dimensions rather than a continuum as originally posited, and Cruz et al.
(2000) suggest that these respective religious factors may have deontological and
teleological

characteristics.

This

conceptualization

is

similar

to

that

of

the

aforementioned idealism-relativism characteristics as posited by Forsyth (1980). The
distinction between “intrinsics” and “extrinsics” indicates that the former “live” their
religion while the latter “use” their religion is consistent with deontology and teleology,
respectively.

Tax and non-tax studies generally find that intrinsic religiousness or a

deontological perspective is directly related to both the moral equity dimension o f the
MES (Collins and Daniel 1996; Knotts et al. 2000; Henderson and Kaplan 2005) and the
contractualism dimension o f the MES (R&R 1988; Henderson and Kaplan 2005), but
inversely related to the relativism dimension o f the MES and tax evasion intentions
(Grasmick et al. 1991; Bamett et al. 1996; Clark and Dawson 1996). However,
insignificant correlations are also found between intrinsic religiousness or a deontological
perspective and the relativism dimension o f the MES (Henderson and Kaplan 2005), the
contractualism dimension o f the MES (Bamett et al. 1996), and tax evasion intentions
(Donahue 1985; Henderson and Kaplan 2005).
Considering the previous research with respect to intrinsic religiousness or a
deontological perspective, the following hypotheses are offered:

Hla:

Intrinsic religiousness is positively related to the moral equity dimension
of the MES.

Hlb:

Intrinsic religiousness is positively related to the contractualism dimension
of the MES.

Hlc:

Intrinsic religiousness is negatively related to the relativism dimension of
the MES.
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Hid:

Intrinsic religiousness is negatively related to tax evasion intentions as
assessed by the MES and has a larger negative effect than extrinsic
religiousness.
Tax and non-tax studies have found inverse correlations between extrinsic
religiousness or a teleological perspective and both the moral equity and the
contractualism dimensions o f the MES (R&R 1988; Clark and Dawson 1996; Henderson
and Kaplan 2005), and a direct association with the relativism dimension o f the MES
(Henderson and Kaplan 2005). Moreover, Grasmick et al. (1991) find that extrinsic
religiousness or a teleological perspective and tax evasion intentions are indirectly
related; whereas, However, Donahue (1985) and Henderson and Kaplan (2005).
Considering the previous research with respect to extrinsic religiousness or a
teleological perspective, the following hypotheses are offered:

H2a:

Extrinsic religiousness is negatively related to the moral equity dimension
o f the MES.

H2b: Extrinsic religiousness is negatively related to the contractualism
dimension o f the MES.
H2c:

Extrinsic religiousness is positively related to the relativism dimension of
the MES.

H2d: Extrinsic religiousness is negatively related to tax evasion intentions as
assessed by the MES and has a smaller negative effect than intrinsic
religiousness.
The D1T 2 P-score and N2-score are both often used to evaluate moral capacity as
assessed by the DIT. The DIT 2 P-score measures the percentage that the respondent
selects postconventional items; whereas, the N2-score measures the extent to which the
subject ranks postconventional items highly while avoiding rating personal interest items
as important. The N2-score has greater internal reliability than that o f the P-score.
Furthermore, the DIT 2 measures three different schemas: (1) personal interest, (2)
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maintaining norms, and (2) postconventional. With respect to the lower levels of
development, the personal interest schema (i.e., Kohlberg’s stages two and three) is
concerned with teleological egoism; whereas, the maintaining norms schema (i.e.,
Kohlberg’s stage four) is associated with relativism. Forsyth (1980) finds that neither
idealism (i.e., MES contractualism dimension) nor relativism as measured by his Ethics
Position Questionnaire is related to the DIT 1 P-score.
Concerning the highest level o f development, the postconventional schema (i.e.,
Kohlberg’s stages five and six) emphasizes society-creating with a justice orientation.
Postconventional thinkers view rules, roles, laws, and institution as serving some sharable
concept o f cooperation (Rest et al. 1999). In particular, postconventional reasoners are
concerned about maintaining an ideal societal structure for all members o f society which
must be open to scrutiny. Riedenbach and Robin (1988) develop the moral equity
dimension of the MES based on a justice perspective similar to that o f the DIT and
Kohlbergian Theory. Studies have found that the MES outperforms the DIT in predicting
behavioral intent (Cohen et al. 1996; Shawver and Sennetti 2009). However, Weber
(1996) indicates that the DIT is neither equal to the MES, nor is it intended to be.
Moreover, Weber resolves that the MES may be a compliment (e.g., justice orientation),
not a replacement, to the DIT and Kohlbergian Theory. Based on the author’s review o f
the literature, Weber’s complementary assertion has not been tested.
Last, Kohlberg (1981) asserts that morality is a philosophical or an ethical rather
than a behavioral concept; therefore cognitive moral development and the DIT may not
accurately measure behavioral intent or action. Concerning the DIT P-score and the
prediction of behavioral intent, previous research has not only found that higher P-scores
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are related to lower tax evasion intentions (Kaplan et al. 1997; Fisher 1999; Trivedi et al.
2003), but also found no relation between P-scores and tax evasion intentions (Troutman
et al. 1995; Shawver and Sennetti 2009).
Considering the previous research with respect to moral capacity, the following
hypotheses are offered:

H3a:

Postconventional moral capacity is positively related to the moral equity
dimension o f the MES.

H3b:

Postconventional moral capacity is not related to the contractualism
dimension o f the MES.

H3c:

Postconventional moral capacity is not related to the relativism dimension
o f the MES.

H3d: Postconventional moral capacity is not related to tax evasion intentions as
assessed by the MES.
Regarding the MES and ethical evaluation, individuals tend to rely on a broad
sense o f moral equity dominated by concerns for fairness and justice, tempered by
relativistic and implied social contract deontological dimensions. Prior research generally
finds that all three MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism)
are indirectly related to the evaluation o f unethical behavior, such as tax evasion
intentions (R&R 1988, 1990; Cohen et al. 1996; Henderson and Kaplan 2005). However,
Henderson and Kaplan (2005) assess both the underreporting of taxable income and the
overreporting o f tax deductions and find that the latter is rated more unethical than the
former for actual taxpayers. Furthermore, the income scenarios are not significant for the
relativism and contractualism dimensions o f the MES; however, when both income and
deduction cases are simultaneously evaluated, all MES dimensions are significant. Their
result concerning the disparity between income and deductions is similar to that of
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Groves (1958) which finds that farmers and landlords are reluctant to overreport
deductions as compared with underreporting income.
Considering the previous research with respect to ethical evaluation, the following
hypotheses are offered:
H4a:

When income and deduction scenarios are simultaneously evaluated, all
three MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism)
will be negatively related with tax evasion intentions.

H4b:

When deduction scenarios are independently evaluated, all three MES
dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) will be
negatively related with tax evasion intentions.

H4c:

When income scenarios are independently evaluated, only the moral
equity dimension o f the MES will be negatively related with tax evasion
intentions.

Last, Kohlberg (1981) distinguishes morality from religiousness in that the
purpose o f the former is to resolve competing claims on the basis o f moral norms;
however, the latter defines life and morality beyond human experiences. This distinction
suggests that the development o f moral reasoning precede that o f religious thinking.
Specifically, perhaps religious reasoning takes longer to develop than moral reasoning.
Rest et al. (1999) note that a limitation o f the Kohlbergian Approach is that it neglects the
role of religion in the formation o f moral thinking. Explicitly, Richards and Davison
(1992) suggest that the weakness o f Kohlbergian Theory is that it assesses information in
light o f justice considerations, to the exclusion o f other philosophies such as care, moral
duty, benevolence, compassion, self-realization, honor, and liberty. Moreover, Getz
(1984) does not find conclusive evidence concerning the relationship between religious
orientations (e.g., intrinsic and extrinsic) and moral judgment as indicated by the DIT Pscore. Interestingly, Richards and Davison (1992) find that some maintaining norms and
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anti-establishment DIT items have attractive religious connotations; whereas, some
postconventional DIT items have negative religious undertones. Because o f these
embedded religious connotations, they suggest that intrinsically religious persons will
tend to reject postconventional items in favor o f conventional or preconventional ones.
Previous research indicates that the ROS and the DIT are distinct measures of
religiousness and moral capacity, respectively. Perhaps these unique measures may
combine to better predict behavioral intent (e.g., tax evasion intentions) than either single
measure alone. Based on the author’s review of the literature, the ROS (intrinsic and
extrinsic religiousness) constructs have not been compared with those o f the DIT 2 (Pscore, N2-score, etc.) concerning the prediction o f behavioral intent.
Considering the previous research indicated above, with respect to the association
between religiousness (i.e, ROS) and moral capacity (i.e., DIT 2) and the prediction of
behavioral intent, the following research question is offered:

RQ:

The model o f the ideological factors o f tax compliance will improve when
considering the ROS (i.e., intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness) in addition
to the DIT (i.e., P-score, N2-score, etc.) above that o f the single construct
alone (i.e., ROS or DIT).

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Overview
To test each o f the research hypotheses, this study surveyed undergraduate and
graduate business and non-business students using a three-part questionnaire. The first
part contained two hypothetical tax compliance cases (i.e., underreported income and
overreported deductions) and was used to assess the subjects’ agreement, or lack thereof,
with

the

unethical

action

described

in

the

scenarios as

determined

by

the

Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES). The sequence o f the cases (i.e., income and
deduction) was presented in the same order for each participant. The second part assessed
their levels o f intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness as measured by the Religious
Orientation Scale (ROS). The last part measured the subjects’ level o f moral capacity as
indicated by the P-score and N2-score derived from the Defining Issues Test (DIT 2).
Each participant received each part of the questionnaire in the same order (i.e., MES,
ROS, and DIT 2).

The Questionnaires
Multidimensional Ethics Scale
First, subjects evaluated two hypothetical tax evasion scenarios via the MES as
shown in Appendix A. The tax scenarios employed income and deduction items that are
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not easily verified by the IRS for which prior research overwhelmingly finds that this
invisibility increases the likelihood o f tax evasion (Madeo et al. 1987). Furthermore,
these scenarios were previously tested by Kaplan et al. (1997) and Henderson and Kaplan
(2005), allowing this study’s results to potentially be comparable with those studies. The
income scenario described selling a business computer to a friend and not reporting the
taxable gain from the sale; whereas, personal meal and entertainment expenses are
illegally deducted for business purposes in the deduction case. In each o f the scenarios,
subjects judged the ethical context based on three dimensions (i.e., moral equity,
relativism, and contractualism) and rated on a seven-point scale. These evaluations serve
as both dependent and independent variables in the assessment of the structured equation
model for this study.
Additionally, participants indicated their (and their peers) probability o f acting in
the same unethical manner as the protagonist in the scenario on a seven-point scale
anchored by “high” (scored 1) and “low” (scored 7). Hence, larger scores indicated
disagreement with the unethical behavior. These evaluations served as univariate
dependent measures o f behavioral intent. Respondents indicated the degree to which the
person described in the scenario acted ethically on a seven-point scaled anchored by
“ethical” (scored 1) and “unethical” (scored 7). Again, larger scores suggested increased
disagreement with the unethical behavior. This measure served as a univariate dependent
measure of ethical evaluation that can be compared with the multivariate measure of
ethical evaluation. Last, subjects indicated their perception of the likelihood o f getting
caught evading taxes on a seven-point scale anchored by “high” (scored 1) and “low”
(scored 7). Based on general deterrence theory (GDT), higher scores indicated a greater
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likelihood o f evading taxes. This measure is used to control for the visibility o f income to
the IRS which prior research indicates is the most important factor for determining tax
compliance behavior. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) results and previous research
indicate that the MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) are
significantly correlated which is represented in all structural models (i.e., Models 1 —9).
When observing the means and standard deviations o f the aforementioned measures,
neither end-loading nor low item variance appears to be a concern for the sample (Flory
et al. 1992). Furthermore, large standard deviations suggest that the scenarios are truly
ethical dilemmas for the respondents as a whole.

Religious Orientation Scale
Second, subjects provided demographic information and, afterwards, completed a
questionnaire to indicate their religious orientation by responding to scale items as shown
in Appendix B. Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) refine the Allport and Ross (1967)
religious orientation scale (ROS) by subdividing the ROS extrinsic construct into three
components: personally oriented extrinsicness, socially oriented extrinsicness, and
reverse intrinsicness. Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) indicate that the best single
measures for personal and social extrinsicness are “What religion offers me most is
comfort in times of trouble and sorrow” and “I go to church mainly because I enjoy
seeing people I know there,” respectively. Furthermore, the strongest predictor o f reverse
intrinsicness is “It doesn’t matter what I believe so long as I am good.” The reversed
intrinsic items are combined with original intrinsic scale items increasing the level of
overall reliability o f intrinsicness while counterbalancing the intrinsic scale against
acquiescence bias (see Tables 1-8).
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Table 1
Ethical Evaluation Demographic and Descriptive Statistics fo r Models 1-3
N
AGE
SEX(M)
I JUST
I FAIR
I RIGHT
I FAMILY
I TRAD
I CULTURE
I CONTRACT
I PROMISE
I FRIENDS
I SUBJECT
D JUST
D FAIR
D RIGHT
D FAMILY
D TRAD
D CULTURE
D CONTRACT
D PROMISE
D FRIENDS
D SUBJECT
JUST
FAIR
RIGHT
FAMILY
TRAD
CULTURE
CONTRACT
PROMISE
FRIENDS
SUBJECT
Valid N (listwise)

181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181

Minimum
18
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1.0
1.0
1.0
1
1
1

Maximum
69
1
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7.0
7.0
7.0
7
7
7

Mean

Std. Deviation
24.19
8.087
.55
.499
2.080
4.45
4.09
2.051
1.779
5.08
2.155
3.79
2.102
3.61
1.807
3.11
2.042
4.38
4.19
2.065
5.20
1.833
4.15
2.269
5.83
1.505
1.468
5.77
1.134
6.19
1.724
5.46
4.93
1.811
1.864
4.47
1.973
4.96
1.944
5.00
3.78
1.931
2.98
2.196
1.534
5.14
1.523
4.93
5.64
1.264
1.652
4.62
1.706
4.27
1.619
3.80
1.705
4.71
4.59
1.749
1.553
4.49
3.56
1.695
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Table 2
Ethical Evaluation Demographic and Descriptive Statistics fo r Models 4-6 and Models 79 (All Subjects)
N
AGE
SEX(M)
I JUST
I FAIR
I RIGHT
I FAMILY
I TRAD
I CULTURE
I CONTRACT
I PROMISE
I FRIENDS
I SUBJECT
D JUST
D FAIR
D RIGHT
D FAMILY
D TRAD
D CULTURE
D CONTRACT
D PROMISE
D FRIENDS
D SUBJECT
JUST
FAIR
RIGHT
FAMILY
TRAD
CULTURE
CONTRACT
PROMISE
FRIENDS
SUBJECT
Valid N (listwise)

128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128

Minimum
18
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1.0
1.0
1.0
1
1
1

Maximum
69
1
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7.0
7.0
7.0
7
7
7

Mean
Std. Deviation
8.855
24.63
.53
.501
4.49
2.047
1.981
4.07
1.638
5.30
3.79
2.128
3.60
2.079
1.724
2.94
4.44
2.023
2.069
4.27
5.36
1.760
2.232
4.23
1.571
5.76
5.74
1.497
6.22
1.108
1.716
5.47
4.84
1.911
4.34
1.905
2.053
4.88
2.033
4.91
1.893
3.79
2.41
1.825
5.13
1.561
4.91
1.530
1.204
5.76
4.63
1.656
1.732
4.219
3.641
1.595
4.660
1.755
1.836
4.59
4.57
1.489
3.32
1.701
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Table 3
Ethical Evaluation Demographic and Descriptive Statistics/or Models 7-9 (High Moral
Capacity)
N
AGE
SEX(M)
I JUST
I FAIR
I RIGHT
I FAMILY
I TRAD
I CULTURE
I CONTRACT
I PROMISE
I FRIENDS
I SUBJECT
D JUST
D FAIR
D RIGHT
D FAMILY
D TRAD
D CULTURE
D CONTRACT
D PROMISE
D FRIENDS
D SUBJECT
JUST
FAIR
RIGHT
FAMILY
TRAD
CULTURE
CONTRACT
PROMISE
FRIENDS
SUBJECT
Valid N (listwise)

64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64

Minimum
19
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2.0
2.0
3
1
1.5
1.0
1
1
2
1.0

Maximum
60
1
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7.0
7.0
7
7
7.0
7.0
7
7
7
7.0

Mean
Std. Deviation
24.84
8.429
.58
.498
4.91
1.925
4.58
1.950
5.52
1.681
4.16
2.110
3.89
2.032
3.11
1.691
4.69
1.975
4.48
1.992
5.38
1.628
3.91
2.252
5.84
1.417
5.95
1.201
6.36
.915
5.52
1.643
4.91
1.779
1.872
4.36
5.08
1.986
2.063
4.89
1.826
4.00
2.44
1.790
5.38
1.464
5.27
1.412
5.94
1.146
4.84
1.640
4.40
1.589
3.73
1.527
4.88
1.666
4.69
1.751
4.69
1.390
3.17
1.751
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Table 4
Ethical Evaluation Demographic and Descriptive Statistics fo r Models 7-9 (Low Moral
Capacity)
N
AGE
SEX(M)
I JUST
I FAIR
I RIGHT
I FAMILY
I TRAD
I CULTURE
I CONTRACT
I PROMISE
I FRIENDS
I SUBJECT
D JUST
D FAIR
D RIGHT
D FAMILY
D TRAD
D CULTURE
D CONTRACT
D PROMISE
D FRIENDS
D SUBJECT
JUST
FAIR
RIGHT
FAMILY
TRAD
CULTURE
CONTRACT
PROMISE
FRIENDS
SUBJECT
Valid N (listwise)

64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64

Minimum
18
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1.0
1.0
1.0
1
1
1

Maximum
69
1
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7.0
7.0
7.0
7
7
7

Std. Deviation
Mean
24.42
9.323
.48
.504
4.08
2.095
3.56
1.893
5.08
1.577
3.42
2.099
2.100
3.31
2.77
1.752
4.19
2.054
4.06
2.137
5.34
1.896
4.55
2.182
5.67
1.719
5.53
1.727
6.08
1.264
5.42
1.798
4.77
2.045
1.952
4.33
4.69
2.115
4.92
2.018
3.58
1.950
2.39
1.874
4.88
1.626
4.55
1.570
5.58
1.242
4.42
1.658
4.04
1.859
3.55
1.666
4.44
1.825
4.49
1.926
4.46
1.584
3.47
1.650
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Table 5
Religiousness Descriptive Statistics fo r Models 1-3
N
11
2ES
3IR
41
51
6EP
71
8EP
9EP
10IR
11ES
121
13IR
Valid N (listwise)

181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181
181

Minimum
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Maximum
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Mean
5.28
3.06
4.93
5.55
5.05
4.11
4.81
4.57
4.88
4.31
2.08
4.24
4.10

Std. Deviation
1.967
1.889
2.137
1.809
2.088
1.983
2.137
2.209
1.907
2.225
1.518
2.187
2.298

Table 6
Religiousness Descriptive Statistics fo r Models 7-9 (All Subjects)
N
11
2ES
3IR
41
51
6EP
71
8EP
9EP
101R
11ES
121
13IR
Valid N (listwise)

128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128

Minimum
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Maximum
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Mean
5.15
3.09
5.02
5.47
5.00
3.97
4.75
4.53
4.79
4.40
2.09
4.24
4.16

Std. Deviation
2.016
1.880
2.142
1.844
2.107
2.008
2.122
2.155
1.902
2.182
1.506
2.091
2.285
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Table 7
Religiousness Descriptive Statistics fo r Models 7-9 (High Moral Capacity)
N
11
2ES
3IR
41
51
6EP
71
8EP
9EP
10IR
11ES
121
13IR
Valid N (listwise)

64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64

Minimum
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Maximum
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Mean
4.94
3.00
4.58
5.02
4.72
3.80
4.52
4.06
4.48
4.38
2.14
4.16
3.98

Std. Deviation
2.046
1.984
2.376
2.097
2.271
2.132
2.282
2.281
1.944
2.020
1.698
2.125
2.236

Table 8
Religiousness Descriptive Statistics fo r Models 7-9 (Low Moral Capacity)
N
11
2ES
3IR
41
51
6EP
71
8EP
9EP
10IR
11ES
121
13IR
Valid N (listwise)

64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64

Minimum
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Maximum
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Mean
5.36
3.19
5.47
5.92
5.28
4.14
4.98
5.00
5.09
4.42
2.03
4.33
4.33

Std. Deviation
1.979
1.781
1.790
1.429
1.906
1.876
1.939
1.927
1.823
2.349
1.297
2.071
2.337
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Both Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) and Allport and Ross (1967) include these
original intrinsic religious items in their overall constructs. Gorsuch and McPherson
(1989) indicate that the best univariate measure o f intrinsicness is “My whole approach to
life is based on my religion.”

This study employs the univariate measures of social

extrinsicness and reverse intrinsicness, while maintaining the multivariate assessments of
personal extrinsicness and intrinsic religiousness (Allport and Ross, 1967; Gorsuch and
McPherson, 1989). Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the single measures are
essentially the same as the multiple measures; furthermore, the scale reduction adds to the
model parsimony. As such, Models 1 - 3 which assess the hypothesized model o f tax
evasion with respect to religiousness and ethical evaluation appear in Figures 5 — 7,
respectively.

The Defining Issues Test
Last, each subject responded to survey items concerning five different social
problems (Defining Issues Test— DIT 2, sample shown in Appendix C). The DIT
activates moral schemas by rating and rankings issues in terms of importance judgments.
If subjects encounter items that both make sense and tap into their preferred schema (i.e.,
activates schema), then those items should be rated and ranked highly. However, if
subjects encounter items that either do not make sense or seem simplistic and
unconvincing, then those items should receive a low rating and not be ranked highly. The
DIT presents just enough o f a line o f argument to activate a schema, but not so much that
the subject substitutes the meaning of the information presented for the meaning o f the
schema already in the subject’s mind. Respondents scoring at higher levels of
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postconventional moral reasoning select items exhibiting a shareable ideal o f cooperation
for all members o f society which should be open to scrutiny.
The current version o f the DIT (DIT2) includes two moral judgment scores for
which this study employs. First, the P-score refers to the extent to which a subject prefers
postconventional moral thinking as indicated by the fifth and sixth stages o f moral
reasoning (Bebeau and Thoma 2003). For each dilemma, participants receive four points,
three points, two points, and one point for the most, second most, third most, and fourth
most important postconventional item, respectively. O f the twelve items to be rated, three
or four items correspond to the four item rankings representing the postconventional
schema. Therefore, the P-score represents the percent o f the postconventional moral
thinking that the participant ranked highly and can range from zero to 95. Second, the
N2-score has two components: two-thirds of the extent that the subject prefers
postconventional moral reasoning (i.e., the P-score) less one-third o f the degree
preconventional moral reasoning receives higher ratings.
Flypothesized structural models (i.e., Model 4, Model 5, and Model 6) o f tax
evasion regarding postconventional reasoning are assessed based on the participants’ DIT
2 P-scores and N2-scores.. Furthermore, participants are dichotomized into above and
below mean groups to assess the combined DIT 2 and ROS models (i.e., Model 7, Model
8, and Model 9). Bebeau and Thoma (2003) indicate that the median level DIT 2 P-score
for college students is approximately forty-five; however, no such measure is provided
for the DIT 2 N2-score. For measures like the DIT 2 P-score and the N2-score, Shadish et
al. (2002) indicate that dichotomizing the measure’s scores (e.g., postconventional and
non-postconventional) strengthens the study’s internal validity. This cutoff seems

103
appropriate given the study’s hypotheses concerning association o f DIT 2 scores with
variation in both ethical evaluation and intention to evade taxes.

Statistical Analyses
Factor analysis was conducted to validate the factor loadings for the ROS and
MES item measures and the results were similar to prior research. Furthermore, the factor
analytical process was performed for the combined DIT 2 P-score and N2-score construct
representing postconventional reasoning. All factor items loaded reasonably high with
their hypothesized construct indicating strong convergent validity while remaining
unrelated to other model constructs indicating discriminant validity.
Furthermore, Structured Equation Modeling (SEM) was conducted to identify
significant empirical paths for Models 1 - 9 as shown in Figures 8 - 23. A similar
methodology was used in previous research to study religiousness, ethical evaluation,
and/or tax evasion intentions (Barnett et al. 1996; Henderson and Kaplan 2005;
Blanthome and Kaplan 2008). Path significance is tested from both the first-order
intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness scales and the postconventional reasoning construct
as measured by the DIT 2 P-score and N2-score (Models 4 - 6 as indicated in Figures 14
- 1 6 , respectively) to ethical evaluation as determined by dimensions o f the MES (i.e.,
moral equity, relativism, contractualism).

Furthermore, the combined effect of

postconventional reasoning and religiousness on ethical evaluation is tested in Models 7 9 as depicted in Figure 18. Last, all models (Models 1 - 9 as indicated in the
aforementioned figures) tested the relationships from the ethical evaluation construct
dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) to tax evasion intention.

Religiousness

Ethical Evaluation

23 * *

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity

-.19*
Intrinsic
.04
.15

66* * *

Relativism

Tax Evasion

-.13

-.01

Extrinsic
-.23*
Contractualism

Figure 8 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 1)

Religiousness

Ethical Evaluation

20* *

Moral Equity

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

.20 * *

-.07
Intrinsic
-.12

.14
Relativism

Tax Evasion

-.15
.02
Extrinsic

.16

-.1 4

-.14
Contractualism

*** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Figure 9 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 2)

Religiousness

Ethical Evaluation

. 2 1 **

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity

-.09
Intrinsic
.17
.14
Relativism

Tax Evasion

-.26**

-.01

Extrinsic
-.26**
Contractualism

* significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.

Figure 10 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 3)

Ethical Evaluation

Moral Capacity

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity
H4a (-)
H4a (-)
H3a (+)
Tax Evasion

Relativism
H3c (NS)

Postconventional

H4a (-)

H3d (NS)
H3b (NS)
Contractualism

Figure 11 Hypothesized SEM o f the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 4)

Ethical Evaluation

Moral Capacity

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity
H4a (-)
H4a (-)
H3a (+)
Tax Evasion

Relativism
H3c (NS)

Postconventional
H3d (NS)

H4a (-)

H3b (NS)
Contractualism

Figure 12 Hypothesized SEM o f the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 5)

Moral Capacity

Ethical Evaluation

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity
H4a (-)

H3a (+)
Relativism

Tax Evasion

H3c (NS

Postconventional
H3d (NS)
H3b (NS)
Contractualism

Figure 13 Hypothesized SEM o f the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 6)

Moral Capacity

Ethical Evaluation

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity

.14*
Tax Evasion

Relativism
.09

Postconventional
-.14*
.16*
Contractualism

* significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.

Figure 14 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 4)

Moral Capacity

Ethical Evaluation

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity

Relativism

Tax Evasion

Postconventional
.03
.09
Contractualism

*** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.

Figure 15 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tea Evasion Intentions (Model 5)

Moral Capacity

Ethical Evaluation

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity

.16**

Relativism

Tax Evasion

.15

Postconventional
-.01

-.01

.16*
Contractualism

*, **, *** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Figure 16 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the DIT 2 on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 6)

Religiousness

Ethical Evaluation

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity

Intrinsic

Relativism

Tax Evasion

Extrinsic

Contractualism

(Note: Dashed lines indicate relationships with hypothesized Moral Capacity differences.)

Figure 17 Hypothesized S E M o f the Effect o f ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Models 7 - 9 )

Religiousness

Ethical Evaluation

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

.00
Moral Equity
. 66 **
- .21*

Intrinsic
-.04
.54**

Relativism

Tax Evasion

.12

Extrinsic

-.49*

Contractualism

(Note: Dashed lines indicate relationships with hypothesized High Moral Capacity differences.)

Figure 18 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model la)

Religiousness

Ethical Evaluation

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity

Intrinsic

.04
-.18
Relativism

Tax Evasion

-.16

Extrinsic

-.12

Contractualism

(Note: Dashed lines indicate relationships with hypothesized Low Moral Capacity differences.)

Figure 19 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 7b)

Religiousness

Ethical Evaluation

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity
. 66 * *

Intrinsic

.34
Relativism

Tax Evasion

Extrinsic

-.26
Contractualism

(Note: Dashed lines indicate relationships with hypothesized High Moral Capacity differences.)

Figure 20 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 8a)

Religiousness

Ethical Evaluation

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

Moral Equity
.24**

Intrinsic
.12
-.02

-.27
Tax Evasion

Relativism
.00

Extrinsic

-.01

-.02
Contractualism

(Note: Dashed lines indicate relationships with hypothesized Low Moral Capacity differences.)

Figure 21 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 8b)

Religiousness

Ethical Evaluation

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

.10

Moral Equity
.49

-.26
Intrinsic
.45

Relativism

Tax Evasion

-.53*

-.41
Extrinsic

Contractualism

Figure 22 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 9a)

Religiousness

Ethical Evaluation

Tax Evasion Intentions
(income/deduction)

.15
Moral Equity
.23

Intrinsic

.09
-.18
Relativism

Tax Evasion

-.21

Extrinsic

-.17
Contractualism

Figure 23 SEM Estimates o f the Effect o f the ROS on the Ethical Evaluation o f Tax Evasion Intentions (Model 9b)
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Based on prior research, ethical evaluation may either mediate or moderate both
the moral capacity- and religiousness-tax evasion intention relationships (Grasmick et al.
1991; Kaplan et al. 1997; Henderson and Kaplan 2005). Bonner (2008) defines a
mediator as a necessary underlying factor in a person’s decision-making process; whereas
a moderator simply determines the strength o f the process-outcome relationship. These
statistical methods are incorporated to assess the significance of the study’s posited
hypotheses and to improve the generalization o f the study’s findings.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Overview
This chapter presents the analyses and results o f the study. Instrument administration,
demographic, and descriptive statistics are presented first. These are followed by
summary statistics and tests o f the hypotheses using Structural Equation Modeling
(SEM).

Instrument Administration
A single administrator distributed 243 assessment packages to potential participants, and
each o f these packages consisted o f the following: (1) a human subjects’ consent form,
(2) two tax evasion scenarios assessed via the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES), (3)
the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS), and (4) the updated Defining Issues Test (DIT 2).
The subjects were undergraduate and graduate students from a medium-sized southern
university. Because average package completion time was expected to be about one hour,
respondents were allowed to complete the instruments on their own and return them to
the administrator or to their course instructor (if applicable) who, in turn, forwarded the
packages to the survey administrator. O f the packages distributed, 53 were not returned
leaving 190 surveys collected. O f the instruments collected, nine were incomplete
concerning either the MES or the ROS, and 53 failed validity checks for the
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DIT 2. Therefore, the final pairwise sample size was 181 for Models 1 - 3 and 128 for
Models 4 - 9 (see Tables 9 - 1 1 ) .

Table 9
Moral Capacity Descriptive Statistics fo r Models 4-9 (All Subjects)

P SCORE
N2 SCORE
PN2
Valid N (listwise)

N
128
128
128
128

Minimum
0
-4.58
-4.58

Maximum
64
64.59
128.59

Mean
28.80
27.2369
56.0385

Std. Deviation
11.596
12.62661
23.26762

Table 10
Moral Capacity Descriptive Statistics fo r Models 4-9 (High Moral Capacity)

P SCORE
N2 SCORE
PN2
Valid N (listwise)

N
64
64
64
64

Minimum
28
18.67
57.86

Maximum
64
64.59
128.59

Mean
37.70
36.4725
74.1695

Std. Deviation
7.216
8.04959
13.79225

Table 11
Moral Capacity Descriptive Statistics fo r Models 4-9 (Low Moral Capacity)

P SCORE
N2 SCORE
PN2
Valid N (listwise)

N
64
64
64
64

Minimum
0
-4.58
-4.58

Maximum
38
30.97
57.32

Mean
19.91
18.0013
37.9075

Std. Deviation
7.630
9.12666
15.27181

The recommended sample size is ten respondents per estimated parameter (Hair et
al. 2006; Byrne 2010). Models 1 - 3 each have 20 estimated items which yields a
recommended sample size of 200 subjects rather than the 181 collected; however, Field
(2009) maintains that a sample size from five to ten subjects per measured parameter is
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acceptable with appropriate model fit. Model fit is assessed in the next section o f this
chapter. The actual sample size for Models 4 - 6 appears to be adequate in that the
models only have twelve estimated items each resulting in a recommended sample size of
120 participants compared to the 128 collected. Models 7 - 9 compare higher moral
capacity respondents with lower ones by splitting the DIT 2 sample (i.e., 128 subjects) at
the mean, resulting in two samples o f 64 participants each. Like Models 1 - 3 , Models 7
- 9 have 20 items to be estimated yielding a suggested sample size from the low- to the
high-end o f 100 and 200, respectively. However, Hair et al. (2006) indicate that with
good model fit, even sample sizes o f those observed in Models 7 - 9 may be adequate.
Again, model fit is examined in the next section o f this chapter.

Measurement Model Results
Overall measurement quality for all models (i.e., Models

1-12)

was

simultaneously assessed using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) for a complete test of
convergent and discriminant validity. A comparative analysis of relevant fit statistics for
the each measurement model is presented in Table 12. First, preliminary tests o f Models
1 - 3 suggested three items (i.e., two items o f reverse intrinsicness and one item o f social
extrinsicness) with low factor loadings (i.e., below .40) be dropped from the models.
Although these measures were eliminated, other items remained in the models which
were similar to those purged (i.e., items measuring reverse intrinsicness and social
extrinsicness). Additionally, two factors (i.e., Tax Evasion Intentions and the MES
Contractualism dimension) which consisted o f only two items each required factor
loadings to be set at .7 because at least one error variance was negative.

Table 12
Comparison o f Measurement Model Fit Statistics

Statistic

Y

*df
pdf

3cn
4rm se
Sample
Size

Model 7 Model 7 Model 8 Model 8 Model 9 Model 9
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 (5High) (6Low)
(High)
(Low)
(High)
(Low)
280.8
157
1.789
.94
.06

275.6
157
1.755
.94
.06

304.0
157
1.936
.93
.07

114.8
46
2.495
.93
.10

138.0
46
3.000
.91
.12

87.2
46
1.897
.96
.08

243.3
158
1.542
.90
.09

218.2
158
1.381
.93
.08

242.0
158
1.532
.90
.09

242.0
158
1.532
.90
.09

227.3
158
1.439
.91
08

222.7
158
1.410
.92
.08

181

181

181

128

128

128

64

64

64

64

64

64

N)
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All factor loadings exceeded .5 except for the socially extrinsic item that read, “I
go to church because it helps me make friends.”

Perhaps respondents viewed this

extrinsically categorized item as intrinsically oriented Christian fellowship. Regardless,
consistent with the scale’s theory, the item was left in the model. Additionally, each
indicator t-value is significant (p < .001). The overall fit supports the measurement
analysis for Models 1 - 3. The x,2 fit statistic is 280.8, 275.6, and 304.0 for Models 1 - 3,
respectively, with 157 degrees of freedom (df) for each model (p < .001). The x2/d f is less
than 1.94 for each model which is less than 2.00 as suggested (Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes
2010). The comparative fit index (CFI) is at least .93 for each model for which Hair et al.
(2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree that acceptable levels are above .9. Furthermore, the root
mean squared error (RMSE) which measures badness o f fit is below .07 for each model
(Models 1 - 3). Statisticians suggest that the RMSE should be below .08 (Hair et al.
2006; Bymes 2010); therefore, Models 1 - 3 fulfill this requirement. Given the indicated
good model fit, the sample size for Models 1 - 3 appear to be acceptable; therefore, the
measures are adequate for further analysis.
Second, initial tests o f Models 4 - 6 did not indicate any necessary model changes
due to low factor loadings; however the Relativism dimension (i.e., a two-measure
construct) o f the MES had at least one negative error variance. Therefore, factor loadings
for the Relativism construct were set at .7 for each of its two items. All factor loadings
exceeded .7 except for the peer assessment item that read, “The probability that my
friends would undertake the same action is ...” This item was added to the scale to
minimize the bias often evident in self-reports o f deviant actions such as tax evasion.
Based on a seven-point scale, respondents rated the likelihood that their friends would
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cheat (i.e., mean = 4.57) higher than that o f themselves (i.e., mean = 3.32) as indicated in
Table 2. Concerning factor loadings, Models 4 - 6 were superior to those o f Models 1 3. Additionally, each indicator t-value is significant (p < .001). The overall fit supports
the measurement analysis for Models 4 - 6 . The %2 fit statistic is 114.8, 138.0, and 87.2
for Models 4 - 6 , respectively, with 46 degrees o f freedom (df) for each model (p < .001).
The x /df is only less than 2.00 for Model 6 (i.e., income scenario); whereas, the x /d f for
Model 4 and Model 5 are 2.50 and 3.00, respectively which exceeds the rule o f thumb
(Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). The CFI is at least .91 for each model for which Hair et
al. (2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree that acceptable levels are above .9. Furthermore, the
RMSE is below .08 for Model 6 (i.e., income scenario), but is .11 and .13 for Model 4
and Model 5, respectively. Statisticians suggest that the RMSE should be below .08 (Hair
et al. 2006; Bymes 2010). Given the moderate model fit, the measures appear adequate
for further analysis; however, concerns about model fit for Models 4 —6 are discussed as
limitations o f this study in Chapter Five.
Third, Models 7 - 1 2 compared higher moral capacity respondents with lower
ones splitting the DIT sample size in half for each group (i.e., 64 subjects in each
sample). Preliminary tests of Models 7 - 9 exhibited similar factor loading concerns as
did Models 1 - 3 ; therefore, the model changes made for Models 1 —3 were also made
for Models 7 - 9 . Considering Models 7 - 9 , all factor loadings exceeded .5 except for the
socially extrinsic item that was previously discussed in the assessment o f Models 1 - 3 .
With respect to factor loadings, Models 7 - 9 for both higher and lower moral capacity
subjects were similar or better than those o f Models 1 - 6. As in the case o f Models 1 - 6,
each indicator t-value was significant (p < .001) for Models 7 - 9 , and the overall fit
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supports the measurement analysis for the models. The %2 fit statistic is less than 243.3
for Models 7 - 9 for both higher and lower moral capacity respondents, with 158 degrees
o f freedom (df) for each model (p < .001). The y? /d f is less than 1.60 for all models which
is less than 2.00 as suggesting good fit (Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). The CFI is at least
.9 for each model for which Hair et al. (2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree that acceptable
levels are above .9. Furthermore, the RMSE is below .08 for Model 7 (i.e., combined
scenario) and Model 9 (i.e., income scenario) and merely .09 for Model 8 (i.e., deduction
scenario). RMSEs below .08 suggest good fit (Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). Models 7 9 have the best overall fit o f any o f the models tested in this study. Given this model fit,
the measures appear adequate for further analysis even though the sample size (i.e., 64
respondents) for these models appeared at first glance to be somewhat small. Precautions
about small sample size are discussed as a limitation o f this study.

Hypotheses Testing
To test the study’s hypotheses, nine structural models are evaluated. The nine
models consist o f three models (i.e., income case, deduction case, and a combination of
the previous cases) o f the effect of each o f the following on the ethical evaluation o f tax
evasion intentions: religiousness, moral capacity, and a mixture o f religiousness and
moral capacity considering high and low moral capacity. Summary results for the study’s
hypotheses are presented in Table 13.

Table 13
Summary Results fo r Research Hypotheses

Hypotheses
H la
H lb
H lc
H id
H2a
H2b
H2c
H2d
H3a
H3b
H3c
H3d
H4a
H4b
H4c

Predicted
Relationship
Direction
Intrinsic Religiousness —►Moral Equity Dimension of MES
Positive
Intrinsic Religiousness —*• Contractualism Dimension of MES
Positive
Intrinsic Religiousness —*■Relativism Dimension of MES
Negative
Intrinsic Religiousness —►Tax Evasion Intentions (larger than extrinsic) Negative
Extrinsic Religiousness —>Moral Equity Dimension of MES
Negative
Extrinsic Religiousness —►Contractualism Dimension of MES
Negative
Extrinsic Religiousness —►Relativism Dimension of MES
Positive
Extrinsic Religiousness —*■Tax Evasion Intentions (smaller than
Negative
intrinsic)
Postconventional Moral Capacity —►Moral Equity Dimension of MES Positive
Postconventional Moral Capacity —►Contractualism Dimension of MES Not Related
Postconventional Moral Capacity —>Relativism Dimension of MES
Not Related
Postconventional Moral Capacity —* Tax Evasion Intentions
Not Related
All MES Dimensions —* Tax Evasion Intentions (simultaneous)
Negative
All MES Dimensions —>Tax Evasion Intentions (deduction)
Negative
Moral Equity MES Dimension —►Tax Evasion Intentions (income)
Negative

Actual
Direction
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Mixed
Negative
Negative
Negative

Significance
**
NS
NS
*
**
**
*
NS
**
NS
*
NS
***
**
***

‘p-value significance *, **, *** at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively
2Not Significant

ts)
00
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Religious Orientation Hypotheses
The hypotheses related to intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness are assessed via
structural Model 1 (i.e., combined case), Model 2 (i.e., deduction case), and Model 3
(income case) as indicated in Figures 8-10. Before evaluating the m odels’ results, model
fit statistics are examined and presented in Table 14. The x2 fit statistics are 287.9, 278.9,
and 321.6 for Models 1-3, respectively. The accompanying degrees of freedom (df) for
each model are 160 resulting in a significant p-value for each model (p < .001). The x2/df
for Models 1-3 are 1.82, 1.77, and 2.04, respectively. These are all less than 2.00 except
for Model 3 (i.e., income case) which is slightly over the suggested limit representing
good model fit (Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). The comparative fit indexes (CFI) are
.94, .94, and .92 for Models 1-3, respectively. Hair et al. (2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree
that acceptable levels o f CFI are above .9. Furthermore, the root mean squared errors
(RMSEs) which measures badness o f fit are .06, .06, and .07, respectively. These
measures are all below the recommended .08 suggesting good model fit (Hair et al. 2006;
Byrnes 2010). Additionally, each estimated indicator t-value is significant for each
model’s constructs (p < .001). The overall fit supports the structural analysis for Models
1-3. Given the indicated good model fit and acceptable sample sizes, Models 1-3 are
adequate for further analysis.

Table 14
Comparison o f Structural Model Fit Statistics

Statistic
y

-df
X '/d f

'CFI
4RMSE
RJ
Sample
Size

Model 1 Model 2
287.9
278.9
158
158
1.822
1.765
.94
.94
.06
.06
.33
.27

Model 3
321.6
158
2.036
.92
.07
.34

Model 4
115.9
47
2.467
.94
.10
.43

Model 5
138.2
47
2.941
.91
.12
.47

Model 6
93.3
47
1.987
.95
.08
.39

Model 7
(Free)
460.4
320
1.439
.92
.11
.14

Model 7
(Constrain)
480.0
332
1.446
.91
.09
.37

Model 8
(Free)
485.1
320
1.516
.90
.06
.35

Model 8
(Constrain)
506.5
332
1.526
.90
.06
.40

Model 9
(Free)
446.9
320
1.397
.92
.05
.17

Model 9
(Constrain)
469.5
332
1.414
.91
.05
.38

181

181

128

128

128

64

64

64

64

64

64

181

'Chi Square
'Degrees o f Freedom
3Comparitive Fit Index
4Root Mean Squared Error
5Higher Moral Capacity as measured by the DIT 2 P-score and N2-score
6Lower Moral Capacity as measured by the DIT 2 P-score and N2-score
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Intrinsic Religiousness Hypotheses
Hypotheses H la through H id regarding intrinsic religiousness and hypotheses
H2a through H2d with respect to extrinsic religiousness are evaluated via Models 1-3 as
shown in Figures 8-10. First, H la posits that intrinsic religiousness is positively related to
the moral equity dimension of the multidimensional ethics scale (MES). Models 1-3 each
support this hypothesis in that their standardized regression weights are all positive (i.e.,
.23, .20, and .21, respectively) and significant (p < .05).
Second, H lb predicts a direct relationship between intrinsic religiousness and the
contractualism dimension o f the MES. This prediction is not supported by Models 1-3.
The standardized regression weights for Models 1-3 are in the predicted direction (i.e.,
.15, .14, and .14, respectively); however, their suggested paths are not significant.
Third, H lc asserts that intrinsic religiousness is negatively associated with the
relativism dimension o f the MES. Models 1-3 also do not support this conjecture in that
the standardized regression weights for Model 1 (i.e., combined cases) and Model 3 (i.e.,
income case) are not in the predicted direction (i.e., .04 and .17, respectively) compared
with that o f Model 2 (i.e., deduction case) -.12. However, none of the indicated paths
have a significant p-value with respect to any of the models.
Last, H id hypothesizes that intrinsic religiousness is negatively related to tax
evasion intention as assessed by the MES and has a larger negative effect than extrinsic
religiousness. Models 1-3 all have standardized regression weights in the predicted
direction (i.e., -.19, -.27, and -.09, respectively) with Model 2 (i.e., deduction scenario)
indicating the strongest association. Although the standardized regression weights are all
in the anticipated direction, only Model 1 and Model 2 are statistically significant at the
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.10 level while Model 3 is not significant at any relevant level. Therefore, Models 1-3
partially support the first part o f H id. The second portion o f the hypothesis is evaluated
in the next section.

Extrinsic Religiousness Hypotheses
Hypotheses H2a through H2d with respect to extrinsic religiousness are evaluated
via Models 1-3 as shown in Figures 8-10. First, H2a posits that extrinsic religiousness is
negatively associated with the moral equity dimension of the MES. Models 1-3
moderately support this prediction. Models 1-3 have standardized regression weights in
the anticipated direction (i.e., -.26, -.15, and -.26, respectively); however, Model 2 (i.e.,
deduction case) is not significant whereas Model 1 (i.e., combined cases) and Model 3
(i.e., income scenario) are statistically significant at the .05 level
Second, H2b predicts an indirect relationship between extrinsic religiousness and
the contractualism dimension o f the MES. This prediction is moderately supported by
Models 1-3. The standardized regression weights for Models 1-3 are in the predicted
direction (i.e., -.23, -.14, and -.26, respectively); however, the statistical significance of
these paths vary. The extrinsic-contractualism path for Model 1 (i.e., combined scenarios)
is significant at the .10 level and that for Model 3 (i.e., income case) is significant at the
.05 level; however, the respective path for Model 2 is not significant at any reasonable
level.
Third, H2c asserts that extrinsic religiousness is directly associated with the
relativism dimension o f the MES. Models 1-3 do not support this conjecture in that the
standardized regression weights for Model 1 (i.e., combined cases) and Model 3 (i.e.,
income case) are not in the predicted direction (i.e., -.13 and -.25, respectively) compared
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with that o f Model 2 (i.e., deduction case) .02. Furthermore, only the indicated extrinsicrelativism path for Model 3 has a significant p-value at the .05 level; however, the
standardized regression weight is not in the anticipated direction.
Last, H2d hypothesizes that extrinsic religiousness is negatively related to tax
evasion intention as assessed by the MES and has a smaller negative effect than intrinsic
religiousness. Neither of the standardized regression weights for Models 1-3 are in the
predicted direction (i.e., .11, .16, and .11, respectively) nor are they statistically
significant at any o f the normal alpha levels. Therefore, the first part o f this hypothesis is
not supported via Models 1-3 and the last part o f this hypothesis is not relevant for this
prediction. However, the fact that H2d is rejected strengthens the support for H id which
predicts that intrinsic religiousness is indirectly associated with tax evasion intentions and
has a larger effect than extrinsic religiousness.
The following summarizes the results o f H la -H ld and H2a-H2d concerning
intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness. First, higher intrinsic religious assessments are
associated with higher evaluations that tax evasion is unjust, unfair, immoral, and
unacceptable to the respondents family as measured by the moral equity dimension o f the
MES, regardless o f the type of hypothetical tax scenario (i.e., income case, deduction
case, or a combination o f the cases). Second, higher extrinsic religious measures are
related to lower assessments of moral equity and implied contracts as represented by the
MES for the hypothetical income tax case and the combined scenarios, but not for the
deduction case. Last, increases in intrinsicness are significantly associated with decreases
in tax evasion intentions considering the effects of the MES dimensions (i.e., moral
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equity, relativism, and contractual ism). However, extrinsic religiousness is not related to
tax evasion intentions when accounting for MES dimensions.

Moral Capacity Hypotheses
The hypotheses related to moral capacity are assessed via structural Model 4 (i.e.,
combined case), Model 5 (i.e., deduction case), and Model 6 (income case) as indicated
in Figures 14-16. Before evaluating the models’ results, model fit statistics are examined
and presented in Table 14. The %2 fit statistics are 115.9, 138.2, and 93.3 for Models 4-6,
respectively. The accompanying degrees o f freedom for each model are 47 resulting in a
significance p-value for each model (p < .001). The x2/df for Models 4-6 are 2.47, 2.94,
and 1.99, respectively. Chi square/df for Model 3 (i.e., income case) is the only one
which is less than the suggested limit o f 2.00 representing good model fit (Hair et al.
2006; Byrnes 2010). The CFIs are .94, .91, and .95 for Models 4-6, respectively. Hair et
al. (2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree that acceptable CFIs are above .9. Furthermore, the
RMSEs which measure badness of fit are .10, .12, .08, respectively. Again, only Model 3
(i.e., income case) is below the recommended .08 suggesting good model fit (Hair et al.
2006; Byrnes 2010). Additionally, each estimated indicator t-value is significant for each
model’s constructs (p < .001). The overall fit supports the structural analysis for Model 6
and perhaps Model 4 and Model 5, since their CFIs indicate good model fit. The
moderate fit o f structural Models 4 and 5 is a potential limitation to this study. Given the
indicated good to moderate model fit and acceptable sample sizes, Models 4-6 are
adequate for further analysis.
Hypotheses H3a through H3d regarding postconventional moral capacity are
evaluated via Models 4-6 as shown in Figures 14-16. First, H3a posits that
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postconventional moral capacity is positively related to the moral equity dimension o f the
multidimensional ethics scale (MES). Models 4-6 each support this hypothesis in that
their standardized regression weights are all positive (i.e., .14, .05, and .16, respectively)
and statistically significant (p < .10, p < .05, and p < .05, respectively).
Second, H3b predicts no relationship between postconventional moral capacity
and the contractualism dimension of the MES. This prediction is partially supported by
Models 4-6. The standardized regression weights for Models 4-6 are all positive (i.e., .16,
.08, and .16, respectively); however, two o f their suggested paths are significant. The
Model 4 (i.e., combined scenarios) and the Model 6 (i.e., income case) postconventional
moral capacity-contractualism paths are statistically significant at the .10 level; whereas,
Model 5 (i.e., deduction scenario) is not significant at normal alpha levels.
Third, H3c asserts that postconventional moral capacity is not associated with the
relativism dimension o f the MES. Models 4-6 support this conjecture. Although, the
standardized regression weights for Models 4-6 are all positive (i.e., .09, .01, and .15,
respectively), none o f the indicated paths have a significant p-value with respect to any of
the fore mentioned models.
Last, H3d hypothesizes that postconventional moral capacity is not related to tax
evasion intention as assessed by the MES. Models 4-6 all have standardized regression
weights in differing directions (i.e., .01, -.03, and -.01, respectively). In addition to the
standardized regression weights being in conflicting directions, no model is statistically
significant at any relevant level. Therefore, Models 4-6 support the hypothesis that
postconventional moral capacity is not associated with tax evasion intentions.
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The following summarizes the results o f H3a-H3d concerning postconventional
moral reasoning. First, like measures o f intrinsic religiousness, higher levels of
postconventional reasoning are associated with higher evaluations that tax evasion is
unjust, unfair, immoral, and unacceptable to the respondents family as measured by the
moral equity dimension o f the MES, regardless o f the type o f hypothetical tax scenario
(i.e., income case, deduction case, or a combination o f the cases). Second, assessments of
postconventional moral reasoning are not related to assessments o f relativism as
measured by the MES. The insignificance in the postconventional reasoning-relativism
path holds for all hypothetical tax cases (i.e., income, deduction, and the combined
scenarios). Third, increases in postconventional moral thinking are significantly
associated with increases in implied contractual ism as measured by the MES for Model 4
(i.e., combined case) and Model 6 (i.e., income case), but not for Model 5 (i.e., deduction
case). Last, postconventional moral reasoning is not related to tax evasion intentions
when accounting for MES dimensions, regardless o f the type o f hypothetical tax scenario.

Ethical Evaluation Hypotheses
The hypotheses related to ethical evaluation are assessed via structural Models 16 as indicated in Figures 8-10 for Models 1-3 and in Figures 14-16 for Models 4-6. Fit
statistics in Table 14 have been examined for all these models, and all models indicated
relatively good fit conducive for further analysis. First, H4a posits that when income and
deduction scenarios are simultaneously evaluated, all three MES dimensions (i.e., moral
equity, relativism, and contractualism) will be negatively related with tax evasion
intentions. Model 1 and Model 4 are assessed to evaluate H4a. The regression weights for
all paths from the moral equity and relativism dimensions of the MES to tax evasion
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intentions are in the predicted direction (i.e., negative) and are statistically significant (p
< .001). However, although regression estimates are in the predicted direction for the
contractualism dimension o f the MES, the estimates are either only moderately
significant (p < .10) as for Model 4 (i.e., moral capacity effects) or insignificant as in the
case o f Model 1 (i.e., religiousness effects). Therefore, H4a is supported with respect to
the moral equity and relativism dimensions o f the MES, but not for the contractualism
dimension o f the construct.
Second, H4b asserts that when deduction cases are independently evaluated, all
three MES dimensions will be inversely associated with tax evasion intentions. Model 2
and Model 5 are assessed to evaluate H4b. The regression weights for all paths from all
MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) to tax evasion
intentions are in the predicted direction (i.e., negative) and are statistically significant (p
< .05) for Model 5 (i.e., moral capacity effects). However, although regression estimates
are in the predicted direction for Model 2 (i.e., religious effects), the estimate is only
significant (p < .001) as for the relativism dimension o f the MES. Consequently, the
results indicate that H4b is supported

when ethical evaluation

is related to

postconventional moral reasoning, but not necessarily when associated with religious
orientation.
Last, H4c predicts that only the moral equity dimension o f the MES will be
indirectly linked with tax evasion intentions when income scenarios are independently
evaluated. Model 3 and Model 6 are assessed to evaluate H4c. Like the results for H4a,
the regression weights for all paths from the moral equity and relativism dimensions of
the MES to tax evasion intentions are in the predicted direction (i.e., negative) and are
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statistically significant (p < .001). Also, similar to the findings for H4a, the regression
estimates are in the predicted direction for the contractualism dimension o f the MES;
however, the estimates are insignificant for both Model 3 (i.e., religiousness effects) and
Model 6 (i.e., moral capacity effects). Therefore, H4c is supported with respect to the
moral equity and relativism dimensions o f the MES, but not for the contractualism
dimension o f the construct.
To

summarize

the

findings

for

the

ethical

evaluation

hypotheses,

all

postconventional moral capacity models (i.e., Models 4-6) generally support a negative
association between each of the MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and
contractualism) and tax evasion intentions. However, only the moral equity and
relativism dimensions of the MES are significantly inversely related to probable tax
evasive practices for religious orientation models (i.e., Models 1-3).

Religiousness Across Moral Capacity
Levels Research Question
The research question related to religiousness across high and low levels of
postconventional moral capacity is assessed via structural Model 7 (i.e., combined case),
Model 8 (i.e., deduction case), and Model 9 (income case) as indicated in Figures 18-23.
Specifically, the research question addresses whether the model o f the ideological factors
o f tax compliance improves when religiousness is evaluated across levels o f moral
capacity. This research question requires testing the aforementioned structural models on
the overall sample and on a dichotomously divided sample of high and low moral
reasoning. Before evaluating the models’ results, model fit statistics are examined. The
'j

X/ df for each model is less than 1.53 which is less than the suggested limit of 2.00
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representing good model fit (Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). Furthermore, the CFIs are
greater than .90 for which Hair et al. (2006) and Bymes (2010) agree are acceptable for
good fit. Moreover, the RMSEs are less than the recommended .08 except for Model 7
(i.e., combined cases) which is .11 and .09 for the totally free and constrained models,
respectively (Hair et al. 2006; Bymes 2010). Additionally, each estimated indicator tvalue is significant for each model’s constructs (p < .001). The overall fit supports the
structural analysis for Model 8 and Model 9 and perhaps Model 7. Given the indicated
good model fit and acceptable sample sizes, Models 7-9 appear adequate for further
analysis.
Factor structure invariance across postconventional moral capacity levels is
examined by comparing the totally free model with the model o f constrained
measurement weights. As indicated in Table 14, the x,2 fit statistics for Model 7 (i.e.,
combination o f the income and deduction scenarios) are 460.4 and 480.0 for the
unconstrained and constrained models, respectively. Furthermore, the related degrees of
freedom are 332 and 320 for the unconstrained and constrained models, correspondingly.
The difference between the x2 and degrees of freedom is 19.7 and 12, respectively which
is marginally significant (p > .10). This finding provides moderate evidence that the
factor weights hold across high and low postconventional levels for Model 7. Next, for
■y

Model 8 (i.e., deduction case), the x

fit statistics are 485.1 and 506.5 for the

unconstrained and constrained models, respectively. Furthermore, the related degrees of
freedom are 332 and 320 for the unconstrained and constrained models. The difference
between the % and degrees of freedom is 21.4 and 12, respectively which is significant (p
< .05). This finding provides evidence that the factor weights are not constant across high
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and low postconventional levels for Model 8. Last, for Model 9 (i.e., income case), the %
fit statistics are 446.9 and 469.5 for the unconstrained and constrained models,
respectively. Furthermore, the related degrees o f freedom are 332 and 320 for the

unconstrained and constrained models. The difference between the x and degrees of
freedom is 22.6 and 12, respectively which is significant (p < .05). Like that o f Model 8,
this finding provides evidence that the factor weights are not constant across high and
low postconventional levels for Model 9.
In addition to factor structure invariance which measures the stability of factor
loadings across postconventional levels, model R2 s may be compared to assess the
quality o f the each models (Models 1-9) predictions. As indicated in Table 14, the R2 s for
Models 1-3 (i.e., religious orientation models) are slightly lower than those of Models 4-6
(i.e., moral capacity models). Furthermore, R2 s for Models 7-9 (i.e., models combining
religiousness and morality) for higher postconventional reasoning are generally lower
than all other models. Moreover, R2 s for lower postconventional moral capacity are
nearly as high as Models 4-6. Therefore, the moral capacity models (i.e., Models 4-6)
seem to not only be more predictive than the combined religiousness-morality models
(i.e., Models 7-9), but also the stand-alone religiousness models (i.e., Models 1-3).
Therefore, both the lack structural invariance across levels o f moral capacity for two of
the three models (i.e., Models 8 and 9) and lower R2 s for most models (i.e., Models 7-9)
indicate that the models o f the ideological factors o f tax compliance (i.e., Models 7-9) do
not seem to improve when religiousness is evaluated across levels of moral capacity.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Overview
The purpose o f this chapter is to summarize the findings o f this study and their
implications to tax compliance research. Furthermore, limitations o f the study are
evaluated and suggestions for future research are discussed along with concluding
remarks.

Summary of Previous Chapters
Chapter One highlights the continuing concern with respect to the widening o f the
tax gap. The chapter outlines the various economic and behavioral theories used to
explain and predict income tax compliance. Furthermore, ideological factors such as
religiousness and morality are suggested as antecedents o f ethical evaluations to predict
tax evasion intentions. The study analyzes the question whether religion, morality, or
some combination o f the two matter relating to the ethical evaluation o f tax evasion
intentions. Chapter One culminates by briefly identifying the study’s results and outlining
the research process.
Selected tax compliance literature is reviewed in Chapter Two. First, this study’s
research design includes low Internal Revenue Service visibility (i.e., low opportunity o f
getting caught evading taxes) based on the assertions o f General Deterrence Theory
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(GDT) and subadditivity o f decision weights from Prospect Theory. Next, the chapter
assesses behavioral theories of fairness (i.e., Fiscal Psychology), social contracts (i.e.,
Social Norms), and behavioral intentions (i.e., Theory o f Planned Behavior). Following
these behavioral conceptualizations, ideological postulations are described including:
Multidimensional

Ethics,

Religious

Orientation,

and

Moral

Reasoning.

The

Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) combines the concepts of fairness, social contracts,
and greater good while evaluating an ethical dilemma (i.e., tax evasion intentions).
Moreover, the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) measures the extent to which one’s
religiousness is either intrinsically or extrinsically motivated. Furthermore, the Defining
Issues

Test

(DIT

2)

assesses

the

level

o f postconventional

moral

capacity.

Postconventional thinkers desire to create a society that appeals to a sharable social ideal
which is fair to all societal members and open to scrutiny. The research design includes
both the ROS and the DIT 2 as antecedents to the MES in that they are posited to
influence the ethical evaluation o f tax evasion intentions. Last, Chapter Two develops the
study’s research hypotheses.
Chapter Three describes the research methodology by describing the study’s
participants, three-part questionnaire (i.e., MES, ROS, and DIT 2), and statistical
analyses. Following the research design, Chapter Four analyzes the data and presents the
results o f the research.

Summary of Research Findings
Cruz et al. (2000, p. 239) states, “ ...future research could investigate whether the
effects o f personal characteristics such as cognitive moral development or personal
values influence their deontological and teleological evaluations of ethical dilemmas, and
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whether those evaluations in turn influence ethical judgments and intentions.” Based on
the previous statement, this study examines three complementary research questions.
First, do personal religious beliefs matter with respect to the ethical evaluation o f tax
evasion intentions?

Similarly, the second question is whether moral capacity matters

regarding the ethical evaluation of tax evasion intentions?

The last inquiry considers

interactive effects and questions whether cognitive moral development interacts with
personal religious beliefs when considering the ethical evaluation o f tax evasive
practices?

The Importance o f Religiousness
Concerning the first question, Figures 5-7 indicate that religiousness is posited to
directly influence the ethical evaluation o f one’s tax reporting decisions. Tax and non-tax
studies generally find that intrinsic religiousness or a deontological perspective is directly
related to both the moral equity dimension o f the MES (Collins and Daniel 1996; Knotts
et al. 2000; Henderson and Kaplan 2005) and the contractualism dimension of the MES
(R&R 1988; Henderson and Kaplan 2005), but inversely related to the relativism
dimension of the MES and tax evasion intentions (Grasmick et al. 1991; Barnett et al.
1996; Clark and Dawson 1996). However, insignificant correlations are also found
between intrinsic religiousness or a deontological perspective and the relativism
dimension of the MES (Henderson and Kaplan 2005), the contractualism dimension of
the MES (Barnett et al. 1996), and tax evasion intentions (Donahue 1985; Henderson and
Kaplan 2005). Thus, when considering the relationship between intrinsic religiousness
and the dimensions o f the MES, only the moral equity dimension is expected to be
consistently significant.
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Moreover, tax and non-tax studies have found inverse correlations between
extrinsic religiousness or a teleological perspective and both the moral equity and the
contractualism dimensions of the MES (R&R 1988; Clark and Dawson 1996; Henderson
and Kaplan 2005), and a direct association with the relativism dimension of the MES
(Henderson and Kaplan 2005). However, Donahue (1985) and Henderson and Kaplan
(2005) find an insignificant correlation between extrinsic religiousness or a teleological
perspective and tax evasion intentions. Therefore, extrinsic religiousness has been
significantly related to the MES dimensions, but not directly associated with tax evasion
intentions.
Considering the previous research with respect to intrinsic and extrinsic
religiousness, the following hypotheses are offered:

Hla:

Intrinsic religiousness is positively related to the moral equity dimension

o f the MES.

Hlb:

Intrinsic religiousness is positively related to the contractualism dimension

of the MES.

Hlc:

Intrinsic religiousness is negatively related to the relativism dimension o f

the MES.

Hid:

Intrinsic religiousness is negatively related to tax evasion intentions as

assessed by the MES and has a larger negative effect than extrinsic religiousness.

H2a:

Extrinsic religiousness is negatively related to the moral equity dimension

o f the MES.

H2b:

Extrinsic religiousness

dimension o f the MES.

is negatively related to the contractualism
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H2c:

Extrinsic religiousness is positively related to the relativism dimension of

the MES.

H2d:

Extrinsic religiousness is not related to tax evasion intentions as assessed

by the MES and has a smaller negative effect than intrinsic religiousness.
Table 13 summarizes the results o f H la-H ld and H2a-H2d concerning intrinsic
and extrinsic religiousness. First, higher intrinsic religious assessments are associated
with higher evaluations that tax evasion is unjust, unfair, immoral, and unacceptable to
the respondents family as measured by the moral equity dimension o f the MES,
regardless of the type o f hypothetical tax scenario (i.e., income case, deduction case, or a
combination o f the cases). This finding provides support for HI a. Second, higher
extrinsic religious measures are related to lower assessments o f moral equity and implied
contracts as represented by the MES for the hypothetical income tax case and the
combined scenarios, but not for the deduction case. This finding provides partial support
for both H2a and H2b. Last, increases in intrinsicness are significantly associated with
decreases in tax evasion intentions considering the effects o f the MES dimensions (i.e.,
moral equity, relativism, and contractualism). However, extrinsic religiousness is not
related to tax evasion intentions when accounting for MES dimension effects. These last
findings confirm the results indicated by previous research.

The Importance o f Moral Judgment
Concerning the second question about moral judgment, Figures 11-13 indicate
that postconventional moral reasoning is an antecedent to the ethical evaluation of one’s
tax reporting decisions. The highest level o f development, the postconventional schema
(i.e., Kohlberg’s stages five and six), emphasizes society-creating with a justice
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orientation. Postconventional thinkers view rules, roles, laws, and institution as serving
some sharable concept of cooperation (Rest et al. 1999). In particular, postconventional
reasoners are concerned about maintaining an ideal societal structure for all members of
society which must be open to scrutiny. Studies have found that the MES outperforms the
DIT in predicting behavioral intent (Cohen et al. 1996; Shawver and Sennetti 2009).
However, Weber (1996) indicates that the DIT is neither equal to the MES, nor is it
intended to be. Moreover, Weber resolves that the MES may be a compliment (e.g.,
justice orientation), not a replacement, to the DIT and Kohlbergian Theory. Concerning
the DIT P-score and the prediction of behavioral intent, previous research has not only
found that higher P-scores are related to lower tax evasion intentions (Kaplan et al. 1997;
Fisher 1999; Trivedi et al. 2003), but also found no relation between P-scores and tax
evasion intentions (Troutman et al. 1995; Shawver and Sennetti 2009).
Considering the previous research with respect to moral capacity, the following
hypotheses are offered:
H3a:

Postconventional moral capacity is positively related to the moral equity

dimension o f the MES.
H3b:

Postconventional moral capacity is not related to the contractualism

dimension o f the MES.
H3c:

Postconventional moral capacity is not related to the relativism dimension

o f the MES.
H3d:

Postconventional moral capacity is not related to tax evasion intentions as

assessed by the MES.
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The finding related to the preceding postconventional moral reasoning hypotheses
may be summarized as follows. First, like measures o f intrinsic religiousness, higher
levels o f postconventional moral thinking are associated with higher evaluations that tax
evasion is unjust, unfair, immoral, and unacceptable to the respondents family as
measured by the moral equity dimension of the MES, regardless o f the type of
hypothetical tax scenario (i.e., income case, deduction case, or a combination o f the
cases). This finding substantially provides support for H3a. Second, increases in
postconventional moral thinking are significantly associated with increases in implied
contractualism as measured by the MES for Model 4 and Model 6, but not for Model 5
(i.e., deduction case). This finding offers partial support for H3b particularly for the
understatement o f income case. Third, assessments of postconventional moral reasoning
are not related to values o f relativism as measured by the MES. The insignificance in the
postconventional reasoning-relativism path holds for all hypothetical tax cases (i.e.,
income, deduction, and the combined scenarios). Therefore, the study’s findings do not
support H3c. Last, postconventional moral reasoning is not related to tax evasion
intentions when accounting for MES dimensions, regardless of the type o f hypothetical
tax scenario. This finding provides support for H3d which is consistent with the assertion
that morality is a philosophical rather than a behavioral concept and may not accurately
measure behavioral intent or action (Kohlberg 1981).

Ethical Evaluation
Regarding the MES and ethical evaluation, individuals tend to rely on a broad
sense o f moral equity dominated by concerns for fairness and justice, tempered by
relativistic and implied social contract deontological dimensions. Prior research generally
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finds that all three MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism)
are indirectly related to the evaluation o f unethical behavior, such as tax evasion
intentions (R&R 1988, 1990; Cohen et al. 1996; Henderson and Kaplan 2005). However,
Henderson and Kaplan (2005) assess both the underreporting of taxable income and the
overreporting of tax deductions and find that the latter is rated more unethical than the
former for actual taxpayers. Furthermore, the income scenarios are not significant for the
relativism and contractualism dimensions o f the MES; however, when both income and
deduction cases are simultaneously evaluated, all MES dimensions are significant. Their
result concerning the disparity between income and deductions is similar to that of
Groves (1958) which finds that farmers and landlords are reluctant to overreport
deductions as compared with underreporting income.
Considering the previous research with respect to ethical evaluation, the following
hypotheses are offered:

H4a:

When income and deduction scenarios are simultaneously evaluated, all

three MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) will be
negatively related with tax evasion intentions.

H4b:

When deduction scenarios are independently evaluated, all three MES

dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and contractualism) will be negatively
related with tax evasion intentions.

H4c:

When income scenarios are independently evaluated, only the moral

equity dimension o f the MES will be negatively related with tax evasion
intentions.
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To summarize the findings for the ethical evaluation hypotheses (i.e., Figures 5-7
for religiousness and Figures 11-13 concerning morality), all postconventional moral
capacity structural models (i.e., Models 14-16 representing the combined case, the
deduction case, and the income case, respectively) generally support a negative
association between each of the MES dimensions (i.e., moral equity, relativism, and
contractualism) and tax evasion intentions. However, only the moral equity and
relativism dimensions o f the MES are significantly inversely related to probable tax
evasive practices for religious orientation models (i.e., Models 1-3). Therefore, the study
provides support for H4a when moral capacity is an antecedent to the ethical evaluation
as measured by the MES, but not when religion precedes the ethical evaluation as
indicated by the MES. Like Henderson and Kaplan (2005), this study finds that subjects
respond differently when considering the income case and the deduction scenario.
However, unlike Henderson and Kaplan (2005), the income case seems to be significant
rather than the deduction case. Perhaps this finding results from differing participant
characteristics. This study assesses student subjects (i.e., mean age = 24.2); whereas,
Henderson and Kaplan (2005)’s participants are more mature (i.e., mean age = 37.2).

The Importance o f Religiousness
Across Moral Capacity Levels
Previous research indicates that the ROS and the DIT are distinct measures of
religiousness and moral capacity, respectively. Perhaps these unique measures may
combine to better predict behavioral intent (e.g., tax evasion intentions) than either single
measure alone. Based on the preceding statements, the following research question is
offered:
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RQ:

The model o f the ideological factors o f tax compliance will improve when

considering the ROS (i.e., intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness) in addition to the
DIT (i.e., P-score, N2-score, etc.) above that o f the single construct alone (i.e.,
ROS or DIT).
Model improvement is evaluated via a two-fold assessment. First, factor structure
invariance across postconventional moral capacity levels is examined by comparing the
totally free model with the model of constrained measurement weights. The difference
between the % and degrees of freedom is insignificant (p > .05) for Model 7, but not for
Model 8 or Model 9. These results provide partial support for factor structure invariance
which indicates that the combination o f the income and deduction scenarios has
consistent factor weights across measures o f high and low postconventional reasoning.
Second, in addition to factor structure invariance, model R2 s may be compared to
assess the quality o f the each models (Models 1-9) predictions. As indicated in Table 14,
the R2 s for Models 1-3 (i.e., religious orientation models) are slightly lower than those of
Models 4-6 (i.e., moral capacity models). Furthermore, R2 s for Models 7-9 (i.e., models
combining religiousness and morality) for higher postconventional reasoning are lower
than all other models, and R2 s for lower postconventional moral capacity are nearly as
high as Models 4-6. Therefore, the moral capacity models (i.e., Models 4-6) seem to be
more predictive not only considering the combined models (i.e., Models 7-9), but also the
religiousness models (i.e., Models 1-3).

Implications
This study potentially contributes to the tax compliance literature in that it sets out
to disentangle the underlying motivations for tax evasion intentions of intrinsic and
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extrinsic religious types with respect to the ethical evaluation dimensions (i.e., moral
equity, relativism, contractualism, and utilitarianism). Based on the author’s research, this
study is the first to simultaneously assess the interaction among religiousness
operationalized by the ROS and the ethical evaluation o f tax evasion intentions using the
MES.
The study’s findings make two significant contributions to the tax compliance
literature. First, intrinsic religiousness appears to be not only an important predictor of
tax evasion intentions, but also an antecedent to the moral equity and deontological
contractualism dimensions o f the MES. However, similar results are not found for
extrinsic religiousness. Second, the models o f postconventional moral reasoning explain
the ethical evaluation of tax evasion intentions better than either the religious orientation
models or the models combining religiousness and morality. However, as predicted, the
models o f postconventional morality do not predict tax evasion intentions directly.

Limitations
The primary limitations o f this study are the use of students as proxies for U.S.
taxpayers, a small sample size and poor model fit with respect to a few o f the study’s
assessed models. First, this study evaluates religious, ethical, moral, and tax compliance
intentions o f undergraduate and graduate students. The average age o f the respondents
who participated in this study is 24.2 years old, while the approximate mean age o f the
U.S. taxpayer in 2010 was 44.9 years old (Hodge and McBride 2012). This may explain
the inconsistent findings between this study and Henderson and Kaplan (2005). Both
studies used the same measure to assess tax evasion intentions for an underreporting of
income scenario and an overreporting o f deduction case. Additionally, both studies’
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findings are statistically significant when the scenarios are combined. However,
Henderson and Kaplan (2005) find significant results primarily for the deduction case;
whereas, this study indicates compelling findings for the income scenario.
Second, the recommended sample size is ten respondents per estimated parameter
(Hair et al. 2006; Byrne 2010). Models 1-3 each have 20 estimated items which yields a
recommended sample size of 200 subjects rather than the 181 collected; however, Field
2009 maintains that a sample size from five to ten subjects per measured parameter is
acceptable with appropriate model fit. The fit o f Models 1-3 meets the suggested
requirements for good fit; therefore, sample size does not appear to be an issue for these
models. The actual sample size for Models 4-6 appears to be adequate in that the models
only have twelve estimated items each resulting in a recommended sample size o f 120
participants compared to the 128 collected. Models 7-9 compare higher moral capacity
respondents with lower ones by splitting the DIT 2 sample (i.e., 128 subjects) at the mean
resulting in two samples o f 64 participants each. Like Models 1-3, Models 7-9 have 20
items to be estimated yielding from the low- to the high-end 100 and 200, respectively.
However, Hair et al. (2006) indicate that with good model fit, even sample sizes o f those
observed in Models 7-9 may be adequate. Fit statistics seem to be adequate for Models 79.
Last, the overall fit partially supports the measurement analysis for Models 4 - 6 .
2

2

The x /df is only less than 2.00 for Model 6 (i.e., income scenario); whereas, the %/d f for
Model 4 and Model 5 are 2.50 and 3.00, respectively which exceeds the rule o f thumb
(Hair et al. 2006; Byrnes 2010). The comparative fit index (CFI) is at least .91 for each
model for which Hair et al. (2006) and Byrnes (2010) agree that acceptable levels are
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above .9. Furthermore, the RMSE is below .08 for Model 6 (i.e., income scenario), but is
.11 and .13 for Model 4 and Model 5, respectively. Statisticians suggest that the RMSE
should be below .08 (Hair et al. 2006; Bymes 2010). Given the moderate model lit,
especially for Model 4 and Model 5, concerns about model fit may limit the interpretation
o f the models’ results.

Future Research
Since the widening o f the tax gap continues to be a concern for governments,
continued research in the area of tax compliance is necessary; however, because o f the
aforementioned limitations future research should include the following. To address the
generalization o f the research findings, a national sample of taxpayers should be assessed.
If a split sample o f higher and lower postconventional reasoning is to be evaluated, a
sample size o f at least 400 respondents should be administered. Perhaps the combination
of taking a national sample of taxpayers and increasing the sample may resolve issues
pertaining to inadequate model fit.
Moreover, this study’s findings related to religiousness and postconventional
morality seem promising. Future research should examine how general deterrence theory
factors and/or fairness phenomenon interact with the ideological constructs of
religiousness, morality and ethicality in predicting tax evasion intentions.
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C o m p u te r Sale S ce n a rio I:
The Smiths purchased a new com puter system for use in their business. T he old system w as sold to a friend
as a hom e com puter for $2,300 in cash. The Sm iths fully depreciated the old com puter system on prior tax
returns, and they are aware that the $2,300 represents taxable income.
A ction: Since the com puter was sold to a friend for cash and the Internal Revenue Service (IR S) w ould not
be aware o f the sale, the Smiths did not report the $2,300 cash received from the sale on their federal
income tax return.
Please give your beliefs concerning the Sm iths’ action described in the scenario above by filling in the
circle corresponding to your assessment.
Just

O

O

O

O

o

o

o

Unjust

Fair

O

O

O

O

o

o

o

Unfair

M orally Right

O

O

O

O

o

o

o

N ot M orally Right

Acceptable
to my Family

O

O

O

O

o

o

o

U nacceptable
to my Family

Traditionally
Acceptable

O

O

O

O

o

o

o

Traditionally
U nacceptable

Culturally
Acceptable

O

O

O

O

o

o

o

Culturally
unacceptable

V iolates an
Unwritten
Contract

O

O

O

O

o

o

o

Does not V iolate
an U nw ritten Contract

V iolates an
O
Unwritten Prom ise

O

O

O

o

o

o

Does not V iolate an
Unw ritten Prom ise

The action
described above is

Ethical

O

O

o

o

o

O

O

U nethical

The probability o f
getting caught
cheating in this
tax situation is

High

O

o

o

o

o

O

O

Low

The probability that
my friends would
undertake the
same action is

High

O

o

o

o

o

O

O

Low

The probability that
I would undertake
the same action is

High

O

o

o

o

o

O

O

Low
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Business M eal S cen ario 2:
The Browns started a business where they frequently incur expenses for business-related m eals and
entertainment. Because o f the nature o f their business, the Browns routinely save all o f their receipts for
meals and entertainm ent. W hile preparing their tax return, the Browns find that, in addition to their
business receipts, they have accum ulated enough personal m eals and entertainm ent receipts to falsely
support an additional $2,300 deduction.
Action: Since falsely reporting the personal m eals and entertainm ent receipts for business would probably
not be detected by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Browns took the additional false $2,300
deduction on their federal income tax return.
Please give your beliefs concerning the action o f the dealer described in the scenario by filling in the circle
corresponding to your assessment.
Just

O

O

O

o

o

o

o

Unjust

Fair

O

O
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o
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O
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O

o

o

o

o
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o

o
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the same action is High

O

O

o

o

o

o

o
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APPENDIX B

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION AND
RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENT

168

169
Thank you for participating in this survey. Y our participation is vital to the success o f this research. This
study is concerned with how people view the social problem s and issues o f taxation. YOUR RESPONSES

ARE COMPLETELY ANONYMOUS.
Please provide the follow ing information about yourself:
What is your grade point average (GPA)? __ . __
Have you com pleted an ethics course?
O Yes O No

What is your undergraduate major?
O Accounting
O Com puter Information Systems
O Economics
O Finance
O M anagement
O M arketing
O Other _________________

Have you ever filed a federal incom e tax return?
O Yes O No

Please respond to the following statements based on the scale below:
N ever
Seldom
Som ew hat
A lw ays N ot
Agree
Rarely Agree N eutral Agree
U sually A gree Applicable

1.

I enjoy reading about my religion.

2.

I go to a place o f worship because it helps m e make friends.

3.

It doesn’t m atter what I believe so long as 1 am good.

©

®

©

®

®

®

®

©

@

®

®

®

®

®

©

®

®

1 have often had a strong sense o f G o d ’s presence.

®
6.

©

®

It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer.

®
5.

®

( D ® ® ® © ® © ®
©

4.

®

©

®

®

®

I pray mainly to gain relief and protection.

©

©

©

@

©

®

®

®

©

®

1 try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs.

©
8.

®

9.

@

®

©

©

@

®

©

Prayer is for peace and happiness.

©
10.

@

®

©

®

W hat religion offers me most is com fort in tim es o f trouble and sorrow.

©

©

®

©

®

®

®

®

©

®

Although I am religious, I don’t let it affect my daily life.

©

©

©

®

©

®

©

®

I go to a place o f worship mostly to spend tim e with my friends.

®

©

@

®

©

®

@

®

©

®

12.

My whole approach to life is based on my religion.

13.

Although I believe in my religion, m any other things are m ore im portant in life.

©
©

®
®

®
@

®
@

®
®

®
®

©

®
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This portion o f the survey is divided into five stories about specific social problems.
After each story, there will be a list of questions. The questions that follow each story
represent different issues that might be raised by the problem. You will be asked to rate
and rank the questions in terms of how important each one seems to you when making
your decision.

Example of the task:
Imagine you are about to vote for a candidate for the Presidency o f the United States.
Before you vote, you are asked to rate the importance of five issues you could consider in
deciding who to vote for. Rate the importance o f each item (issue) by checking the
appropriate box.
Rate the following issues in terms o f importance:
Great
1. Financially are you personally better o ff now
2.
3.
4.

5.

than you were four years ago?
Does one candidate have a superior moral
character?
Which candidate stands the tallest?
Which candidate w ould make the best
world leader?
Which candidate has the best ideas for our
country’s internal problem s, like crim e and
health care?

Much Some

Little

None

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
□

□

□
□

□

□

□

□

□

Note. Some items may seem irrelevant or do not make sense (as possibly in item #3). In
that case, rate the item as "None". After you rate all o f the items you will be asked to
RANK the TOP FOUR ITEMS in terms of importance. Note that it makes sense that the
items you rate as most important should be RANKED high as well. So if you only rated
Item 1 as having great importance, you should rank it as most important.
Consider the five issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important:
Most important issue?
Second most im portant?
Third most im portant?
Fourth most im portant?

1.
1.
1.
1.

□
□
□
□

2.
2.
2.
2.

□
□
□
□

3.
3.
3.
3.

□
□
□
□

4.
4.
4.
4.

□
□
□
□

5.
5.
5.
5.

□
□
□
□

Again, remember to consider all o f the items before you rank the four most important
items and be sure that you only rank items that you found important.
Note also that before you begin to rate and rank items you will be asked to state your
preference for what action to take in the story.
Thank you and you may begin the questionnaire!
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Story 1 Famine
The small village in Northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but this
year’s famine is worse than ever. Some families are even trying to feed themselves by
making soup from tree bark. Mustaq Singh’s family is near starvation. He has heard that
a rich man in his village has supplies o f food stored away and is hoarding food while its
price goes higher so that he can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq is desperate
and thinks about stealing some food from the rich m an’s warehouse. The smalt amount of
food that he needs for his family probably would not even be missed.
Do you favor the action o f taking food?
□

Should take the food □ Cannot decide □ Should not take the food

Rate the follow ing issues in term s o f im portance:

Some

Little

None

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
□

□
□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

G reat Much
1.

Is M ustaq Singh courageous enough to risk
getting caught for stealing?
2. Is it not only natural for a loving father to care
so much for his family that he would steal?
3. Should not the com m unity’s laws be upheld?
4. Does M ustaq Singh know a good recipe for
preparing soup from tree bark?
5. Does the rich m an have any legal rights to store
when other people are starving?
6. Is the motive o f Mustaq Singh to steal for
him self or to steal for his family?
7. W hat values are going to be the basis for
social cooperation?
8. Is the epitom e o f eating reconcilable with the
guilt o f stealing?
9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for
being so greedy?
10. Is not private property an institution to enable
to enable the rich to steal from the poor?
11. W ould stealing bring about more total good
for everybody concerned or w ouldn’t it?
12. Are laws getting in the way o f the m ost basic
claim o f any m em ber o f a society?

Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FO UR ISSU ES that are most important:
1. □
Most im portant issue?
Second m ost important? 1. □
Third m ost important?
l.D
Fourth most im portant? 1. □

2.
2.
2.
2.

□
□
□
□

3.
3.
3.
3.

□
□
□
□

4.
4.
4.
4.

□
□
□
□

5.
5.
5.
5.

□
□
□
□

6.
6.
6.
6.

□ 7. □
□ 7. □
□ 7. □
□ 7. □

8.
8.
8.
8.

□
□
□
□

9.
9.
9.
9.

□
□
□
□

10.
10.
10.
10.

□
□
□
□

11.
11.
11.
11.

□
□
□
□

12.
12.
12.
12.

□
□
□
□

Story 2 Reporter
Molly Dayton has been a news reporter for the Gazette newspaper for over a decade.
Almost by accident she learned that one of the candidates for Lieutenant Governor for her
state, Grover Thompson, had been arrested for shop-lifting 20 years earlier. Reporter
Dayton found out that early in his life, Candidate Thompson has undergone a confused
period and done things he later regretted, actions which would be very out o f character
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now. His shoplifting had been a minor offense and charges had been dropped by the
department store. Thompson has not only straightened him self out since then, but built a
distinguished record in helping many people and in leading constructive community
projects. Now, Reporter Dayton regards Thompson as the best candidate in the field and
likely to go on to important leadership positions in the state. Reporter Dayton wonders
whether or not she should write the story about Thompson’s earlier troubles because in
the upcoming close and heated election, she fears that such a news story could wreck
Thompson’s chance to win.
Do you favor the action of reporting the story?
□

Should report the story

□ Cannot decide

□ Should not report the story

Rate the follow ing issues in term s o f importance:
G re a t M uch
□
□

1.

D oesn’t the public have a right to know all the
facts about all the candidates for office?
2. W ould publishing the story help Reporter
D ayton’s reputation for investigative reporting?
3. If Dayton does not publish the story, w ouldn’t?
another reporter get the story anyway and get
the credit for investigative reporting?
4. Since voting is such a joke anyway, does it
m ake any difference what reporter Dayton does?
5. H asn’t Thom pson shown in the past 20 years
that he is a better person than his earlier days as
a shoplifter?
6. W hat would best service society?
7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to
report it?
8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and
heartless as to report the dam aging story about
candidate Thom pson?
9. Does the right o f “habeas corpus” apply in
this case?
10. W ould the election process be more fair with
or without reporting the story?
11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for
office in the same w ay by reporting everything
she learns about them good or bad?
12. Isn’t it a reporter’s duty to report all the news
claim o f any m em ber o f a society?
regardless o f the circum stances?

Some
□

L ittle
□

N one
□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FO U R ISSU ES that are most important:
Most important issue?
Second most important?
Third most im portant?
Fourth m ost im portant?

1.
1.
1.
1.

□
□
□
□

2.
2.
2.
2.

□
□
□
□

3.
3.
3.
3.

□
□
□
□

4.
4.
4.
4.

□
□
□
□

5.
5.
5.
5.

□
□
□
□

6.
6.
6.
6.

□ 7. □ 8.
□ 7. □ 8.
□ 7. □ 8.
□ 7. □ 8.

□
□
□
□

9.
9.
9.
9.

□
□
□
□

10.
10.
10.
10.

□
□
□
□

11.
11.
11.
11.

□
□
□
□

12.
12.
12.
12.

□
□
□
□
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Story 3 School Board
Mr. Grant has been elected to the School Board District 190 and was chosen to be
chairman. The district is bitterly divided over the closing o f one of the high schools. One
o f the high schools has to be closed for financial reasons, but there is no agreement over
which school to close. During his election to the School Board, Mr. Grant had proposed a
series o f “Open Meetings” in which members of the community could voice their
opinions. He hoped that dialogue would make the community realize the necessity of
closing one high school. Also, he hoped that through open discussions, the difficulty o f
the decision would be appreciated, and that the community would ultimately support the
school board decision. The first “Open Meeting” was a disaster. Passionate speeches
dominated the microphones and threatened violence. The meeting barely closed without
fist-fights. Later in the week, school board members received threatening phone calls.
Mr. Grant wonders if he ought to call off the next “Open Meeting.”
Do you favor the action o f calling o ff the next “Open Meeting”?
□

Should call o ff the next open m eeting

□ Cannot decide □ Should have the next open m eeting

Rate the follow ing issues in term s o f importance:
1.

Is Mr. G rant required by law to have “Open
□
M eetings “on m ajor school board decisions?
2, W ould Mr. G rant be breaking his election cam paign □
prom ises to the com m unity by discontinuing the
“O pen M eetings” ?
3. W ould the com m unity be even angrier with
□
Mr. Grant if he stopped the “ Open M eetings”?
4. W ould the change in plans prevent scientific
□
assessm ent?
5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairm an □
have the legal authority to protect the Board by making
decisions in closed m eetings?
6. W ould the com m unity regard Mr. G rant as a
□
coward if he stopped the open m eetings?
7. Does Mr. G rant have another procedure in m ind for □
ensuring that divergent views are heard?
8. Does Mr. G rant have the authority to expel
□
troublem akers from the m eetings or prevent
them from m aking long speeches?
9. Are som e people deliberately underm ining the
□
school board process by playing some sort o f
pow er gam e?
10. What effect would stopping the discussion have
□
on the com m unity’s ability to handle controversial
issues in the future?
11. Is the trouble com ing from only a few hotheads
□
and is the com m unity in general really
fair-minded and dem ocratic?
12. W hat is the likelihood that a good decision
□
could be made w ithout open discussion from
the com m unity?

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
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Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FOUR ISSU ES that are m ost important:
M ost im portant issue?
Second most im portant?
Third most im portant?
Fourth m ost important?

1.□
1.□
1.□
1.□

2.
2.
2.
2.

□
□
□
□

3.
3.
3.
3.

□
□
□
□

4.
4.
4.
4.

□
□
□
□

5. □
5. □
5. □
5. □

6.
6.
6.
6.

□
□
□
□

7.
7.
7.
7.

□
□
□
□

8. □
8. □
8. □
8. □

9.
9.
9.
9.

□
□
□
□

10.
10.
10.
10.

□
□
□
□

ll.D
11. □
11. □
11. □

12.
12.
12.
12.

□
□
□
□

Story 4 Cancer
Mrs. Bennett is 62 years old, and in the last phases of colon cancer. She is in terrible pain
and asks the doctor to give her more pain-killer medicine. The doctor has given her the
maximum safe dose already and is reluctant to increase the dosage because it would
probably hasten her death. In a clear and rational mental state, Mrs. Bennett says that she
realizes this; but she wants to end her suffering even if it means ending her life. Should
the doctor give her an increased dosage?
Do you favor the action o f giving more medicine?
□

Should give Mrs. Bennett increased dosage □ C annot decide
increased dosage

□ Should not give M rs. B ennett

Rate the follow ing issues in term s o f importance:

G reat
1.

Isn’t the doctor obligated by the same laws as everyone
else if giving an overdose would be the sam e as killing
her?
2. W ouldn’t society be better o ff w ithout so m any laws
about what doctors can and cannot do?
3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally
responsible for m alpractice?
4. Does the fam ily o f Mrs. Bennett agree that she should
get m ore painkiller m edicine?
5. Is the painkiller m edicine an active heliotropic drug?
6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence
o f those who do not w ant to live?
7. Is helping end another’s life ever a responsible act o f
cooperation?
8. W ould the doctor show more sym pathy for Mrs. Bennett
by giving the m edicine or not?
9. Would not the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett
so much drug that she died?
10. Should only God decide when a person’s life should end?
11. Shouldn’t society protect everyone against being killed?
12. Where should society draw the line betw een protecting
life and allow ing som eone to die if the person w ants to?

□

IVIiich !Some
□
□

Little

Non

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□

Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FO U R ISSUES that are m ost important:
M ost important issue?
Second most important?
Third most im portant?
Fourth m ost important?

1. □
1. □
1. □
! .□

2.
2.
2.
2.

□
□
□
□

3.
3.
3.
3.

□
□
□
□

4.
4.
4.
4.

□
□
□
□

5.
5.
5.
5.

□
□
□
□

6.
6.
6.
6.

□
□
□
□

7.
7.
7.
7.

□
□
□
□

8.
8.
8.
8.

□
□
□
□

9.
9.
9.
9.

□
□
□
□

10.
10.
10.
10.

□
□
□
□

11.
11.
11.
11.

□
□
□
□

12.
12.
12.
12.

□
□
□
□
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Story 5 Demonstration
Political and economic instability in a South American country prompted the President of
the United States to send troops to “police” the area. Students at many campuses in the
U.S.A have protested that the United States is using its military might for economic
advantage. There is widespread suspicion that big oil multinational companies are
pressuring the President to safeguard a cheap oil supply even if it means loss o f life.
Students at one campus took to the streets in demonstrations, tying up traffic and
stopping regular business in town. The president o f the university demanded that the
students stop their illegal demonstrations. Students then took over the college’s
administration building, completely paralyzing the college. Are the student’s right to
demonstrate in these ways?
Do you favor the action o f demonstrating in this way?
□

Should d e m o n stra te this way □ C annot decide □ Should n o t d e m o n stra te this w ay

Rate the follow ing issues in term s o f importance:

G reat

Much
□

Som e
□

Little

□

□

Norn
□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

1.

Do the students have any right to take over
property that does not belong to them?
2. Do the students realize that they might be
arrested and fined, and even expelled from
school?
3. Are the students serious about their cause or are
they ju st doing it ju st for fun?
4. If the university president is soft on students
this tim e, will it lead to more disorder?
5. Will the public blam e all students for the
actions o f a few student dem onstrators?
6. Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the
greed o f the multinational oil com panies?
7. Why should a few people like Presidents and
business leaders have more power than
ordinary people?
8. Does this student dem onstration bring about
more or less good in the long run to all people?
9. Can the students ju stify their civil disobedience?
10. Shouldn’t the authorities be respected by
students?
11. Is taking over the building consistent with
principles o f justice?
12. Isn’t it everyone’s duty to obey the law w hether
one likes it or not?

Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important:
M ost im portant issue?
Second m ost important?
Third most important?
Fourth most important?

1.
1.
1.
1.

□
□
□
□

2.
2.
2.
2.

□
□
□
□

3.
3.
3.
3.

□
□
□
□

4.
4.
4.
4.

□
□
□
□

5.
5.
5.
5.

□
□
□
□

6.
6.
6.
6.

□
□
□
□

7.
7.
7.
7.

□
□
□
□

8.
8.
8.
8.

□
□
□
□

9.
9.
9.
9.

□
□
□
□

10. □ 11. □
10. □ 11. □
10. □ 11. □
10. □ 11. □

12. □
12. □
12. □
12. □
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LOUI SI A N A T E C H
U N

I V E R S I T Y
MEM ORANDUM

OFFICE OF UN IVERSITY RESEARCH

TO:

Mr. F red Colem an and Dr. T hom as Phillips

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, U niversity Research

SUBJECT:

HUM A N USE C O M M IT TE E REVIEW

DATE:

June 23, 2011

In order to facilitate your project, an EX PE D ITE D REV IEW has been done for your proposed study
entitled:

“G en eral D eterrence T h eo ry and the D efining Issues T e st:...”
HUC 878
T he proposed study’s revised procedures w ere found to provide reasonable and adequate safeguards
against possible risks involving hum an subjects. The inform ation to be collected m ay be personal in
nature or implication. T herefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the privacy o f the participants
and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Inform ed consent is a critical part o f the research
process The subjects m ust be inform ed that their participation is voluntary. It is im portant that consent
m aterials be presented in a language understandable to every participant. I f you have participants in your
study whose first language is not English, be sure that inform ed consent m aterials are adequately
explained or translated. Since your review ed project appears to do no dam age to the participants, the
Hum an U se Com m ittee grants approval o f the involvem ent o f hum an subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renew ed annually. This approval w as finalized on June 23, 2011 and this project will

need to receive a continuation review by the IRB i f the project, including data analysis, continues
beyond June 23, 2012. A ny discrepancies in procedure or changes that have been m ade including
approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects involving NIH funds require annual
education training to b e docum ented. F or m ore inform ation regarding this, contact the O ffice o f
U niversity Research.
You are requested to m aintain w ritten records o f your procedures, data collected, and subjects involved
T hese records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f th e study and retained by the
university for three years after the conclusion o f the study. If changes occur in recruiting o f subjects,
informed consent process or in your research protocol, or i f unanticipated problem s should arise it is the
Researchers responsibility to notify the OITice o f Research or IRB in w riting The project should be
discontinued until m odifications can be review ed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. M ary Livingston at 257-4315.

A M EM BER O F I H E U N IV ER SITY O r L O U IS IA N A SY ST E M

P.O. BOX 3052 • R U STO N , LA 71 ’ 72 • TELEPHO NE (318) J57-5075 • FAX (318) 257-5079
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LOUISIANA TECH
U N I V E R S I T Y
O F F IC E O F U N I V E R S I T Y

M EM O R A N D U M

R ESEA R C H

TO:

Mr. Fred Coleman and Dr. Thom as Phillips

FROM :

Barbara Talbot, University Research

SUBJECT:

HUM AN USE C O M M ITTEE REV IEW

DATE:

June 20, 2012

In order to facilitate your project, an EX PED ITED R E V IE W has been done for your proposed
study entitled:

“The Effects of Ideology on the Likelihood of Income Tax Compliance”
HUC 982
The proposed study’s revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate
safeguards against possible risks involving hum an subjects. T he inform ation to be collected may
be personal in nature or im plication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the
privacy o f the participants and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Inform ed consent is a
critical part o f the research process. T he subjects m ust be inform ed that their participation is
voluntary. It is im portant that consent m aterials be presented in a language understandable to
every participant. If you have participants in your study w hose first language is not E nglish, be
sure that inform ed consent m aterials are adequately explained or translated. Since your review ed
project appears to do no dam age to the participants, the Hum an U se C om m ittee grants approval
o f the involvem ent o f hum an subjects as outlined.
P rojects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on June 20, 2012 and this
project will need to receive a continuation review by the IRB i f the project, including data
analysis, continues beyond June 20, 2013. A ny discrepancies in procedure or changes that have
been m ade including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects
involving NIH funds require annual education training to be docum ented. For m ore inform ation
regarding this, contact the Office o f U niversity Research.
You are requested to m aintain written records o f your procedures, data collected, and subjects
involved. T hese records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f the study
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion o f the study. If changes occur
in recruiting o f subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if
unanticipated problem s should arise it is the R esearchers responsibility to notify the O ffice o f
Research or IRB in writing. T he project should be discontinued until m odifications can be
review ed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-4315.
A M E M B E R O F T i l t U N IV E R SIT Y O F L O U IS IA N A SYSTEM
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